McGlothlin v. Murray
| Decision Date | 13 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 93-0981-R.,CIV.A. 93-0981-R. |
| Parties | John McGLOTHLIN, Plaintiff, v. Edward MURRAY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
John Patton McGlothlin, Bland, VA, pro se.
Pamela Anne Sargent, Asst. Attorney General, Richmond, VA, Rosalie Pemberton Timberlake, Smith Thomas & Moses, Staunton, VA, for Defendant.
After conducting a plenary hearing in the above-captioned case, United States Magistrate Judge B. Waugh Crigler issued a thorough and comprehensive forty-seven page Report and Recommendation in which he set forth factual findings, legal conclusions, and recommendations to this court. The Magistrate determined that plaintiff had failed to prove his claim of religious discrimination and recommended that this court dismiss plaintiff's case. Plaintiff's only objections to the Magistrate's Report come in the form of a letter, addressed to the Magistrate Judge. A letter addressed to the Magistrate Judge does not qualify as a proper means of lodging objections to a Report and Recommendation. Plaintiff in this case is well-versed in litigation matters and is, or should be, fully aware that objections should not be filed in this manner. Nonetheless, because courts should generally exercise caution before sanctioning pro se prisoners for failing to comport their motions to the appropriate form, the court will treat plaintiff's letter as though it were a properly filed motion.
After reviewing plaintiff's objections and examining the case de novo, the court adopts the Magistrate's Report.
For the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation issued by United States Magistrate Judge B. Waugh Crigler on January 28, 1997, it is this day
as follows:
(1) The Report and Recommendation issued by United States Magistrate Judge on January 28, 1997, shall be, and it hereby is, adopted.
(2) Plaintiff's objections shall be, and they hereby are, overruled.
(3) This case shall be, and it hereby is, dismissed and stricken from the docket of this court.
The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to send a certified copy of this Order to all counsel of record, to pro se plaintiff, and Magistrate Judge B. Waugh Crigler.
Plaintiff, an inmate at Dillwyn Correctional Center ("Dillwyn") and, as conceded by defendants, a Sunni Muslim, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that defendants violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection in that he was treated differently than inmates of other faiths while incarcerated at Staunton Correctional Center ("Staunton") and at Dillwyn. The Hon. Jackson L. Kiser, Chief United States District Judge, granted summary judgment on some of plaintiff's claims, but denied summary judgment on the following claims:
(1)(a) The state provided a smaller bulletin board for the Orthodox Muslims than for the Christians at Staunton Correction Center, and then money from the chaplain's fund was used to render improvements to the Christian bulletin board, thereby making it more lavish.
(1)(c) Plaintiff, as secretary for the Sunni Islam, had to use his own money for paper to make announcements because his requests for paper from the chaplain's office were refused, while Christians' activities were announced on paper supplied by the chaplain's office.
(1)(d) The chaplain's fund was only used for Christian activities, despite the fact that the monies came from all inmates regardless of their faith.
(1)(e) Chaplain Roepke supervised an inmate who was paid by the state but who nevertheless worked strictly on Christian projects.
(1)(f) Chaplain Roepke denied plaintiff use of a typewriter on at least two occasions but allowed Christian inmates to use the typewriter whenever they wanted to use it.
(1)(g) Chaplain Roepke denied him photocopies while providing copies for Christians.
(1)(h) The inmate supervised by Chaplain Roepke had a nice office in which to work, while plaintiff had to work from his own cell.
(1)(I) Chaplain Roepke refused to let Orthodox Muslims display their literature in his office despite numerous requests.
(1)(j) Chaplain Roepke refused to provide letters of reference to Orthodox Muslims, despite having provided the same service for Christian inmates.
(1)(k) Christian services were always announced on the public address system, while plaintiff had to personally announce Sunni Islam services to members because these services were rarely announced over the public address system. (This claim remains against the institutional defendants only.)
(1)(l) Chaplain Roepke saw to it that all requests by the Christians for extra time in the chapel were granted, but he refused any requests by plaintiff for extra time.
(1)(p)(ii) Plaintiff has been denied access to a Koran while in protective custody at Dillwyn Correctional Center. (This claim remains against the institutional defendants only.)
