Le Blanc v. Cutler Co.
| Decision Date | 28 February 1940 |
| Parties | LE BLANC v. CUTLER CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Greenhalge, Judge.
Action of tort by Ellen J. Le Blanc, administratrix, against the Cutler Company for damages arising out of a collision between a motorcycle and a motortruck. The jury found for plaintiff in the sum of $5,700 but the judge ordered a verdict to be entered for defendant, and plaintiff brings exceptions.
Exceptions sustained, and judgment entered for plaintiff.J. E. Rice and L. H. Bigelow, both of Marlboro, for plaintiff.
E. R. Langenbach, of Boston, for defendant.
This action of tort, brought in the Superior Court by the administratrix of the estate of James E. Le Blanc, grew out of a collision on June 26, 1937, between a motorcycle owned and operated by him and a motor truck owned by the defendant, and operated by its agent or servant. The declaration is in three counts, respectively, for the death of James E. LeBlanc, his conscious suffering and damage to his motorcycle. It was agreed at the trial that there was evidence tending to show that at the time of the accident he was in the exercise of due care and that the operator of the defendant's motor vehicle was negligent.
It was admitted at the trial that the correct residential address of James E. LeBlanc at the date of his application for registration of his motorcycle, June 7, 1937, was 34 Milham Road, Marlboro, Massachusetts. The certificate of registration of the motorcycle-which was introduced in evidence-contained the same residential address. The original application for registration with the insurance certificate attached was introduced in evidence. On this application the answer to question 11, ‘Massachusetts residential address,’ was ‘34 Milham Road.’ Question 11A, ‘Mail address, if different,’ was not answered. The entire answer to question 12, ‘Municipality, City or Town where vehicle is Principally Garaged,’ was ‘Marlboro, Mass.’ The residential address stated on the insurance certificate was ‘34 Milham Road Marlboro, Mass.’ An employee in the office of the registrar of motor vehicles testified, in substance, ‘that the application for registration together with the insurance certificate which is printed on the back of the application was on a single piece of paper from one end to the other without any perforation and that the name of James E. LeBlanc and address, as stated above, were typewritten in the insurance certificate.’
At the close of the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict. ‘The court declined to act at that time on defendant's motion for a directed verdict subject to the defendant's exceptions and submitted the case to the jury under the following stipulation agreed to by the parties, to wit: ‘If upon the record the motorcycle of the plaintiff's intestate could have been found to have been legally registered, judgment to be entered for the plaintiff upon each count in the amount found by the jury; otherwise judgment to be entered on the verdict.’' The jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff on all counts but, before recording it, the judge under leave reserved allowed the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and ordered a verdict to be entered for the defendant. The plaintiff duly excepted.
As the case comes before us no question of pleading is presented. Since, however, the burden of proving that the motorcycle was not legally registered was on the defendant (Conroy v. Mather, 217 Mass. 91, 104 N.E. 487, 52 L.R.A.N%.s./, 801; Faria v. Veras, 298 Mass. 117, 10 N.E.2d 267;MacInnis v. Morrissey, 298 Mass. 505, 11 N.E.2d 472), ‘the motorcycle of the plaintiff's intestate could have been found to have been legally registered’ if a contrary finding was not required as matter of law. It is to be assumed that in making the stipulation as to the entry of judgment the parties contemplated that the question of law presented should be decided in accordance with the usual principles.
The basic facts are established: the actual residential address of James E. LeBlanc by agreement of the parties, and the form of the application by the records in the office of the registrar of motor vehicles. See Dean v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 217 Mass. 495, 105 N.E. 616;Crean v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 292 Mass. 226, 228, 198 N.E. 172;MacInnis v. Morrissey, 298 Mass. 505, 11 N.E.2d 472. Apart from the provision that was added to G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 9, by St.1934, c. 361-which is considered later-these established facts, as matter of law, required a finding that the motorcycle was not legally registered, because the application for registration did not meet the statutory requirement that it ‘contain * * * a statement of the name, place of residence and address of the applicant.’ G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 2. A statement of the city or town in which the applicant resided was an essential part of that statement of his ‘place of residence.’ Incorrect statements as to the city or town of residence-apart from trifling inaccuracies (Caverno v. Houghton, 294 Mass. 110, 113, 1 N.E.2d 4)-and total omission of a statement of the ‘place of residence’ have been held to invalidate an attempted registration. Di Cecca v. Bucci, 278 Mass. 15, 178 N.E. 447;Ricker v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 290 Mass. 111, 113, 194 N.E. 815;Crean v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 292 Mass. 226, 198 N.E. 172;Brodmerkle v Gorolsky, 293 Mass. 517, 200 N.E. 274;Lappanasse v. Loomis, 297 Mass. 290, 293, 8 N.E.2d 766;Gray v. Hatch, Mass., 12 N.E.2d 71. This principle governs the failure of the...
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