Blanke v. United Rys. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1919
• Docket Number: No. 15462.,15462.
• Parties: BLANKE v. UNITED RYS. CO. OF ST. LOUIS.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

213 S.W. 174

BLANKE v. UNITED RYS. CO. OF ST. LOUIS.

No. 15462.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

June 3, 1919.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Kent K. Koerner, Judge.

"Not to be officially published!'

Action by C. F. Blanke against the United Railways Company of St. Louis. From an order granting plaintiff a new trial, defendant appeals. Order affirmed, and cause remanded.

Boyle & Priest and S. P. McChesney, all of St. Louis, for appellant.

Earl M. Pirkey, of St. Louis, for respondent.

BECKER, J.

Plaintiff sued for damages to his automobile, alleged to have been sustained as the result of a collision between said automobile and one of the defendant's street cars. Plaintiff obtained a verdict in the sum of $1, which verdict the court set aside, on the ground that it was grossly inadequate. From the order granting plaintiff a new trial, defendant appeals.

The only assignment of error made by appellant is that the action of the trial court in granting plaintiff a new trial on the ground that the verdict was grossly inadequate cannot be sustained, in that the evidence not only fails to show that plaintiff had sustained any damages in excess of the amount of the verdict, namely, $1, but fails to show, in point of fact, that the plaintiff has sustained any damages whatsoever.

After the collision plaintiff had his automobile towed into the shop of the Dorris Motorcar Company and this company made up an itemized list of the repairs required on the car, due to the collision, and it appears that the reasonable value of such repairs aggregated $597.45. Plaintiff, however, instead of having the car repaired, traded in or exchanged the car for another, and the sum of $597.45 was allowed plaintiff in the trade as (he "amount of repairs that was settled on."

The only instruction on the measure of damages is to the effect that, if the jury find for plaintiff, they should assess his damages at such sum, if any, as they find from the evidence equals the reasonable cost, if any, of repairing the injuries sustained by said automobile. In this state of the record appellant argues that it is plain that plaintiff below sought to recover upon the theory that he was entitled to recover the cost of repairing the automobile, but that the evidence shows plaintiff did not have the car repaired, and that he did not incur obligations for the same, and therefore plaintiff failed to make out such a case as entitled him to recover damages under the theory upon which plaintiff submitted his case to the jury, and therefore the verdict of $1, in the most favorable view of the case, is all that plaintiff was entitled to recover.

The rule as to the measure of damages, where there has been an injury to personal property, and where the injury does not result in its total destruction, so that the property is capable of being repaired, is the difference between its reasonable market value immediately before the injury, at the place thereof, and its reasonable market value immediately after the injury. If the required repairs bring it about that the property has a reasonable market value greater than its reasonable market value immediately before the injury then that part of the cost of the repairs equal to the amount in value that the property has been enhanced beyond its reasonable market value immediately before the injury should be deducted from the total amount of the repairs and whatever balance remains is recoverable. When the...