Blair v. Washington State University
| Decision Date | 06 August 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 50591-8,50591-8 |
| Citation | 740 P.2d 1379,108 Wn.2d 558 |
| Parties | , 41 Ed. Law Rep. 361 Karen BLAIR, Amy Cox, Theresa Elliott, Kenda Erickson, Kathleen Ferguson, Denise Green, Laurie Hansen, Sharon Hecker, Debra Hilmes, Judy Holm, Gail Houser, Melanie Jennings, Karen Kasmer, Jaqueline Kent, Lou Lemmon, Roxanne Lindquist, Patty Manning, Marie Matsen, Grace McCarley, Jody McCarthy, Deb McGill, Francine Moses, Julie Newnam, Rhonda Panattoni, Marilyn Parish, Patricia Plunkett, Julie Ramstead, Maureen Robbins, Joann E. Roberts, Amy Rust, Elizabeth Rust, Tonya Sandvik, Jobe Smith, Kathryn M. Smith, Carol Spiegelberg, Judy Spoelstra, Laurie Turner, Wendy J. Tyus, Heidi Urquhart, and Shannon Votava, individually and on behalf of a class of all women athletes similarly situated; Diane Albright, Theresa Coblentz, Dorothy Dobie, Sue Durrant, Wilma Harrington, Bente Kjoss-Hansen, Cindy Laughlin, Sandra Moore, Marilyn Mowatt, Debra Pipher, Alfred Sanders, Phyllis Wilke, and William Zietz, individually and on behalf of a class of coaches of women athletes similarly situated, Appellants, v. WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY, an agency of the State of Washington; Glenn Terrell, individually and as President of Washington State University; Wallis Beasley, individually and as Executive Vice President of Washington State University; Diptiman Chakravarti, Jack Cole, Robert P. Gibb, Edwin J. McWilliams, Harold A. Romberg, Kate Webster, and Edith Williams, individually and as members of the Board of Regents of Washington State University, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Stoel, Rives, Boley, Fraser & Wyse, Susan P. Graber, Laurel S. Terry, Joyce M. Bernheim, Portland, Or., MacDonald, Hoague & Bayless, Ester Greenfield, Seattle, Wash., for appellants.
Kenneth Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Sally P. Savage, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Kenneth Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Paul Tanaka, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pullman, Wash., for respondents.
J. Kathleen Learned, Seattle, Judith E. Schaeffer, Margaret A. Kohn, Marcia D. Greenberger, Washington, D.C., amici curiae for appellants.
This is a sex discrimination action brought under the state Equal Rights Amendment, Const. Art. 31, § 1 (Amend. 61), and the Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60. Appellants are female athletes and coaches of female athletes at Washington State University. Respondents are Washington State University, its President, Executive Vice President, and Board of Regents.
The trial court concluded the University had discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of sex and awarded damages, injunctive relief, attorney fees, and costs. The plaintiffs now appeal (1) the exclusion of football from the court's calculations for sports participation and scholarships; (2) the trial court's decision to allow each sport to benefit from the revenue it generates; (3) the reduction of the attorney fee award; and (4) the trial court ruling requiring them to file a claim under the tort claims act, RCW 4.92.110, as a condition precedent to bringing this suit. The University in its cross appeal challenges portions of the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs. Subject to the discussion below, we reverse the trial court on issues (1) and (3), affirm on issues (2) and (4), and affirm on the issues raised by the University's cross appeal.
The comprehensive findings of fact of the trial court demonstrate that, despite marked improvements since the early 1970's, the women's athletic programs have continued to receive inferior treatment in funding, fundraising efforts, publicity and promotions, scholarships, facilities, equipment, coaching, uniforms, practice clothing, awards, and administrative staff and support. During the 1980-81 school year, the year before the trial, the total funding available to the men's athletic programs was $3,017,692, and for the women's programs was $689,757, roughly 23 percent of the men's. The funds for the men's programs were derived largely from revenues, both gate admissions ($958,503) and media rights, conference revenues, and guaranties ($943,629). Most of these revenues were derived from football ($1,430,554). Of the funding available to the women's programs, most was derived from legislative appropriations ($451,082). Very little came from gate admissions ($10,535). Although the number of participation opportunities for men increased by 115 positions from 1973-74 to 1980-81, the opportunities made available for women decreased 9 positions during the same period. The budget for men's scholarships increased from $380,056 to $478,052 during that period; the budget for women's scholarships in 1980-81 was $150,000. The trial court observed in its memorandum opinion:
The non-emphasis on the women's athletic program was demonstrated in many ways, some subtle, some not so subtle.... The message came through loud and clear, women's teams were low priority.... [T]he net result was an entirely different sort of participation opportunity for the athletes.
