Blair v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 20 September 2016
• Docket Number: No. 112,535,112,535
• Citation: 2016 OK 96,381 P.3d 717
• Parties: Pat Blair, an individual, Appellant, v. Gayle Richardson, an individual, Troy Richardson, an individual, and Mellon Trust of New England, NA as Trustee of the UPS Qualified Stock Ownership Plan and Trust and the UPS Stock Trusts, Appellees.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

381 P.3d 717

2016 OK 96

Pat Blair, an individual, Appellant,

v.Gayle Richardson, an individual, Troy Richardson, an individual, and Mellon Trust of New England, NA as Trustee of the UPS Qualified Stock Ownership Plan and Trust and the UPS Stock Trusts, Appellees.

No. 112,535

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

FILED SEPTEMBER 20, 2016

James W. Tilly, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellant.

Sam T. Allen, IV, Sapulpa, Oklahoma, for Appellees.

KAUGER, J.:

¶ 1 The two dispositive questions presented are whether: 1) the enactment of 43A O.S. 1986 § 1–105¹ reestablished the legal competency of an individual previously admitted to a mental health facility and presumed incompetent without a separate competency proceeding; and 2) the conveyance of her real property was void as a result of undue influence.² We hold that 43A O.S. 1986 § 1–105 reestablished the legal competency of the individual conveying the property, and that the deed was not executed under undue influence.

FACTS

¶ 2 Plaintiff/Appellant Pat Blair (Blair) and Defendant/Appellee Gayle Richardson (Richardson) are sisters. They grew up in Sapulpa, Oklahoma, the location of the subject real property. After graduating from high school, Richardson married and remained in Sapulpa, while Blair attended college in Oklahoma and moved to Texas. Their mother (mother) was the only child of Mabel Grigsby, their grandmother (grandmother). The mother and grandmother initially owned the real property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.

¶ 3 After the mother's death, Richardson helped care for the grandmother. She occasionally assisted the grandmother with errands because the grandmother could not drive. Richardson took the grandmother shopping for clothing, and would drive her around town so that she could pay her bills. One day, the grandmother told Richardson that she wanted “everything” to go to her and her children. Richardson subsequently sought advice as to the preparation of deeds at a courthouse and obtained a copy of a deed form at an office supply store. Richardson then drove the grandmother to American Abstract in Sapulpa, where the deed was filled out. The grandmother conveyed the property to herself and Richardson as joint tenants with rights of survivorship on January 23, 1987.

¶ 4 The grandmother had dealt with mental health issues in her past. In May, 1966, the District Court of Creek County ordered her admitted to Eastern State Hospital for treatment and care. She remained there until she was released as an outpatient in July, 1966. Her outpatient status lasted until 1974, and there were no further hospitalizations.

¶ 5 The relevant statute in effect at the time of the grandmother's admittance to the facility in 1966 was 43A O.S. 1961 § 64, which provided that:

No person admitted to any institution in the Department shall be considered legally mentally incompetent except those admitted in accordance with the provisions of Sections 55 and 58 of this Title and those admitted under Section 59 of this Title who have been declared legally mentally incompetent elsewhere. (Emphasis supplied).

Because the grandmother was admitted in accordance with 43A O.S. 1961 § 55,³ she was automatically considered legally incompetent at the time of her admittance even though there was no separate proceeding to determine her competency. In 1986, § 64 was repealed and replaced by 43A O.S. 1986 § 1–105. It provided that:

No person admitted to any facility shall be considered or presumed to be mentally or legally incompetent except those persons who have been determined to be mentally or legally incompetent in separate and independent proceedings of an appropriate district court.

Therefore, the law in effect at the time of the grandmother's admittance in 1966 rendered her legally incompetent without a separate proceeding, while the law in effect at the time of the conveyance in 1987 required a separate proceeding to render her legally incompetent.

¶ 6 The grandmother died in November, 1987. At a hearing to terminate the joint tenancy, the District Court of Creek County found that Richardson owned all interest in the property. Notice of the proceeding was mailed to Blair at her home in Texas. From 1988 to 1998, Richardson rented the property and distributed a percentage of the rental proceeds to both Blair and their father. In 1988, Richardson sold the property for $85,000 and invested the funds in shares of UPS stock that were owned by her husband, Defendant/Appellee Troy Richardson. This stock is held by Defendant/Appellee Mellon Trust of New England. A disagreement arose regarding ownership of the proceeds of the real property sale and Blair filed suit on November 1, 2007, in the District Court of Creek County.