(1)(p)(iii) Chaplain Austin, at Dillwyn, has refused to talk to plaintiff about the denial of the Koran or to counsel him otherwise.1 (This claim remains against the institutional defendants only.)
(2)(a) Both Chaplain Roepke and Chaplain Austin, who have access to an office and an assistant supplied by the state, view Orthodox Muslims as potential converts and freely express this view.
(2)(b) While at Staunton and Dillwyn, plaintiff did not have access to an Orthodox Muslim chaplain, Chaplains Roepke and Austin ignored him, and Sunni Islam volunteers were refused permission to counsel inmate members of the faith.
(6)(a) Staunton kept lists of inmates with Korans as a method by which prison staff could monitor Orthodox Muslims and harass them, even though no lists were kept of inmates with Bibles or Torahs. (This claim remains against the institutional defendants only.)
(6)(b) May D. Campbell directed him to compile a list of those inmates with Korans so that the administration could monitor and harass Orthodox Muslims.
(6)(c) Only Orthodox Muslims were required to get passes to go to services which are held in another building because the chapel is unavailable to them.
(8)(a) Staunton refused to acknowledge prayer beads and other Islamic Holy symbols, but Christians are allowed to have their crosses and beads. (This claim remains against the institutional defendants only.)
(11)(c) Hearings officer refuses to name a Sunni Islamic advisor although regulations require her to keep a list of "qualified advisors." (This claim remains against the institutional defendants only.)
The case then was transferred to the Hon. James H. Michael, Jr., presiding District Judge, by Order entered on August 7, 1996. In turn, Judge Michael referred the case to this court by Order entered on August 15 1996 under authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) to conduct proceedings and to render a report setting forth appropriate findings, conclusions, and recommendations for disposition. A plenary hearing was held on November 12 and 13, 1996, in consequence whereof this Report and Recommendation issues.
Plaintiff testified that he practices the alIslam faith and belongs to a community that adheres to Sunni Islam. Plaintiff described the tenets of his faith, and stated that the only physical item that was absolutely necessary for the practice of his faith was access to a Koran. He noted that Muslims such as himself also regard the Bible and the Torah as holy and consider having prayer beads and a prayer rug as desirable, but not essential. According to plaintiff, the practice of faith and not the use of faith objects is at the core of Islam. Having said this, plaintiff then directed his testimony to each of his remaining claims in turn.
As to his claim that the state provided the Christians at Staunton a bigger and better bulletin board than the Muslims were provided, plaintiff testified that the real problem was not the size of the bulletin boards but that the Muslims' bulletin board was often vandalized. The Christian Fellowship was able to use the Chaplain's Fund, funds the Christian Fellowship raised in their picture project, to have their bulletin board covered with glass to avoid vandalism. The Muslim group did not participate in the Christians' fund raiser, but conducted their own fund raisers. Plaintiff testified that funds from the Muslim account were never used to improve their bulletin board because the group never obtained permission to do anything to the board. Plaintiff asserted that he requested permission to improve the Muslim bulletin board first from Chaplain Roepke in June 1993, then from Major Jack, the Chief of Security. Plaintiff stated his requests to Chaplain Roepke were both written and oral, even though plaintiff was unable to produce a copy of his written requests. He stated they were included in the records that were lost when he was transferred from Staunton to Dillwyn. At first he and the Muslim community asked that the improvements to their bulletin board be paid for from the Chaplain's fund, but then they offered to spend their own funds on the project. In support of his claims, plaintiff offered into evidence a letter addressed to Warden John Taylor, dated July 9, 1993, that mentioned the bulletin board discrepancy. (Pltf.Ex. 5). He also offered a July 9, 1993 letter to Ed Murray, Director of VDOC, referring to the letter to Taylor (Pltf.Ex. 6), and the December 10, 1994 letter to Mr. Mahon, the warden at Dillwyn, informing him of his missing files. (Pltf.Ex. 7).
Plaintiff also addressed his claim that he was forced to use his own money for paper to make announcements for the Muslim community. According to what the chaplain's clerks told plaintiff, the Christians' activities were announced on paper supplied by the...
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