Blanchard v. Blanchard

• Decision Date: 06 September 2016
• Docket Number: Docket: Cum-15-504
• Citation: 148 A.3d 277,2016 ME 140
• Parties: Sharon Blanchard v. Ronald Blanchard
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

148 A.3d 277

2016 ME 140

Sharon Blanchard

v.Ronald Blanchard

Docket: Cum-15-504

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: May 3, 2016

Decided: September 6, 2016

John P. Simpson, Esq. (orally), Simpson Law Offices, Cumberland Foreside, for appellant Sharon Blanchard

Robert A. Levine, Esq. (orally), Portland, for appellee Ronald Blanchard

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

SAUFLEY, C.J.

[¶1] Sharon Blanchard appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Portland, Moskowitz, J. ) finding that a valid premarital agreement had been executed by the parties before their marriage and entering a judgment of divorce. We affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] On June 22, 1986, four days after executing a premarital agreement, Sharon and Ronald Blanchard were married. The parties had two children, both of whom are now adults. Twenty-six years after the marriage, in December 2012, Sharon filed for divorce. Ronald responded, asserting that the parties had entered into a valid premarital agreement that governed the equitable distribution of property and the award of spousal support. Highly contentious proceedings continued for over two and a half years before a final hearing was held. During this time, prejudgment orders requiring Ronald to pay interim spousal support were entered. Ronald paid some of the ordered interim spousal support but did not fully comply with the orders.

[¶3] On August 24, 2015, the court held a bifurcated trial on (1) the validity of the premarital agreement and (2) the divorce complaint. After trial, the court found the following facts, which are supported by competent evidence in the record. Prior to their marriage in 1986, Sharon and Ronald requested that an attorney draft a premarital agreement in exchange for consideration. That attorney had previously represented Ronald in other contexts, and he made it clear to Sharon that he was representing Ronald only. At the time, Sharon and Ronald had been living together for about four years and were expecting a child.

[¶4] The attorney provided a financial disclosure form to each of the parties and requested that they provide full and complete information about their financial circumstances. The parties provided completed forms to the attorney, and the attorney began drafting a premarital agreement. The parties were then furnished with a copy of the proposed agreement.

[¶5] Approximately six weeks after a draft of the agreement was provided to the parties, before the final agreement was executed, the attorney asked Sharon if she had consulted with independent counsel regarding the terms of the proposed agreement. She stated that she had done so. She also confirmed that the final agreement contained certain revisions to the original draft that she had specifically requested.

[¶6] During the first part of the trial regarding the validity of the premarital agreement, the parties testified that at the time they signed the premarital agreement, Ronald's net worth was substantially larger than Sharon's, but Sharon was self-sufficient and supported herself. The court entered in evidence the premarital agreement signed by the parties.

[¶7] That agreement, executed on June 18, 1986, was written before the enactment of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19–A M.R.S. §§ 601–611 (2015), and it does not have the clarity of more recently drafted instruments. It states that Ronald desires to make provision for Sharon “in release of and in full satisfaction of all rights” which Sharon might have “by reason of the marriage, in the property which Ronald F. Blanchard now has or may hereafter acquire.” It further states that Sharon desires to accept the provision “in lieu of all rights which she would otherwise acquire, by reason of the marriage, in the property ... of Ronald F. Blanchard.” In the event of divorce after a marriage lasting more than five years, the premarital agreement provides the following.¹ Ronald will repay Sharon “the principal amount of $2,100 plus 12% interest thereon computed from May 1, 1984,” which represents money that Sharon loaned to Ronald. In addition, temporary spousal support “shall be paid” to Sharon. Furnishings are to be divided equally and each party is to keep his/her personal effects. Sharon has the right to select any automobile owned by the parties, but if it is subject to debt, Sharon alone will be responsible for the debt.

[¶8] The agreement also states,

Sharon Elaine Turgeon acknowledges that the present approximate net worth of Ronald F. Blanchard has been fully disclosed to her and she understands that such net worth is in excess of $750,000, that she has given consideration to this fact and others, and that she has had the advice of independent accounting counsel and independent legal counsel, and that having had such independent counsel, she chooses to enter into this Agreement freely and with full understanding of its provisions.

Attached to the agreement as appendices are complete lists of Sharon's and Ronald's assets held at the time of the agreement.

