Blanchard v. Department of Transp.

Decision Date20 June 2002
Citation798 A.2d 1119,2002 ME 96
PartiesNancy BLANCHARD et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Patrick Sharkey, (orally), Boston, MA, David A. Lourie, Cape Elizabeth, for plaintiff.

Rebecca H. Farnum, (orally), Deborah M. Mann, (orally), Portland, for defendants.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.

CLIFFORD, J.

[¶ 1] Nancy Blanchard1 appeals from a partial summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J.) in favor of the Department of Transportation on the issue of the authority of the Department to take land owned by Blanchard. Blanchard also appeals from a judgment of the court entered following a three-day nonjury trial, in which the court concluded that the public use clause of Article I, § 21, of the Constitution of Maine had been satisfied in the taking. Blanchard contends that the Department exceeded its legislative authority, and that the taking was for a private use in violation of Article I, § 21. We are unpersuaded by Blanchard's contentions and affirm the judgments of the Superior Court.

[¶ 2] Chebeague Island is a small island community in Casco Bay with approximately 350 year-round residents and about 2000 additional summer residents. The island is part of the Town of Cumberland and is not connected to the mainland by a bridge. Cousins Island, which is connected to the mainland by a bridge, is the most convenient mainland terminal for the ferry service to Chebeague Island. The ferry service is provided by the Chebeague Transportation Company (Ferry).2 The ferry link to Cousins Island is essential to maintaining Chebeague Island as a year-round residential community.

[¶ 3] In October of 1999, the Department acquired from Blanchard, by eminent domain, 1.4 acres of land for continued use as a parking lot for ferry users traveling to and from Chebeague Island. At the time of the taking, the transportation system used by commuters consisted of the ferry service between Chebeague Island and Cousins Island operated by the Ferry, the Cousins Island wharf, a satellite parking lot located in the Town about ten miles away from the Cousins Island Wharf, serviced by a shuttle bus, and the parking lot owned by Blanchard, which is a short walk up Wharf Road from the Cousins Island wharf.

[¶ 4] Prior to the taking, Blanchard had leased the lot to the Ferry, who used it as a parking lot in conjunction with the ferry service to Chebeague Island for over thirty years. The Ferry does not transport cars, and the lot allows commuting island residents to have close access to their vehicles. The lot lease was set to terminate on January 1, 2000.

[¶ 5] After conducting extensive studies, the Department concluded that the existing facility on Cousins Island was the only feasible location for the ferry landing and that the availability of parking on Cousins Island adjacent to the wharf was essential for the operation of a ferry transportation system connecting Chebeague Island residents with their jobs, schools, hospitals, health care providers, food stores, and other essential mainland services. In order to ensure that the Blanchard lot would continue to be available for parking once the lease expired, the Department acquired the lot by eminent domain.

[¶ 6] Following the taking, the Department leased the land to the Town for its continued operation as a parking lot. The Town then subleased the parking lot to the Ferry, incorporating the same lease terms as the Department's lease. Both the Town and the Department have retained the ability to reassert control over the lot if they are dissatisfied with the Ferry's performance.

[¶ 7] The Department's lease with the Town gives the Department the right to terminate if the Town, or its assignee or sublessee, fail, in the sole determination of the Department, "to provide safe and accessible parking services for persons using the Transportation System." "Transportation System" is defined to include the ferry service operating between Chebeague and Cousins Islands, the wharf at Cousins Island, the Wharf Road linking the wharf with the Blanchard lot, the satellite parking lot, and the shuttle-bus service to and from the satellite lot. The Town is also obliged to "maintain the Premises in good operating condition year-round so that the Premises are accessible and safe for public use."

[¶ 8] The sublease between the Town and the Ferry gives the Town similar rights to the Department. The Ferry is also obligated to "maintain the Premises in good operating condition year-round so that the Premises are accessible and safe for public use." Both the lease and the sublease mandate that revenues generated by the lot "shall be used to support the transportation system."

