Le Blanc v. Standard Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 07 September 1915 |
| Citation | 95 A. 284 |
| Parties | LE BLANC v. STANDARD INS. CO. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Androscoggin County, at Law.
Action by Alfred Le Blanc against the Standard Insurance Company. Cause reported to the Supreme Judicial Court. Judgment for plaintiff.
Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and SPEAR, KING, BIRD, HALEY, and HANSON, JJ.
McGillicuddy & Morey and Harry Manser, all of Lewiston, for plaintiff. White & Carter, of Lewiston, for defendant.
On December 2, 1912, an automobile, owned by the plaintiff, and driven by his brother Philip, collided with a team driven by one Littlefield, as a result of which Littlefield was injured and afterwards died. On March 14, 1913, suit was brought by Littlefield's administrator against the plaintiff to recover the damages sustained by Littlefleld, on account of negligence in the operation of the automobile. The case was tried at the April term of this court in Androscoggin county, and plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment, which afterwards was satisfied by this plaintiff by paying the sum of $2,533.27. At the time of the accident this plaintiff held a policy in the defendant company, issued by its local agent, Harvey, at Lewiston, indemnifying him "against loss from the liability imposed by law upon him for damages on account of bodily injuries, including death at any time resulting therefrom, accidentally sustained by any person or persons, by reason of the maintenance or use of" the automobile in question. This action is brought upon that policy to recover the amount paid by the plaintiff in satisfaction of the Littlefleld judgment, and comes to this court upon report.
By the terms of the policy, the insurance was made subject to certain conditions, among which are the following:
"This policy does not cover loss from liability on account of such injuries (including death) caused or suffered by reason of the maintenance or use of such automobile * * * while used for any purpose other than as specified in item 3 of said declarations," and
Item 3 of the declaration, referred to in the first of the foregoing conditions provides that:
"The purposes for which the above-described automobiles are to be used are private and pleasure purposes and all ordinary business uses for which automobiles are suitable."
In the brief statement under its plea of the general issue, the defendant set up the following defenses: (1) That at the time of the accident the automobile was not being used for any purpose specified in item 3 of the declaration, but was used by Philip Le Blanc in the business of the Lewiston Steam Dye House; (2) that the assured did not give notice to the company in writing of any claim made on account of said accident; and (3) that after suit was brought against the assured on account of said accident, the assured did not forward to the company the original summons and other papers served on him in the Littlefleld suit. No other issues are of importance.
The ease shows that the plaintiff did not give written notice to the company, but that on the day of the accident the plaintiff told Harvey, the local agent, that an accident had happened to his car, and Harvey replied that he would take care of him; that Oakes, Pulsifer & Ludden, attorneys, would see him.
It further appears that Harvey, the agent on the day of the accident, made out a full and particular report of the accident upon the company's blank, and forwarded it to Mr. Kemp, the company's Boston resident manager, who had countersigned the policy; Kemp on the next day placed the matter in the hands of Dickson & Knowles, Boston attorneys, for investigation; they at once communicated by telephone with Oakes, Pulsifer & Ludden, and asked them to look the matter up. On the same day Mr. Pulsifer went to the plaintiff and asked, and was told, how the accident happened, the details of which he reported to Dickson & Knowles. A week later Harvey told the plaintiff to turn over to Mr. Pulsifer any paper that might be served on him. When the summons in the Littlefield suit was served: on the plaintiff, he did not forward it to the company, but he testifies that he gave it to Mr. Pulsifer. At the trial of the Alfred Le Blanc case, Oakes, Pulsifer & Ludden appeared in defense for Mr. Le Blanc. And we think they were justified in supposing that they had authority to do so from this defendant. Not only did Dickson & Knowles ask Oakes, Pulsifer & Ludden to investigate the accident, but they led them to have the statements of the various witnesses reduced to writing and signed by them; that is, to do the usual professional work in preparation for a possible trial. And at the same time they directed them to continue their efforts to bring about some satisfactory settlement. Efforts were made by Mr. Pulsifer to effect a compromise, which he reported to Dickson & Knowles. The correspondence of the Boston attorneys and of the company's home office shows that Oakes, Pulsifer & Ludden were recognized as the local attorneys. We allude to this only because the defendant company now claims that their appearance in the Littlefield suit in its behalf was without authority from it. But in our view of the case, as will be shown hereafter, it is not material to this plaintiff whether Oakes, Pulsifer & Ludden had specific authority from the defendant company or not.
We now take up the several defenses offered in this suit. The contention that at the time of the accident the automobile was being used for a purpose excluded from the terms of the policy is not supported by the evidence. The contention that the plaintiff did not give notice of his claim to the company in writing is sufficiently answered by saying that the requirement was effectually waived by what was said and done by Harvey, the Boston attorneys, and the company, for a period of four months, before the Littlefield suit was commenced, as we have indicated. They had power to waive the requirement that the notice...
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