Blase v. City of Neosho, Civil Action Number 10-03311-CV-S-JTM
| Decision Date | 17 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action Number 10-03311-CV-S-JTM |
| Parties | Jan M. Blase, Plaintiff, v. The City of Neosho, Steve Hart, Richard Davidson, Tom Workman, David Ruth, Charles Collinsworth, and Steven Hays, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
On February 22, 2010, Jan Blase ("Blase") was terminated as the City Manager of Neosho, Missouri ("Neosho"). A few months thereafter, on July 19, 2010, Blase filed an action in state court against Neosho, the individual members of the City Council for Neosho, and the Neosho City Attorney. The Petition asserted four counts:
The case was subsequently removed from the state court to this Court and currently pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment [Doc. 22] filed by the defendants.1 For the reasons set out herein, the motion is granted.
With regard to Blase's first allegation, to wit, that his termination violated the due process protections embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment, although not specifically cited by Blase, such a claim is cognizable - if at all - pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First enacted by Congress following the conclusion of the Civil War, section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. By its plain terms then section 1983 provides a remedy "against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights," including the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2041 (1978).
It is well settled that the Constitution, as construed over the years, encompasses two different types of due process claims - substantive due process and procedural due process. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1713 (1998). Affording Blase's Petition a favorable reading, he is complaining about both procedural and substantive due process violations in his termination by Neosho. While the nature of the two due process claims is distinct, both types of claims involve one common and essential element:
Section 1983 relief is predicated on the denial of a right or interest protected by the Constitution. . . . Analysis of either a procedural or substantive due process claim must begin with an examination of the interest allegedly violated. Protected property interests are created by state law, but federal constitutional law determines whether the interest created by state law rises to the level of a protected property interest.
Dover Elevator Co. v. Arkansas State University, 64 F.3d 442, 445-46 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Accordingly to prevail on either a substantive due process claim or a procedural due process claim, Blase must be able to establish that he had a protected property interest in his job as City Manager with Neosho.
Blase was an at-will employee of Neosho. As the City Manager, he was appointed by the City Council and "serve[d] at the pleasure of the Council." Neosho City Code § 105.140. Blase did enter into an Employment Agreement with Neosho that was intended to memorialize certain benefits and establish working conditions for Blase's employment with Neosho. However, that Employment Agreement also specifically provided:
Nothing in this agreement shall prevent, limit, or otherwise interfere with the right of the Council to terminate the services of [Blase] at any time, subject only to the provisions set forth in Section 3, Paragraphs A and B, of this Agreement and the City Charter.
Employment Agreement § 2(A). The City Charter provides that "[t]he City Manager shall hold office at the pleasure of the Council." Neosho City Charter § 3.02. Section 3 of the Employment Agreement merely provides severance pay terms in the event Blase was terminated by Neosho.
As an at-will employee in Missouri, Blase could have been discharged by Neosho "for cause or without cause." Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). Indeed,Blase could even have been discharged "for no reason or for an arbitrary or irrational reason." Shawcross v. Pyro Products, Inc., 916 S.W.2d 342, 343 ( (quotations omitted). Given this status under Missouri law, a substantial question arises as to whether Blase had a property interest under Missouri law in his employment with Neosho and, to the extent that he did, whether federal constitutional law would conclude that the property interest rises to the level of a protected property interest. Indeed, in broad terms, it is well settled that "that an at-will employee has no property interest to support a claim for violation of due process when discharged." Daniels v. Board of Curators of Lincoln University, 51 S.W.3d 1, 7 ( .
Blase argues, however, that his due process claim falls within an exception to the general rule based on his Employment Agreement with Neosho. Specifically, Blase argues that his due process rights were violated when: (1) he was not paid severance pay following his termination, and (2) the procedures employed by Neosho in conducting his termination hearing were inadequate. The Court rejects both arguments.
With regard to Blase's assertion that Neosho has violated his due process rights by breaching the Employment Agreement (by the non-payment of severance), Blase does not state a constitutionally protected property interest, but rather a garden variety breach of contract claim. As the Eighth Circuit has noted, "[i]t is well established that "a simple breach of contract does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation." Dover Elevator Co. v. Arkansas State University, 64 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1995) (). Indeed, as summarized by another court:
[These] courts have observed that if every breach of contract by someone acting under color of state law constituted a deprivation of property for procedural due process purposes, the federal courts would be called upon to pass judgment on the procedural fairness of the processing of a myriad of contractual claims against public entities. We agree that such wholesale federalization of state public contract law seems far afield from the great purposes of the due process clause.
Unger v. Nat'l Residents Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1398 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
Furthermore, as to the conduct of the termination hearing, Blase complains that he was not afforded the names of witnesses to be called and the documents to introduced at his termination hearing prior to the hearing. However, Blase has produced no evidence establishing that he was entitled to such pre-hearing discovery, including no evidence that such discovery was an implied contractual term "arising out of customs, practices and de facto policies." Winegar v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 20 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir. 1994). As such, the Court finds that Blase had no constitutionally protected property interest in the precise manner that Neosho conducted his termination hearing.
Inasmuch as the Court concludes that Blase has failed to identify and establish any constitutionally protected property interest. Blase's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of his due process rights necessarily fails.
In his second cause of action, Blase asserts that his termination was "wrongful" under Missouri law in that it was in violation of public policy. Although Blase purports to assert this claim against Neosho and the City Council and City Attorney, the latter individuals are not proper party-defendants in a wrongful termination action. A wrongful discharge claim, ifcognizable at all, is only appropriate against a plaintiff's employer. The City Council members were essentially Blase's supervisors, not his employer; while the City Attorney was essentially a co-employee. Compare Buckner v. Atlantic Plant Maintenance, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 12, 230 Ill. Dec. 596, 694 N.E.2d 565 (1998); Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333 (1998) (). Moreover, even if the individual defendants could be deemed to be Blase's employer, they would be entitled to official immunity protecting them from liability. Gavan v. Madison Memorial Hospital, 700 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Mo. App. 1985) (). If not official immunity, then the Court concludes that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
It is well understood that "the doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials . . . from individual liability . . . unless their conduct violated 'clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 473...
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