Blake v. Voight
| Citation | 31 N.E. 256,134 N.Y. 69 |
| Parties | BLAKE v. VOIGHT et al. |
| Decision Date | 31 May 1892 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from common pleas of New York city and county, general term.
Action by Frederick D. Blake against Carl Voight and others to recover commissions alleged to be due from the defendants to the plaintiff upon the proceeds of certain goods, which he caused to be consigned to them upon their promise to pay him at the rate of 1 1/2 per cent. on the amount of the sales. The defendants pleaded, among other defenses, that the agreement was not in writing, and was therefore void under the statute of frauds, because, according to its terms, it was not to be performed within one year from the making thereof. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Charles E. Hughes, for appellant.
Z. Brainbridge Smith, for respondents.
In the month of November, 1888, the plaintiff was engaged in business at Rockvile, Conn., and the defendants were commission merchants in the city of New York. During that month the plaintiff had several interviews with one of the defendants, the result of which, as stated by him in his testimony, ‘was that I was to cause to be consigned all the goods that I could influence to him, for which I was to receive one and one half per cent. commission on the sales of such goods; and he requested me to put that in writing in the form of a letter to him, which I did, and delivered to him in person.’ The letter, which bore the date of its delivery, November 27, 1888, was signed by the plaintiff, and addressed to the defendants, but was not signed by them. It referred to the interview that the parties had ‘had together relating to forming business relations,’ and, after stating as the result thereof the agreement alleged in the complaint, closed in these words: ‘This agreement to take place and effect December 1st, 1888, for one year.’ The plaintiff testified that the letter embraced the agreement as previously made; that he delivered it to one of the defendants, who read it, and said it was correct, but added ‘that on June following this either party could make the contract null and void by due notice,-null and void as to continuance;’ to which the plaintiff assented. Pursuant to the agreement the plaintiff procured goods to be consigned to the defendants at various times prior to June 3, 1889, when it was terminated by them under the option permitting it.
The main question requiring discussion is whether the trial court erred in denying the motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint, upon the ground that the agreement in question was void under the statute of frauds because it ‘could not, according to its terms, be performed within one year, and was not reduced to writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged.’ The learned general term of the city court gave no reasons for its decision, but the court of common pleas, in construing the last clause of the letter, held that, although the minds of the parties met on the 27th of November, the agreement did not ‘take place’ until the 1st of December because they expressly deferred the ‘making of it’ until the latter date. There is no evidence, however, tending to show that any agreement was in fact made on the 1st of December, or that the parties had any negotiations after November 27th. The agreement, therefore, was actually made in November, and, if the parties provided as a part thereof that it was not to be an agreement until the 1st of the following month, that provision was an essential part of the whole, and was clearly in force prior to the 1st of December. We think that the natural construction of the clause under consideration requires us to hold that the parties intended thereby to simply fix the date when the agreement was to go into practical effect by the consignment of goods, and it appears that the first consignment was actually made on the day thus designated.
We are also of the opinion that the agreement made November 27, 1887, was to continue for one year from December 1, 1888, unless terminated under the option reserved by the parties. The expression ‘one year,’ as the context shows, refers to the date which immediately precedes it, and not to the date when the agreement was made, which is not expressly mentioned in any part of the letter. Thus actual performance of the business in contemplation was to begin on that day, and was to continue for one year thereafter.
We are hence brought to the question whether the reservation of an option to terminate the contract within the year took it out of the operation of the statute. We agree with the learned counsel for the defendants that the actual termination of the agreement within the year does not affect the question, as the contract must be construed as it stood when it was made. Browne, St. Frauds, § 279. The ultimate question, therefore, is whether a contract, which, by the terms applicable to the leading subject thereof, is not to be performed within a year, is taken out of the statute by the fact that it was a part of such contract that either party might rightfully terminate it within the year. It is contended that termination is not performance, but rather the destruction, of the contract, and this is true where there is no provision authorizing either or both of the parties to terminate as a matter of right. Performance, however, is simply carrying out the contract by doing what it requires or permits. The contract under consideration required the plaintiff to procure consignments of goods to the defendants during one year from December 1, 1888, and that they should pay him a commission therefor, but it permitted either party to terminate it in June, 1889. The permission was part of the agreement, and effective action under it was performance of that part. The contract could be performed in either of two ways: (1) By performance according to its terms without exercising the option; (2) by performance according to its terms until June, and then exercising the option. By either mode the contract would be fulfilled in a sense originally contemplated by the parties, and by neither would performance be frustrated, because the contract would be executed in a way that the parties agreed that it might be executed. The contingency did not defeat the contract, but...
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...of Frauds applies, and the contract may not be enforced in the absence of a sufficient writing(s). See id. (citing Blake v. Voigt, 134 N.Y. 69, 72, 31 N.E. 256, 256 (1892)); see also Ohanian, supra, 779 F.2d at 107. As the New York Court of Appeals Being terminable only by a breach, the agr......
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