Blake v. Boisjoli

• Decision Date: 17 November 1892
• Citation: 51 Minn. 296
• Parties: PETER BLAKE <I>vs.</I> JOSEPH BOISJOLI, <I>et al.</I>
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

51 Minn. 296

PETER BLAKE vs. JOSEPH BOISJOLI, et al.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Submitted on briefs October 27, 1892.

Decided November 17, 1892.

Appeal by plaintiff, Peter Blake, from an order of the District Court of Morrison County, Baxter, J., made August 7, 1891, refusing a new trial.

This action was brought by the plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the defendant Joseph Boisjoli, under 1878 G. S. ch. 43, §§ 7, 8, to

enforce a trust in favor of plaintiff in Lot two, (2,) Block fourteen, (14,) of Little Falls, the title to which stood in the name of defendant Rosalie Boisjoli. The court made findings ordering judgment for the defendants. Plaintiff moved for a new trial, the motion was denied, and he appealed.

A. P. Blanchard, for appellant.

Taylor, Calhoun & Rhodes, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

This was an action to enforce an alleged trust in favor of plaintiff, as creditor of defendant J. Boisjoli, (1878 G. S ch. 43, §§ 7, 8,) in land, the consideration for which had been paid by the debtor, and the conveyance made to his wife and codefendant; and the only question raised by this appeal is whether the evidence justified the finding of the court to the effect that the statutory presumption of fraud had been disproved.

The undisputed evidence is that the defendant debtor was the owner of 200 acres of land, 80 of which was exempt as his homestead; that the whole of the land was subject to a mortgage for over $1,650; that the nonexempt 120 acres were also subject to the lien of a judgment for $175; that the nonexempt part of the land was worth not to exceed $1,200 to $1,400, or considerably less than the incumbrances; that the debtor exchanged the whole 200 acres subject to the incumbrances (which the purchaser assumed) for the land in suit, worth from $800 to $1,200, and had the conveyance made to his wife. This, which was substantially all the evidence in the case, fully justified the finding of the trial court.

The statute provides that "every such conveyance shall be presumed fraudulent as against the creditors, at that time, of the person paying the consideration; and, when a fraudulent intent is not disproved, a trust shall result in favor of such creditors to the extent that may be necessary to satisfy their just demands." The presumption of fraudulent intent in such cases is not conclusive, but simply casts the burden upon the grantee to disprove a fraudulent intent.

This was but declaratory of the rule already sanctioned by the great weight of authority, although some authorities, notably Chancellor Kent, in Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481, had held that the fact of indebtedness at the time of such a conveyance was conclusive evidence of fraud. To constitute any disposition of property fraudulent as to creditors, an essential element is that the thing disposed of must be of value, out of which the creditor could have realized the whole or a part of his claim, or otherwise expressed, property which is appropriable by law...