On the basis of numerous findings of fact detailing the inferior treatment of the women's athletic program, the trial court concluded the University had "acted, or failed to act, in the operation of the University's intercollegiate athletics program in a manner that resulted in discriminatory treatment of females ..." The athletes had "suffered unlawful sex discrimination violative of RCW 49.60 and the State Equal Rights Amendment."
The court entered a detailed injunction to remedy the violations. With respect to funding, the court ordered the women's program must receive 37.5 percent of the University's financial support given to intercollegiate athletics during the year 1982-83. The required minimum percentage for women increased each year by 2 percent until it corresponded to the percentage of women undergraduates at the University, 44 percent at the time of the injunction. The trial court provided, however, the level of support for women's athletics was not required to exceed by more than 3 percent the actual participation rate of women in intercollegiate athletics at the University, excluding football participation from the comparison. The injunction prohibited the total budget for women's athletics ever to be less than the base budget of $841,145 for 1981-82, unless the expenditures for men's athletics were correspondingly reduced.
The injunction also specified:
In determining the level of University financial support of intercollegiate athletics for purposes of the above calculation, the term "University financial support" shall not include revenue generated by or attributable to any specific sport or program. Such excluded sources of revenue shall specifically include gate receipts, conference revenues, guarantees, sale of media rights, concession and novelty sales at games, coach and athlete work projects, and donations attributable to a sport or program.
The injunction apportioned the funding for athletic scholarships in a similar manner. The women received 37.5 percent of all money expended for scholarships, excluding funds expended for football scholarships. The percentage increased yearly until it equaled the percentage of women undergraduates. The allocation could not fall below $236,300, the amount allocated for 1982-83, unless matched by a reduction in male scholarships.
The court also ordered the University to allow for increased participation opportunities until female participation, again excluding football participation from the comparison, reached a level commensurate with the proportion of female undergraduate students. The court noted female participation had increased in recent years and stated in its memorandum opinion, "[t]he change in the last ten years is dramatic, and it seems possible that parity will soon arrive."
The court further required the University to take affirmative steps to make opportunities to generate revenue equally available to men's and women's programs, stating:
Because past sex discrimination has afforded women's teams and coaches less opportunity to generate revenue, the University should take affirmative action in providing additional personnel with such knowledge and experience.
The trial court required the University to appoint a committee to monitor the application of the funding formulas and other elements of the injunction. The sex equity committee, comprised of students, coaches, and administrators, was also given the mandate to develop recommendations for policies concerning matters affecting sex equity in athletics and recommendations for the promotion of women's athletics. After approval by the Provost, the committee's recommendations are to be implemented and administered in an equitable and timely manner.
In addition to the injunction, the court awarded the plaintiffs monetary damages for certain tangible losses caused by the University's discriminatory policies. The plaintiffs contest the trial court's reduction of the damages award. The trial court held RCW 4.92.110 required the plaintiffs to file a tort claim with the State before bringing a discrimination action under RCW 49.60. The parties had stipulated that if RCW 4.92.110 did apply, the complaint would be deemed filed on September 12, 1980, and any damage award would extend back 3 years from that date. The court, accordingly, calculated the award based only on injuries since 1977.
Finally, the court awarded the plaintiffs approximately $170,000 in attorney fees, expert witness fees, and costs. The court in calculating the attorney fee award concluded the plaintiffs had prevailed but reduced the award after finding the attorneys had duplicated some efforts and expended an excessive amount of time on some issues. The court also noted the plaintiffs' attorneys worked for a nonprofit legal organization.
Appeal was made directly to this court. The University directed its notice of appeal from the...
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