Blake v. City of Tampa
Decision Date | 27 April 1934 |
Citation | 115 Fla. 348,156 So. 97 |
Parties | BLAKE et al., Consolidated Special Tax School District Trustees v. CITY OF TAMPA. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied June 21, 1934.
Suit by the City of Tampa against Charles F. Blake and others, as and constituting the Trustees of Consolidated Special Tax School District No. 4, in Hillsborough County. From an order denying a motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended bill of complaint, defendants appeal.
Reversed and remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill, but without prejudice to appellee's right to seek adjudication of lien by amended bill or new bill. Appeal from Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; L. L Parks, judge.
Himes & Himes, of Tampa, for appellants.
Alonzo B. McMullen and Miles H. Draper, both of Tampa, for appellee.
The city of Tampa, a municipal corporation, filed its amended bill against Charles F Blake, H. Dorsey McMichael, and Philip Robin, as and constituting the trustees of consolidated special tax school district No. 4 of Hillsborough county; the object of the suit being to enforce, by foreclosure and sale of the affected premises, a special assessment improvement lien, imposed by the city of Tampa, Fla., on certain school property as the school district's proportionate part of the cost incurred by the city for the making of a street improvement abutting the school premises.
A motion to dismiss the amended bill of complaint, which the chancellor denied, gave rise to this appeal whereon is presented to us for determination, the following question of law: 'Is property acquired and used for public school purposes, owned by a special tax school district under the constitution and laws of Florida, subject to be decreed in equity to be sold to pay a special assessment entered by a municipal corporation against said school property to pay what has been determined by the municipal authorities pursuant to statute to be the school district's proportionate part of the cost of grading, paving and curbing an abutting street, it appearing that special statutory authority has been conferred upon the municipality to order street improvements and to impose on abutting properties special assessments in proportion to benefits to pay the cost thereof?'
From the allegations of the amended bill it appears that, in substantial accordance with the procedural requirements of Tampa Local Improvement Act (chapter 11232, Special Acts 1925), a final assessment was made on May 3, 1927, by the city of Tampa, against certain premises owned by consolidated special tax school district No. 4, upon which premises was situated a county high school used for county and special tax school district purposes.
The assessment, in the original amount of $8,095.07 represented the cost of grading, paving, and curbing an abutting street known as Central avenue. That assessment, under the provisions of chapter 15536, Special Acts of 1931 Laws of Florida, was reduced to the principal sum of $5,396.72, the difference being absorbed by the city of Tampa. The special assessment of May 3, 1927, as so reduced by the act of 1931, was by the 1931 act undertaken to be confirmed, validated, and made incontestable under a general validating provision of the statute.
Default having been duly alleged in the paying of installments of the assessment made against the school properties, the amended bill asserted the right of the city to enforce under chapter 11232, Special Acts of 1925, an amended and reduced lien in its favor. Foreclosure of the lien and sale of the premises under decree of the court for the amount due the city of Tampa for principal, interest, and attorney's fees was prayed.
Appellants' motion to dismiss asserted, in substance, that the bill was without equity. But as special grounds for that assertion it also set up that the bill was an attempt on the part of the city, through the instrumentality of the court, to divert public school property to uses not permitted, in violation of sections 10, 11, and 13 of article 12 of the Constitution of Florida; that chapter 11232, Sp. Acts 1925, in so far as it applied to school property, violated sections 10, 11, and 13 of said constitutional article 12, and that chapter 15536, Sp. Acts 1931, was violative of the enumerated sections of the Florida Constitution in so far as it undertook to validate or legalize, in whole or in part, or in any amount, the alleged special assessment specified in the complainant's amended bill of complaint.
In addition to the usual and ordinary provisions which are customarily incorporated into a municipal special improvement statute of the character of the Tampa Local Improvement Act, chapter 11232, supra, contained a particular section which reads as follows:
Section 18 of the same Chapter reads as follows:
It appears from the provisions of chapter 15536, supra, that under the Tampa Local Improvement Act the entire cost had in the first instance been assessed against the property deemed to be benefited, including the school property here involved. By its 1931 act, the Legislature reassessed the benefits by authorizing the city of Tampa to reduce to the extent of one-third the principal amount of such assessments and to extend the time for the payment of all such assessments as so reduced into twenty equal annual installments. Section 8 of said chapter 15536, supra, provided that all the assessments theretofore made to the extent of 66 2/3 per cent. thereof should be and the same were thereby validated and legalized, and declared valid, binding, and incontestible.
In article 12 of the Constitution of the state of Florida, by section 1, it is provided: 'The Legislature shall provide for a uniform system of public free schools and shall provide for the liberal maintenance of the same.' By section 13 it is provided:
'No law shall be enacted authorizing the diversion * * * of any County or District School Funds, or the appropriation of any part of the permanent or available school Fund to any other than school purposes.'
By section 9 it is provided that the county school fund shall be disbursed 'solely for the support and maintenance of public free schools.'
The only funds of the special tax school districts are those derived from the sale of bonds issued under the provisions of section 17, and the maintenance tax levied under section 10, 'for the exclusive use of public free schools within the district,' which, under section 11, may be expended only in the district where levied 'for building or repairing school houses for the purchase of school libraries and text-books, for salaries of teachers, or for other educational purposes.'
Taxes proper, or general taxes, whether for state, county municipal, or school purposes, proceed upon the theory that the existence of the government is a necessity; that it cannot continue without means to pay its expenses; that for those means the state has the right to compel all citizens and property within its limits to contribute; and that for such contribution it renders no return or special benefit to any property, but only secures to the citizen that general benefit which results from protection to persons and property, and the promotion of those various schemes, such...
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