Blake v. Hood

• Decision Date: 01 June 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:21-cv-00167
• Parties: BOBBY L. BLAKE, Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY HOOD, Circuit Clerk; CARL ALDRIDGE, Superintendent; FLEMING C.O., Major; BETSY JIVIDEN, Commissioner of Corrections; DIANN E. SKILES, Director of Inmates; LORA A. DYER, Circuit Judge and ELIZABETH JONES, Circuit Clerk, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia

BOBBY L. BLAKE, Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY HOOD, Circuit Clerk; CARL ALDRIDGE, Superintendent;FLEMING C.O., Major; BETSY JIVIDEN, Commissioner of Corrections;DIANN E. SKILES, Director of Inmates; LORA A. DYER, Circuit Judgeand ELIZABETH JONES, Circuit Clerk, Defendants.

Case No. 3:21-cv-00167

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA HUNTINGTON DIVISION

June 1, 2021

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On March 11, 2021, Plaintiff Bobby L. Blake, ("Blake"), proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 2). This matter is assigned to the Honorable Robert C. Chambers, United States District Judge, and by standing order has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for the submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Currently pending is the initial screening of Blake's complaint. Having thoroughly considered the matter, the undersigned FINDS that (1) the complaint cannot withstand initial review; and (2) the Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs should be denied as moot. Therefore, the undersigned DENIES Blake's Application to Proceed in forma pauperis, (ECF No. 1) and RECOMMENDS, for the following reasons, that the presiding District Judge DISMISS the complaint and REMOVE this matter from the docket of the Court.

I. Relevant Facts

In March 2021, when Blake filed the instant action, he was incarcerated at the Western Regional Jail and Correctional Facility in Barboursville, West Virginia ("WRJ"). At some point thereafter, Blake was transferred to the Martinsburg Correctional Center and Jail ("MCC") in Martinsburg, West Virginia, where he is now housed. See https://apps.wv.gov/ois/offendersearch/doc. Blake is currently serving a seven-year prison sentence imposed on June 16, 2020 by the Circuit Court of Mason County, West Virginia related to a revocation of his supervised release. State v. Blake, Case No.: CC-26-2016-FM-32 (C.C. Mason Aug. 26, 2020).¹ He is also serving a concurrent sentence of one to five years' imprisonment, which was imposed on February 3, 2021 by the Circuit Court of Wayne County, West Virginia, on a conviction of Failure by a Sex Offender to Provide Notice of Registration Changes. State v. Blake, Case No. CC-50-2020-F-129 (C.C. Wayne Feb. 3, 2021).

In the complaint, Blake makes the following allegations:

1. Defendant Jeffrey Hood, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cabell County, West Virginia, refused to docket a petition for a writ of habeas corpus submitted by Blake;

2. Judge Lora Dyer, of the Circuit Court of Mason County, refused to credit Blake's sentence with time he spent incarcerated while awaiting his revocation hearing;

3. Elizabeth Jones, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Mason County, docketed Judge Dyer's sentencing order, which failed to provide Blake credit for his jail time; 4. Diann Skiles, the Director of Inmate Records, sent Blake a time sheet of his incarceration, which did not allow Blake credit for good time;

5. Major Fleming, a correctional officer at the WRJ, failed to provide Blake with time in the law library, even after he submitted a grievance about the situation;

6. The WRJ's Superintendent, Mr. Aldridge, failed to address the law library problem and held Blake in custody without due process; and

7. Commissioner Jividen discriminated against Blake and inflicted cruel and unusual punishment upon him by refusing to allow him good time credit, by withholding opportunities available to other inmates to reduce their inmate classification and obtain parole, and by not allowing Blake to serve his time in work release or work camp. (ECF No. 2 at 4-6).

For relief, Blake asks that the Court order the following: (1) Jeffrey Hood to accept the habeas petition and appoint Blake a lawyer; (2) Judge Dyer to credit Blake's sentence with his pre-conviction jail time; (3) Ms. Jones to docket an Order that credits Blake with jail time; (4) Ms. Skiles to provide Blake with a time sheet that includes good time credit; (5) Major Fleming and Superintendent Aldridge to follow proper jail procedures; (6) Commissioner Jividen to allow Blake to receive good time credit and give him the chance to go to work camp, work release, or on parole; and (7) payment of $75.00 for every day he spent in jail that Judge Dyer did not count against his sentence. (Id. at 6-7).

II. Screening Standard

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a court must screen each case in which a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. The court must dismiss the case, or any part of it, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant "who is immune fromsuch relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915. A "frivolous" case has been defined as one which is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), or lacks "an arguable basis either in law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992). Likewise, a complaint fails to state a compensable claim, and therefore should be dismissed, when viewing the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint does not contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

The Supreme Court further clarified the "plausibility" standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009), stating that the Court is required to accept as true the factual allegations asserted in the complaint, but is not required to accept the legitimacy of legal conclusions that are "couched as . . . factual allegation[s]." Id. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp, 550 U.S. at 554). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679.

Blake has filed his complaint pro se, and courts are required to liberally construe pro se complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the complaint still must contain sufficient factual allegations to support a valid legal cause of action. Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003). The court may not rewrite the pleading to include claims that were never presented, Parker v. Champion, 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998), construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for her, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993),or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

III. Discussion

Blake's complaint is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a remedy to parties who are deprived of federally protected civil rights by persons acting under color of any state "law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage." To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that: (1) an official deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected civil right, privilege or immunity and (2) that the official did so under color of State law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Perrin v. Nicholson, C/A No. 9:10-1111-HFF-BM, 2010 WL 3893792 (D.S.C. Sept. 8, 2010). If either of these elements is missing, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moreover, for an official to be liable under § 1983, it must be "affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section." Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (quoting Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Md. 1971)).

A. The Claims Asserted Against Defendants Fleming and Aldridge are Moot

Blake asks the Court to compel Defendants Aldridge and Fleming to allow him law library time and to follow proper jail procedures. As a prerequisite to the exercise of federal jurisdiction, the complaint before the Court must present an actual case or justiciable controversy. "To be justiciable under Article III of the Constitution, the conflict between the litigants must present a 'case or controversy' both at the time the lawsuit is filed and at the time it is decided. If intervening factual ... events effectively dispel the caseor controversy during pendency of the suit, the federal courts are powerless to decide the questions presented." Ross v. Reed, 719 F.2d. 689, 693-94 (4th Cir. 1983). "The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation ... must continue throughout its existence." Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997) (citations omitted). "Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). "[A]s a general rule, a prisoner's transfer or release from a particular prison moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to his incarceration there." Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009). "The reasons for finding mootness in such a context are clear. Once an inmate is removed from the environment in which he is subjected to the challenged policy or practice, absent a claim for damages, he no longer has a legally cognizable interest in a judicial decision on the merits of his claim." Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir.2007).

An exception to the mootness doctrine exists for claims that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review."...