Blaisdell v. Daigle

• Decision Date: 30 March 1959
• Citation: 149 A.2d 904,155 Me. 1
• Parties: Mildred M. BLAISDELL v. Henry DAIGLE.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 904

149 A.2d 904

155 Me. 1

Mildred M. BLAISDELL v. Henry DAIGLE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 30, 1959.

McLean, Southard & Hunt, Augusta, for plaintiff.

Jerome G. Daviau, Waterville, Donald J. Bourassa, Augusta, for defendant.

Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, TAPLEY, SULLIVAN and DUBORD, JJ.

WEBBER, Justice.

On motion and exceptions. This was an action for trespass for the wrongful cutting of trees on the plaintiff's woodlot. Several points of law have been disposed of by waiver, stipulation or non-argument in the briefs before us. Only one issue remains to be considered here. The defendant admits an unintentional and innocent trespass. The jury, however, awarded double damages and answered in the affirmative as part of their verdict the specific question, 'Was the cutting down of plaintiff's trees committed willfully or knowingly?' Our inquiry is now as to whether or not there was evidence to support this finding of the jury.

We look first to the statute which appears as R.S.1954, Ch. 124, Sec. 9. After providing a remedy for trespass in such circumstances as these, the statute provides: 'If said acts are committed willfully or knowingly, the defendant is liable to the owner in double damages.' The use of the word 'or' suggests at once that willfulness without actual knowledge of wrong doing will suffice to justify the imposition of double damages. We think therefore that it follows logically and almost automatically that the word 'willfully' as used in this statute is intended to embrace conduct on the part of the defendant which displays an utter and complete indifference to and disregard for the rights of others. One should not be permitted to hide behind his lack of knowledge if he has meticulously avoided every means of acquainting himself with the truth. The statute impliedly recognizes that lack of knowledge is easily professed and with difficulty disproved. It offers small comfort to him who recklessly perseveres in keeping intact his ignorance of the facts.

What of the evidence of willful misconduct as thus defined? The Silver Spur Riding Club, Inc., owner of the land abutting the plaintiff on the north, sold its stumpage by written contract to one Beaulieu for $300. About a month later Beaulieu in turn assigned his interest in the contract (by writing on the reverse side thereof) to one Voisine. Eight days later Voisine assigned his interest (again on the reverse side of the original contract) to the defendant. The last transaction took place in a lawyer's office. The jury has found on the basis of evidence that the defendant subsequently cut trees owned by the plaintiff which were fairly worth $900 (the verdict for double damages being $1,800). The jury could properly consider that the defendant should have ascertained that his assigned contract showed on its face a purchase price of $300. The great...