Blanchard v. Blanchard
| Citation | 770 P.2d 227 |
| Decision Date | 08 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-190,88-190 |
| Parties | Zella Fern BLANCHARD, Appellant (Defendant), v. Ronald Deloss BLANCHARD, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Bruce P. Badley and Clay B. Jenkins, Badley & Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, for appellant.
H. Steven Brown, Brown, Raymond & Rissler, P.C. Casper, for appellee.
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
The issue in this case is whether the district court abused its discretion in connection with its property settlement award and its refusal to award alimony to the wife in the divorce proceeding before it. Our examination of the record and our analysis of the pertinent authority persuades us that no abuse of discretion can be found. The judgment of the trial court in the Order and Decree of Divorce is affirmed.
Zella Fern Blanchard (wife) is the appellant, and she states the issues in this case to be:
Ronald Deloss Blanchard (husband), as appellee, defines the issues in this way:
The divorce case was commenced by a Complaint filed by the husband on November 4, 1987. The Complaint alleged irreconcilable differences in the parties' marriage and sought, as a part of the divorce, an equitable division of the parties' assets and liabilities. The record discloses that the case proceeded with dispatch and in an atmosphere of cooperation that usually does not attend a divorce action which is appealed to this court. Early in the proceedings, on February 3, 1988, the husband submitted an offer of judgment to the wife in accordance with Rule 68, W.R.C.P. The wife refused to accept this offer, however, and the case proceeded to hearing before the district court. In the Order and Decree of Divorce, entered on June 6, 1988, the marital estate was divided, pursuant to § 20-2-114, W.S.1977, as follows, according to the summary in the wife's brief:
HUSBAND'S PROPERTY
1. Halliburton retirement accounts $235,072.00
2. Husband's life insurance policy 10,050.97
3. Daughter's insurance policy 819.96
TOTAL $245,942.93
WIFE'S PROPERTY
1. South Dakota rental property $ 28,500.00
2. 13 acres of South Dakota Land 13,569.00
3. Scottish bank accounts 76,367.00
4. Merrill Lynch account 33,952.00
5. E.F. Hutton account 7,148.00
6. J.W. Gant account 2,810.00
7. State Farm IRA 4,491.99
8. Wife's insurance policy 4,256.00
TOTAL $171,093.99
The wife argues that this property division is so unequal that it manifests an abuse of discretion by the trial court, and she contends that this court must remand the case to the district court for a more equitable distribution of the property or for an award of alimony which will result in a more equitable division. The standards that pertain in this review are neither novel nor mysterious. The district court has great discretion in making a division of marital property; a just and equitable division is as likely as not to be unequal; there are no standardized rules which govern property division; and the exercise of discretion by the district court will not be disturbed except on clear grounds. Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707 (Wyo.1980); Cross v. Cross, 586 P.2d 547 (Wyo.1978).
It is fair to note that the summaries presented by the wife set forth above do not encompass the entire property division. In addition to the property itemized, the husband received: a pickup truck worth several thousand dollars; miscellaneous tools and machinery worth several hundred dollars; and some personal property, including clothing, household goods, and furniture of modest value. The wife received, in addition to the property itemized: a 1969 Chevrolet automobile of disputed value; most of the household goods and furnishings from the parties' five-bedroom home which apparently are of considerable value; and she was permitted to continue to live in the parties' home in Gillette until such time as it was sold. The husband was required to satisfy the mortgage, tax and insurance payments on the home until it was sold. This obligation constituted a substantial liability because the record demonstrates that the house was purchased for $81,000; was subject to a mortgage in the amount of $77,000; and, at the time of the divorce, had a market value of approximately $65,000. The husband also was required to maintain health insurance for the wife for a period of eighteen months following the divorce. In addition, he provided the primary support for the parties' daughter who was attending college. While no specific values were assigned to many of these items, when they are factored into the property division, they well may serve to make it more nearly equal.
In presenting her argument to this court, the wife focuses primarily upon her claim of inequity with respect to the Halliburton retirement accounts. Testimony at the hearing on the property division supported an after-tax value of the Halliburton retirement accounts in the amount of approximately $180,000. Nothing in the record indicates that the district court relied on this valuation of the retirement accounts in making the property division but, even so, the wife asserts that the district court misapplied the rule promulgated in Dice v. Dice, 742 P.2d 205 (Wyo.1987). The rule of Dice is that in an instance in which a district court divides a retirement account between parties to a divorce, and an immediate cash payment is required, the after-tax value of the account must be used for purposes of the division. Dice, 742 P.2d at 208. The wife contends that the district court must have relied upon the after-tax value of the retirement accounts because of the otherwise apparent disparity of the property division. She insists that the district court completely ignored the evidence which she presented that the retirement accounts would not be diminished by taxation because provisions of the Internal Revenue Code permit the withdrawal of retirement funds and the placement of them in Individual Retirement Accounts without tax consequences.
The record in this case fails to support the wife's claim. The district court was able to achieve a fair and equitable property settlement without the necessity of dividing the retirement accounts. The wife's argument in this respect simply is not relevant. Dice has no significance when the retirement account is not divided. The wife also contends that the district court ignored our holding in Broadhead v Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731 (Wyo.1987), in which we set...
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Brown v. State
...rules, W.R.C.P. 40.1(b) and W.R.Cr.P. 23(d), are procedurally different. Wyoming Bank, N.A., 771 P.2d 374 (Wyo.1989); Blanchard v. Blanchard, 770 P.2d 227 (Wyo.1989); Garnett v. State, 769 P.2d 371 (Wyo.1989); Lozano v. State, 751 P.2d 1326 (Wyo.1988); Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo.19......
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