[¶ 9] The lease and sublease limit parking at the lot to 165 cars, with fifteen spaces being reserved for residents of the Town of Yarmouth, and, except for ongoing barge operations, the leases prohibit all commercial activities. The Ferry allocates the 150 unreserved spaces at the lot by awarding overnight-parking permits to members of the public based on need, with first priority to members of the public who are year-round residents of Chebeague Island, who commute to and from the mainland for work on a daily basis; second priority going to other year-round residents, and third priority being any other persons who can demonstrate a specific and unusual need. Except in rare cases, each household receives only one over-night-parking permit. There are other priority-parking categories, but these generally do not need overnight permits. People who are unable to demonstrate a priority need for an overnight parking permit may park at, and obtain overnight permits for, the satellite lot. In combination, the satellite lot and the Blanchard lot are more than adequate to satisfy the demand for overnight parking.

[¶ 10] Daytime parking at the Blanchard lot is often available without a permit. During the month of August of 2000, the year after the taking, an average of seventeen vehicles per day used the Blanchard lot in this manner during the weekdays, three per day on the weekends. In addition, the Blanchard lot is the mainland terminus for the barging operation conducted by the Ferry to transport other items, such as vehicles, or freight that cannot be carried on the passenger ferry. This service is available equally to all members of the public.

[¶ 11] Blanchard initially brought this action to enjoin the Department from taking the property. After an ex parte temporary restraining order was denied (Cumberland County, Crowley, J.), the Department filed a notice of condemnation and tendered compensation to Blanchard. Blanchard amended her complaint, seeking to have the taking set aside. The Department answered and filed a conditional counterclaim for return of the compensation paid in the event that Blanchard prevailed. Blanchard filed a second amended complaint requesting damages based on the temporary taking of the property should the taking be determined to be unlawful.

[¶ 12] The trial court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the Department and against Blanchard on the issues of the Department's authority to take the lot and the sufficiency of the public exigency to justify the taking. After a three day nonjury trial, the court found that the transportation system of which the Blanchard lot is an integral part is accessible to all members of the public and the Blanchard lot is available for use by all members of the public ..., [but] the Blanchard lot is not accessible to all members of the public on equal terms.

The evidence at trial demonstrated... that the limited parking space at the Blanchard lot is appropriately allocated on the basis of need.

[¶ 13] Based on these findings the court concluded that the taking was for a public use, and entered a judgment in favor of the Department. This appeal followed.

I. PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[¶ 14] The Legislature has granted a general power of eminent domain to the Department pursuant to 23 M.R.S.A. § 153-B(1) (Supp.2001), which provides, in pertinent part:

The Department of Transportation, on behalf of the State may take over and hold for the State such property as it determines necessary to:
. . . .
G. Construct, improve and maintain transportation projects as directed by law and provide mitigation for existing or potential environmental effects of transportation projects.

[¶ 15] The Superior Court concluded that section 153-B(1)(G) gave the Department the authority to take Blanchard's lot.

[¶ 16] We review a trial court's construction of a statute de novo. Great Northern Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot Nation, 2001 ME 68, ¶ 14, 770 A.2d 574, 580. Our main objective in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Id. ¶ 15. "[W]e look first to the statute's plain meaning and, if there is ambiguity, we look beyond that language to the legislative history to determine [that] intent." Id.

[¶ 17] When the Legislature delegates the power of eminent domain, the parameters of that power are strictly construed. In re Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 314 A.2d 800, 806 (Me.1974). "Strict construction, however, cannot be used to defeat the clear intent of the statute nor to construe the statute in an unreasonable manner." Town of Union v. Strong, 681 A.2d 14, 18 (Me.1996).

[¶ 18] Relying on the canon of strict construction, Blanchard argues that the phrase "as directed by law," in section 153-B(1)(G), limits the Department's delegated power to instances where there is a legislative directive to carry out a particular transportation project. Under this interpretation, because the Legislature did not specifically authorize either the taking of the lot or the ferry-passenger service, the Department would have exceeded its authority in taking the lot. We disagree.

[¶ 19] If the words "as directed by...

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