Blair v. Preece

Citation346 S.E.2d 50,176 W.Va. 532
Decision Date03 July 1986
Docket NumberNo. 16949,16949
PartiesMyrtle Sue BLAIR v. Amos PREECE and Hazel Preece.
CourtSupreme Court of West Virginia

Syllabus by the Court

" ' "Upon a motion to direct a verdict for the defendant, every reasonable and legitimate inference fairly arising from the testimony, when considered in its entirety, must be indulged in favorably to plaintiff; and the court must assume as true those facts which the jury may properly find under the evidence. Syllabus, Nichols v. Raleigh-Wyoming Coal Co., 112 W.Va. 85, 163 S.E. 767." ' Point 1, syllabus, Jenkins v. Chatterton, 143 W.Va. 250, 100 S.E.2d 808 (1957)." Syllabus point 1, Jividen v. Legg, 161 W.Va. 769, 245 S.E.2d 835 (1978).

Myrtle Sue Blair, pro se.

H. Truman Chafin, Williamson, for appellees.

PER CURIAM:

The principal question in this boundary dispute case is whether the Circuit Court of Mingo County properly directed a jury verdict against the appellant, Myrtle Sue Blair. We conclude that it did not, and, for that reason, we reverse the circuit court's judgment.

The appellant instituted this action for the determination of the location of a boundary line after a dispute arose between her and her next-door neighbors, Amos and Hazel Preece. The appellant represented herself during most of the proceedings in the case, including the jury trial which was conducted on July 16, 1985.

During the jury trial the appellant, who was a lay person and not a lawyer, was frustrated in the presentation of her case by various evidentiary rulings made by the trial judge. She was allowed to introduce into evidence a number of documents, including deeds and plats, relating to the location of the boundary line. She was not, however, allowed to adduce from her husband, who was neither a licensed surveyor nor a civil engineer, an expert opinion as to where the boundary line was located. Frustrated, she called as a witness James Albert Coleman, a licensed surveyor, whom the Preeces had subpoenaed as their expert witness. Mr. Coleman, predictably, testified that the boundary line was not located where the appellant asserted it was, but, instead, indicated that it ran where the Preeces claimed it ran.

At the conclusion of the appellant's case the Preeces moved for a directed verdict. The trial court, concluding that the appellant had produced no evidence supporting her case, granted the motion and subsequently rendered judgment against the appellant. It is from that judgment that the appellant now appeals.

In West Virginia, the basic rule is that a verdict should not be directed against a plaintiff in a civil case unless he has failed to present a prima facie case. See Jividen v. Legg, 161 W.Va. 769, 245 S.E.2d 835 (1978). In determining whether a prima facie case has been established, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to weigh the evidence in the plaintiff's favor. The rule, as set forth in syllabus point 1 of Jividen v. Legg, requires that:

" 'Upon a motion to direct a verdict for the defendant, every reasonable and legitimate inference fairly arising from the testimony, when considered in its entirety, must be indulged in favorably to plaintiff; and the court must assume as true those facts which the jury may properly find under the evidence. Syllabus, Nichols v. Raleigh-Wyoming Coal Co., 112 W.Va. 85, 163 S.E. 767.' " Point 1, syllabus, Jenkins v. Chatterton, 143 W.Va. 250, 100 S.E.2d 808 (1957).

In the case presently before the Court the trial judge was apparently persuaded that the appellant failed to make a prima facie case because she failed to adduce expert testimony supporting her position, but, instead, elicited expert testimony from Mr. Coleman supporting her opponents' position.

Although it is true that the only expert testimony, that of Mr. Coleman, did support the Preeces' position, the appellant did introduce into evidence a number of documents. Among those items was Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, a copy of the deed by which she acquired title to her property. That deed indicated that the boundary line ran where the appellant claimed it ran. 1

The Court is of the opinion that the...

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5 cases
  • Rodgers v. Rodgers
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • November 13, 1990
    ...be directed against a plaintiff in a civil case unless he has failed to demonstrate a prima facie right to recover. Blair v. Preece, --- W.Va. ----, 346 S.E.2d 50 (1986). See Church v. Wesson, --- W.Va. ----, 385 S.E.2d 393 (1989); Hinkle v. Martin, 163 W.Va. 482, 256 S.E.2d 768 (1979); Jen......
  • Snyder v. Scheerer
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • July 16, 1993
  • Elkins Manor Associates v. Eleanor Concrete Works, Inc.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • July 25, 1990
    ...facie case has been established, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to weigh the evidence in the plaintiff's favor. Blair v. Preece, 176 W.Va. 532, 346 S.E.2d 50 (1986), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 923, 109 S.Ct. 3253, 106 L.Ed.2d 599 (1989). We explained this more fully in the Syllabus of Nic......
  • Blair v. Preece
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • December 21, 1988
    ...judgment of the Circuit Court of Mingo County is affirmed. AFFIRMED. 1 This dispute was previously before the Court in Blair v. Preece, 176 W.Va. 532, 346 S.E.2d 50 (1986). In that case the Court addressed the question of whether the trial court properly entered default judgment against the......
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