Blanchard v. Portland & R. F. Ry.

• Decision Date: 25 February 1895
• Citation: 87 Me. 241,32 A. 890
• Parties: BLANCHARD v. PORTLAND & R. F. RY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

32 A. 890

87 Me. 241

BLANCHARD

v. PORTLAND & R. F. RY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Feb. 25, 1895.

(Official.)

Exceptions from superior court, Cumberland county.

This was an action of assumpsit by Charles E. Blanchard against the Portland & Rumford Falls Railway, tried without the intervention of a jury, subject to exceptions in matters of law.

The action was brought to recover for work done as a laborer in the construction of defendant's railroad, under Rev. St. c. 51, § 141.

It appeared from the bill of exceptions that the Portland & Rumford Falls Railway contracted with one Berry to construct an extension of its line from Mechanic Falls to a connection with the Maine Central Railroad near Danville Junction. Berry made a contract with one William Hogan to build the bridges on the line, and Hogan contracted with one Fred Blanchard to build two of the bridges. The plaintiff was employed by Fred Blanchard to superintend the work on the two bridges. He had charge of the stonecutters and masons, kept the time, and made out the pay rolls. The plaintiff worked as above for 89 days.

It was admitted by the defendant that the plaintiff seasonably gave the notice in writing required by the statute.

Upon the foregoing matter, the presiding justice ruled as matter of law:

(1) That the plaintiff was a laborer within the meaning of the statute.

(2) That he was entitled to recover against the defendant, though he was employed by a subcontractor.

The defendant took exceptions.

The statute on which the action was brought is as follows:

"Every railroad company in making contracts for the building of its road, shall require sufficient security from the contractors for the payment of all labor thereafter performed in constructing the road by persons in their employment; and such company is liable to the laborers employed, for labor actually performed on the road, if they, within twenty days after the completion of such labor, in writing, notify its treasurer that they have not been paid by the contractors. But such liability terminates unless the laborer commences an action against the company, with, in six months after giving such notice."

Defendant excepts. Sustained.

A. R. Savage and H. W. Oakes, for plaintiff.

J. W. Symonds, D. W. Snow, and C. & Cook, for defendant.

WALTON, J. The decision of this cause depends upon the meaning of the word "laborers," as used in Rev. St c. 51, § 141.

That section provides, among other things, that railroad companies shall be liable to the "laborers" employed by contractors. What is the meaning of the word "laborers," as here used? Does it include one who, at an agreed compensation of seven dollars a day, superintends the building of bridges, keeps an account of the men's time, and makes out the pay rolls?

We think not. A laborer, says Webster, is one who labors in a toilsome occupation; a person that does work that requires strength rather than skill, as distinguished from that of an artisan. And in the construction of statutes similar to our own, it has been held that the word "laborer" does not include a bookkeeper or a superintendent (Wakefield v. Fargo, 90 N. Y. 213); nor a civil engineer (Katlroad Co. v. Leuffer, 84 Pa. St. 168); nor an assistant...