Blakeley v. Shortal's Estate

• Decision Date: 16 October 1945
• Docket Number: 46690.
• Citation: 20 N.W.2d 28,236 Iowa 787
• Parties: BLAKELEY v. SHORTAL'S ESTATE ex al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

20 N.W.2d 28

236 Iowa 787

BLAKELEY v. SHORTAL'S ESTATE ex al.

No. 46690.

Supreme Court of Iowa

October 16, 1945

Ralph H. Munro, of Fairfield, for appellant.

Richard C. Leggett, of Fairfield. for appellees.

MANTZ Justice.

This action is based upon a claim in probate filed by Ella Blakeley against the estate of Martin Shortal deceased, wherein damages are claimed for a shock which claimant alleges she suffered when she attempted to enter her home and found therein Martin Shortal, a neighbor, lying on the kitchen floor with blood on the floor and other parts of the room. Her claim is that Shortal by his own wilful act suicided in the kitchen of her home and that when she saw the body and the blood she suffered a physical shock to her nerves and that this condition has continued since that time.

The administrators of the Shortal estate denied the claim generally, admitted the finding of the body in claimant's kitchen, but specifically denied that claimant suffered any injury or damage because of the finding of the body.

When claimant rested, upon motion of the administrators of the estate, the jury, by direction of the court, returned a verdict for such defendants. Claimant appealed.

I. There is little dispute in the essential facts. For about four years claimant and her husband had lived close neighbors on adjoining farms in Jefferson County, Iowa, to Martin Shortal and wife. About September, 1943, Shortal and his wife separated, the latter securing a divorce. Shortal had a sale about March 1st, following, and the property was divided. Claimant and her family remained on good terms with Shortal. Shortal was 50 years of age. On March 3, 1944, at about 6 p.m. Shortal came to the Blakely home. It was raining hard Shortal was soaking wet, and his clothes were muddy. He wanted to stay all night. Some of his wet and muddy clothing was removed and hung up to dry and he was provided with a bed. In the morning he ate breakfast and remained in the house visiting with claimant and her husband. He asked for a pencil and some paper to do some figuring, saying that he thought in the division of his property he had been beaten out of some money. About noon claimant and her husband went to town to trade leaving Shortal sitting at the table figuring. They came home about 4 p.m. that day and claimant started to enter the kitchen of the home. She pushed the door partly open and there saw Shortal lying on the floor with pools of blood about him. When claimant saw the body and the blood she exclaimed, 'Oh, my God, Martin has killed hisself!' She started falling but her husband behind her prevented her fall. They at once drove to a neighbor's and called the sheriff and coroner. These officials came an hour or so later and upon entering the house found Martin Shortal lying on the floor of the kitchen. He was then dead. His throat had been cut and there was a considerable quantity of blood on the floor and about the room. By his side was a skinning knife which belonged to claimant's son. It had blood on it. When claimant left for town this knife was in a holder hanging on the kitchen wall.

Claimant was then taken to a physician who pronounced her condition as one of shock to the nerves caused by her discovery of the body. Since that time she finds difficulty in sleeping, is nervous and restless. She did not return to the home for some time.

Appellees' motion for a directed verdict in essence is that claimant's evidence failed to sustain the allegation of her claim; that if Shortal did commit suicide the evidence failed to show that such act was wilful from which a shock could have been suffered and was to be reasonably anticipated as a natural consequence of such act; and that as a whole the evidence failed to show a situation wherein the jury could find damages for the claimant.

The court in ruling on the motion, stated in part: 'The nub of that proposition is the query whether or not a cause of action has been alleged and proven. The court is inclined to believe that there has been no cause of action alleged or proven. * * * It appears to the court that no cause of action existed at the time of the death of this wrong-doer, and therefore, no cause of action to survive. It is a general rule that a cause of action for tort does not arise, or is not complete, until there is an injury. The mere fact that Martin Shortal committed suicide in the home of this claimant was not the cause of action claimed in this case, but it was the injury to the claimant which she claims thereafter resulted. * * * Therefore, the cause of action did not come into existence until after, as she claims, she saw the body and suffered as a result of shock therefrom. The cause of action therefore was not complete until after the death of Martin Shortal. If it had existed before his death, it would have survived. The court feels that there was no cause of action in existence at his death, therefore there could be no survival thereof.'

II. The correctness of the court's holding that no cause of action was in existence at the time of Shortal's death and therefore there could be no survival thereof, is challanged by this appeal. We hold that the court erred in such ruling.

The ruling involves an interpretation of sections 10957 and 10959 of the Code of 1939, which provide as follows:

'10957. Actions survive. All causes of action shall survive and may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same.'

'10959. Actions by or against legal representatives--substitution. Any action contemplated in sections 10957 and 10958 may be brought, or the court, on motion, may allow the action to be continued, by or against the legal representatives or successors in interest of the deceased. Such action shall be deemed a continuing one, and to have accrued to such representative or successor at the time it would have accrued to the deceased if he had survived. If such is continued against the legal representative of the defendant, a notice shall be served on him as in case of original notices.'

Our statute on survival of actions, section 10957, provides: 'All causes of action shall survive * * *.'

This statute, although in derogation of the common law, should be liberally construed. Wood v. Wood, 136 Iowa 128, 113 N.W. 492, 12 L.R.A., N.S., 891, 125 Am.St.Rep. 223; section 64, Iowa Code, 1939; 1 C.J.S., Abatement and Revival, § 133, p. 181.

The term, cause of action, has sometimes been held to mean: 'the act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint.' Williamson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Co., 84 Iowa 583, 588, 51 N.W. 60, 62. See also, 1 C.J.S., Actions, § 8, at p. 985 et seq.

This court has said: 'In an action to recover damages the cause of action is not on the one hand the damage suffered by plaintiff, nor on the other hand the mere evidentiary facts showing defendant's wrong. But it is the wrong itself done by defendant to plaintiff, that is the breach of duty by the defendant to the plaintiff, whether it be a duty arising out of contract or of tort.' Cahill v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 137 Iowa 577, 580, 115 N.W. 216, 217, citing cases.

If Martin Shortal wilfully set in motion a cause that after his death...