Blake v. Baker

• Decision Date: 24 July 1917
• Docket Number: Case Number: 8004
• Parties: BLAKE et al. v. BAKER, County Treasurer, et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1917 OK 386

167 P. 329

66 Okla. 88

BLAKE et al. v. BAKER, County Treasurer, et al.

Case Number: 8004

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: July 24, 1917

Syllabus

¶0 1. Judgment--Vacation--Motion--Time. Courts of general common-law jurisdiction have control of all judgments, decrees, or other orders, however conclusive in their character, during the term at which they are rendered, and may set aside, vacate, and modify them during said term, and a motion invoking this inherent equitable power filed during the term at which judgments, decrees, or other orders are made invests such court with full power to act at a subsequent term, and the action of the court in the premises at subsequent term has the same legal effect as if such ruling had been made at the term at which the motion was filed.

2. Same. Action of trial court in setting aside certain orders and judgments on application filed at same term they were made and entered examined and approved.

E. E. Blake, Shirk & Dannet, and Loyal J. Miller, for plaintiffs in error.

John Embry, for defendants in error.

WEST, C.

¶1 This is an appeal from the action of the district court of Oklahoma county vacating and setting aside judgment rendered in said cause on the 27th day of January, 1915. Plaintiffs in error, plaintiffs below, instituted suit against defendants in error, defendants below, to restrain the collection of certain taxes assessed against certain property described in their petition for the years 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913. To petition filed by plaintiff the defendant by the county attorney filed a demurrer alleging general and special grounds therefor. The court overruled said demurrer, and thereupon defendant elected to stand thereon, and judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs. Some days later, and during the same term of the court, defendants filed motion to set aside said judgment, which was by the court at the next term thereof sustained as to certain of the plaintiffs and overruled as to others; and this action of the court is brought here for review. For convenience the parties will be designated here as they were below. It is contended by plaintiffs that, notwithstanding the action of the court in vacating its judgment was upon motion filed at the same term of court at which the judgment was entered, the court was without authority and right even in the exercise of its inherent equitable power to vacate its judgment. In case of Barnes et al. v. Bruce et al., 63 Okla. 270, 165 P. 405, the first and second paragraphs of the syllabus are as follows:

"1. Judgment--Opening or Vacating--Discretion of Court During Term. For the purpose of administering justice, the district court has very wide and extended discretion in opening judgments and in setting aside, vacating, or modifying proceedings had before it, if it does so at the same term at which the judgment or proceedings were had, if all the parties are present in court, and no advantage is taken of either party.

"2. New Trial--Denial of Motion for New Trial--Vacation and Granting of Motion.--A trial court, after hearing a case and rendering judgment in favor of one of the parties and after the motion for a new trial has been filed, heard, and overruled, and extension of time granted to make and serve a case-made, at the same term at which all such proceedings and orders were rendered, may in its discretion entertain a motion to set aside its former order denying a new trial and grant a new trial of said cause."

¶2 The principal question presented and decided in the case supra, as stated in the body of the opinion, is as follows, to wit:

"The right of the court to entertain a motion to set aside its order overruling a motion for a new trial, and having granted an extension of time in which to make and serve case-made, it had no further jurisdiction, and therefore no right to pass upon any judgment or order made in the case, although all of the judgments and orders and proceedings were had at the same term of said district court."

¶3 In the body of the opinion the court cites in the case of Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Halsey, 37 Okla. 678, 133 P. 202, as follows:

"A court has control of its judgments during the term at which they are rendered, and may set them aside of its own motion, if they are erroneous" --and citing the case of Shallenberger v. Brady, 37 Okla. 440, 131 P. 1096, quoting the following language:

"The judgment was set aside at the same term at which it was rendered. A court has control of its proceedings during the term and may set aside a judgment upon motion or upon its own motion, in proper cases, at any time during the term. When a court sets aside a judgment during the term at which it was rendered, the only question upon appeal is whether the judgment should have been set aside, not whether the court had jurisdiction to set it aside. Of course, in order for a party to take advantage of the court's refusal to set aside a judgment, he must have complied with the statute with reference to motions for new trials; but his failure to do so does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to act."

¶4 In the case of Todd et al. v. Orr, 44 Okla. 459, 145 P. 393, Chief Justice Sharp in the syllabus lays down the following rules in the first, second, and third paragraphs of the syllabus:

"1. New Trial--Power to Grant--Statute. Courts of general common-law jurisdiction have the inherent power upon their own motion to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial on account of prejudicial error, when done at the same term of court at which the verdict was returned or judgment rendered; and the power will not be deemed to have been taken away by statute, unless intent to do so is clear. Long v. Board of County Commissioners, 5 Okla. 127 [128], 47 P. 100 [1063], announcing a contrary rule, overruled.

"2. Judgment--Procedure--Vacation During Term. A court of general jurisdiction has control over orders or judgment during the term at which made, and for sufficient cause may modify or set them aside at that term, and, when so set aside the parties are remitted back to such rights and remedies as they formerly had, the same as though the order or judgment vacated had not been made in the first instance.

"3. Trial--Jurisdiction--Correction of Errors. The power to correct errors in their own proceedings is inherent in all courts of general jurisdiction and in the exercise of that discretion they are governed not alone by their solicitude for the rights of litigants, but also by the considerations of justice to themselves as instruments provided for the impartial administration of the law."

¶5 In the body of the opinion, after an exhaustive review of the power and authority of the court in the exercise of their inherent equitable power over judgments during the term at which they were...