[¶9] The court found that, when she executed the agreement, Sharon had a “full understanding of the parties' respective financial circumstances,” had consulted with independent counsel, and had “more than a fair opportunity to fully understand and consider any marital rights she would gain” in Ronald's assets and how the agreement would modify those rights. Thus, the court gave full force and effect to the premarital agreement, and proceeded to try the other issues raised by the parties.

[¶10] Regarding the spousal support and equitable distribution of property, Sharon sought repayment of a promissory note that Ronald had signed promising to pay back money that Sharon had loaned him in 2010. Sharon also sought payment of a spousal support arrearage, and Ronald admitted that he had not yet paid Sharon approximately $20,000 of court-ordered interim support.

[¶11] The court noted that the premarital agreement had not been amended to include the 2010 loan that the parties testified to, and concluded that the loan would therefore not be enforced through the present action. The court concluded that Ronald was required to pay Sharon $2,100 in satisfaction of the loan mentioned in the agreement plus 12% annual interest² and that the agreement permitted Ronald to credit any temporary spousal support already paid toward that obligation.³ Thus, the court concluded that Ronald had fulfilled all of his obligations under the agreement, and it granted the parties a divorce in a judgment in which the terms did not require either party to pay support or further cash distribution to the other.⁴ The judgment did not explicitly address the spousal support arrearage that Ronald had not paid to Sharon. Sharon appeals to us. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901(1) (2015) ; M.R. App. P. 2.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Premarital Agreement

[¶12] Sharon argues that the court erred in failing to find that the premarital agreement is invalid and unconscionable. We review the court's factual findings for clear error. In re Heather G. , 2002 ME 151, ¶ 12, 805 A.2d 249. We review “the legal determination of the [premarital] agreement's validity and enforceability de novo.” Hoag v. Dick , 2002 ME 92, ¶ 7, 799 A.2d 391. We review de novo whether, based on the facts found by the trial court, an agreement is unconscionable. See Bedrick v. Bedrick , 300 Conn. 691, 17 A.3d 17, 29 (2011) ; cf. Estate of Martin , 2008 ME 7, ¶ 18, 938 A.2d 812 (de novo standard of review pursuant to the now existing Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19–A M.R.S. §§ 601–611).

[¶13] The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19–A M.R.S. §§ 601–611, was first passed in 1987, a year after the parties signed the agreement at issue here; thus, we analyze the validity of the agreement under common law principles as they existed in 1986. See Hoag , 2002 ME 92, ¶¶ 9–10, 799 A.2d 391. For a premarital agreement to be valid, “there shall be no fraud or imposition practiced,” “full and complete disclosure shall be made,” and adequate provisions shall be made for each spouse. Rolfe v. Rolfe , 125 Me. 82, 83, 130 A. 877 (1925). The burden of proof begins with the party seeking to invalidate the agreement. See id. When the party seeking to invalidate the agreement establishes that the agreement's provisions for [one] spouse are “clearly disproportionate to the [other spouse's] wealth,” a presumption of fraud arises. Wilson v. Wilson , 157 Me. 119, 131, 170 A.2d 679 (1961). Once a presumption of fraud is established, the burden of proof shifts to the party seeking to enforce the agreement to rebut the presumption of fraud by proving “fairness, notice, understanding and adequacy.” Rolfe , 125 Me. at 83, 130 A. 877 ; see also Estate of Martin , 2008 ME 7, ¶¶ 10–11, 938 A.2d 812 (discussing the pre-UPAA “common law presumption of fraud”).

[¶14] The court concluded that the agreement's provisions for Sharon were clearly disproportionate to Ronald's wealth. Ronald does not dispute this conclusion.

Therefore, a rebuttable presumption of fraud arose, and the burden of proof shifted to Ronald to rebut that presumption. The court then went on to conclude that Ronald had successfully rebutted this presumption of fraud.

[¶15] Sharon argues that the court failed to make the necessary findings to allow it to conclude that the presumption of fraud had been rebutted. In its judgment, the court did not explicitly find that the agreement was “fair” or “adequate.” Because no motion for additional findings was filed, we assume the court found facts to support these implied findings. See Coppola v. Coppola , 2007 ME 147, ¶ 25, 938 A.2d 786 (“[I]n the absence of a motion for further findings, we must assume that there was competent evidence in the record, which the court considered, to support the ... judgment.”); M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).

[¶16] The court found that after living together for four years, the parties requested that an attorney draft a premarital...