¶ 7 Blair alleged that the 1987 deed was void for two alternative reasons and requested that a constructive trust be imposed on the stock. First, she asserted that the grandmother lacked the legal capacity to convey the property. A person judicially determined to be incompetent cannot convey property.⁴ Blair argued that because the grandmother's admission to the facility in 1966 had the effect of rendering her legally incompetent, and because her legal competency was never restored, she lacked the capacity to convey property. Second, Blair asserted that the deed was tainted by undue influence.

¶ 8 At a bench trial on December 11–12, 2013, the trial court found in favor of Richardson under both theories of recovery. It concluded that the grandmother was mentally and legally competent at the time of the conveyance and that the conveyance was therefore valid. It also concluded that Blair failed to establish that the grandmother was acting under undue influence when the deed was executed.

¶ 9 Blair appealed on February 4, 2014, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded. It reasoned that because the grandmother was considered legally incompetent at the time of her admittance to the facility and because her capacity was never judicially restored, she lacked the capacity to convey the property. It reversed based on a lack of capacity, and consequently did not address the issue of undue influence. We granted certiorari to determine whether 43A O.S. 1986 § 1–105⁵ affected the grandmother's legal competency, and whether the deed was executed under undue influence. We hold that the grandmother was legally competent to convey the real property, and that the deed was not executed under undue influence.

I.

THE CONVEYANCE WAS NOT VOID DUE TO LACK OF CAPACITY.

A. The Law in Effect at the Time of the Conveyance Governed the Conveyance.

¶ 10 Blair argues that the application of 43A O.S. 1986 § 1–105 to the grandmother constitutes a retroactive application of that statute in violation of Art. 5, § 54 of the Oklahoma Constitution, which provides that:

The repeal of a statute shall not revive a statute previously repealed by such statute, nor shall such repeal affect any accrued right, or penalty incurred, or proceedings begun by virtue of such repealed statute . (Emphasis supplied).

According to Blair, the grandmother's admission hearing constitutes “proceedings” begun by virtue of 43A O.S. 1961 § 64, and therefore the repeal of 43A O.S. 1961 § 64 cannot change the legal effect of any order made pursuant to the admission hearing.

¶ 11 Richardson, however, maintains that the admission proceedings were not begun by virtue of 43A O.S. 1961 § 64. Instead, she claims, the proceedings were begun by virtue of 43A O.S. 1961 § 55.⁶ Section 55 provided the means through which the court could be petitioned and the means through which the court could grant the admission order, while § 64 had the effect of rendering the grandmother legally incompetent after the proceedings had concluded.

¶ 12 Title 43A O.S. 1986 § 1–105 was the law at the time of the conveyance. To determine whether a statute should be applied retroactively or prospectively, the statute should be interpreted to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.⁷ While a statute is generally presumed to apply prospectively,⁸ it may be applied retroactively if the statute's language implies that the Legislature intended to extend the benefits of the statute to situations already in existence at the time of the statute's passage.⁹ The text of the statute is not the only decisive factor.¹⁰ Even in the absence of language specifying that the statute is intended to remedy existing conditions, such an intention may be inferred by probing the purpose of the statute.¹¹ A statute is interpreted to further that purpose, and to champion the broad public policy goals that underlie it.¹²

¶ 13 We have previously recognized legislative intent to apply a statute retroactively although the statute was devoid of any express retroactive language. In re Bomgardner, 1985 OK 59, ¶ 10, 711 P.2d 92 involved the interpretation of a statute specifying the rights of grandparents to visit their grandchildren.¹³ The grandparents' daughter had died, and the daughter's husband refused to allow the grandparents access to their grandchild. The grandparents brought suit under the statute in effect at the time of that suit, which would have allowed them access to the child. The child's father successfully argued in the district court that the grandparent's claim was governed by the statute in effect at the time of the mother's death, which would not have allowed them access to the child.¹⁴ We held that the father could not “simply rely on the presumption against retroactive application.”¹⁵ After considering the legislative policy goal of promoting the best interests of the child, we reversed the district court and held that the grandparents had standing to bring their claim under the statute even though it had not been enacted when their claim arose.

¶ 14 Similarly, the policy goals underlying the enactment of 43A O.S. 1986 § 1–105 demonstrate legislative intent to extend the benefits of the statute to those previously presumed incompetent without a separate competency proceeding. Two of...