Blanton v. State, A89A0250
| Decision Date | 19 April 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. A89A0250,A89A0250 |
| Citation | 382 S.E.2d 133,191 Ga.App. 454 |
| Parties | BLANTON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Tisinger, Tisinger, Vance & Greer, Paul E. Weathington, Carrollton, for appellant.
William G. Hamrick, Jr., Dist. Atty., Peter J. Skandalakis, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
James Ernie Blanton was indicted on two counts of child molestation and two counts of enticing children for indecent purposes. A jury found Blanton guilty on all four counts, but the trial court merged the counts of child molestation and enticing children for indecent purposes stemming from the same incidents. Appellant appeals from his conviction.
The record reveals that on at least two different occasions, while driving his truck in residential areas appellant stopped and exposed himself to a child under 14 years of age and asked the child to get in the truck and go with him. The children described appellant and the truck, and appellant was apprehended after the mother of one of the children noticed a truck which matched the description her child had given, followed the truck, wrote down the tag number, and gave the information to the sheriff's department. After appellant was arrested, he gave a statement in which he admitted exposing himself to the children.
1. Appellant enumerates the general grounds, arguing that the crime of child molestation requires specific intent, which was not shown by the State. OCGA § 16-6-4(a) provides that "[a] person commits the offense of child molestation when he does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 14 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person." In this case, the trial court charged the jury that they must find an intent on appellant's part to arouse his own sexual desires in order to convict appellant of child molestation. The court also instructed the jury that they "may find such intention, or the absence thereof, upon a consideration of words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is being prosecuted." At appellant's request, the trial court also charged the jury as to public indecency.
A reviewing court will not disturb a factual determination by the jury on intent unless it is contrary to the evidence and clearly erroneous. Thomas v. State, 176 Ga.App. 771, 773, 337 S.E.2d 344 (1985). Mallette v. State, 119 Ga.App. 24, 27, 165 S.E.2d 870 (1969). Here the jury was permitted to infer intent from appellant's actions, including the fact that he asked the children to get in his truck and go for a ride with him. The jury decided the question of intent adversely to appellant, and we cannot say their determination was contrary to the evidence or clearly erroneous. The evidence in this case was sufficient to sustain the verdict.
2. Appellant contends the trial court erred by refusing to allow a psychologist to give his opinion that, in exposing himself, appellant did not act with sexual intent. The record reveals that Dr. James Thomas, a licensed clinical psychologist, testified that he interviewed appellant, administered certain psychodiagnostic tests, and concluded that appellant was an exhibitionist. Although Dr. Thomas was not permitted to respond when asked on redirect examination whether, based on his information, training, and knowledge "he had formed any opinion as to whether or not [appellant] had sexual intent in the act he was performing here," he had already responded on direct examination to the question "[w]as there any sexual desire or sexuality involved in the acts that [appellant] committed, in your opinion?" by saying: "[n]o." Accordingly, although it may have been error to prevent Dr. Thomas' answer to the question on redirect examination, see Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981), we are unable to perceive any harm to appellant, as the same evidence had already been admitted without objection, and Raines v. State, 186 Ga.App. 239, 242(4)(c), 366 S.E.2d 841 (1988).
3. We find no merit in appellant's contention that the trial court erred by charging the jury that the required intent could be inferred by the jury from appellant's actions. Appellant has failed to cite any authority for this enumeration, and it is thus deemed abandoned pursuant to this Court's Rule 15(c)(2). Smith v. State, 187 Ga.App. 322, 325(7), 370 S.E.2d 185 (1988). Moreover, the...
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...and requiring other members to reveal their identity." To warrant reversal, harm as well as error must be shown. Blanton v. State, 191 Ga.App. 454, 455(2), 382 S.E.2d 133. In the case sub judice, defendant fails to show harm in the requirement that he attend "NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS MEETINGS TW......
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Brown v. State, A13A1595.
...OCGA § 16–6–4(a). The question of intent “is peculiarly a question of fact for determination by the jury,” Blanton v. State, 191 Ga.App. 454, 455(1), 382 S.E.2d 133 (1989), which may infer a defendant's intent from the evidence presented at trial. Branam v. State, 204 Ga.App. 205, 206(1), 4......
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Cornelius v. State
...motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted." OCGA § 16-2-6. See Blanton v. State, 191 Ga.App. 454(1), 455, 382 S.E.2d 133. In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that defendant touched the mouth of the 11-year-old victim with his mouth a......