Blasing v. P. R. L. Hardenbergh Co.
| Decision Date | 31 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 44609,44609 |
| Parties | Victor J. BLASING, d.b.a. Vic's Barber Shop, et al., Respondents, v. P. R. L. HARDENBERGH COMPANY, Appellant, Phil Sampson Interiors, Inc., Respondent. PHIL SAMPSON INTERIORS, INC., Respondent, v. P. R. L. HARDENBERGH COMPANY, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. In a negligence action based upon the theory that the manufacturer and the distributor of a liquid finish remover had failed to give adequate notice to users that the vapors from the remover were flammable, Held there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that defendants were negligent.
2. Where there is evidence in the record to support a finding by the jury that the user of the remover was not aware of the flammability of the vapors, and where there is evidence in the record to support a finding that the user of the remover had read the labels on the cans of remover, there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the negligence of the manufacturer and the distributor in failing to give adequate warning of the fire hazards associated with the vapors was a proximate cause of the fire.
3. The fact that a person causing an accident has complied with a statute or ordinance regulating conduct under the circumstances does not preclude a finding of common-law negligence.
4. The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendants' requested jury instructions.
Shanedling, Phillips, Gross & Aaron, Allen H. Aaron and Richard T. Wylie, Minneapolis, for appellants.
Robins, Daivs & Lyons and A. James Anderson and Robert M. Wattson, Minneapolis, for Blasing.
Hagglund & Johnson, Minneapolis, for Sampson.
Sahr, Kunert, Tambornino & Soshnik, Minneapolis, for respondents.
Heard before SHERAN, C.J., and KELLY and MacLAUGHLIN, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.
This is an appeal from the denial of an alternative motion for judgment n.o.v. or a new trial and from the judgment for some of the plaintiffs. We affirm.
Victor J. Blasing, d.b.a. Vic's Barber Shop; 1 Winton N. Petersen, d.b.a. Chicken Pete; and Sven O. Anderson, d.b.a. Anderson Hardware, (plaintiffs) were tenants in a commercial building in Minneapolis which was damaged by fire on May 3, 1968. The fire originated in a portion of the basement occupied by defendant Phil Sampson Interiors, Inc. Sampson had been using a room in the basement to remove the finish from old furniture and for this purpose made use of a flammable liquid called Kut-Koat, which is manufactured by defendant James B. Day and Company and distributed locally by defendant P. R. L. Hardenbergh Company. Plaintiffs brought an action against Phil Sampson Interiors, Inc., and P. R. L. Hardenbergh Company for damages caused by the fire. Sampson brought a similar action against Hardenbergh and James B. Day and Company. These actions were consolidated for trial. The jury returned a special verdict ascribing 65 percent of the causal negligence to Sampson and 35 percent of the causal negligence to Hardenbergh and Day. Sampson has not appealed and the issues before us are those raised by defendants Hardenbergh and Day.
Steven C. Johnson, an employee of Sampson, was removing the finish from an old table on the day of the fire. Although Johnson had trouble recalling the particular remover he used that day, both he and Phil Sampson, the sole shareholder of Sampson, testified that Kut-Koat was the only remover ever used by Sampson. Johnson was working close to the center of the basement room over a floor drain. Approximately 15 feet distant from the working area were two gas water heaters, each having a separate pilot light. Approximately 12 feet away was a furnace with an open flame. There was a bathroom opening off the workroom, and a 2-foot by 2-foot fan in the bathroom window provided the only ventilation in the basement area. In the course of removing the finish from the table, Johnson applied Kut-Koat on the table with a brush. After the finish had softened he removed the finish with a putty knife and washed the liquid down the floor drain with warm water. While he was working with his back to the water heaters, Johnson heard a 'poof' sound and turned to see the floor 'light up' with the flames approaching from the direction of the water heaters.
Edward O. Locke, an expert witness called by plaintiffs, testified that in his opinion the fire was directly caused by the use of Kut-Koat. Locke testified that, as is true with all flammable liquids, it is not the liquid itself but the vapors given off by the liquid that burn. The lowest temperature at which a combustible liquid will give off sufficient vapors to be ignited by a source of ignition is called the flashpoint. The flashpoint of Kut-Koat is below 20 F. It is therefore constantly giving off flammable vapors at room temperature. If these vapors reach a certain concentration in the air and come in contact with a source of ignition, they will ignite with a flame front radiating away from the source of ignition until all the vapors are burned. The fire will then remain at the liquid which is giving off the vapors. Since the flame front often travels at speeds approaching or exceeding the speed of sound, a 'poof' sound will be heard. It was Locke's opinion that because the room was inadequately ventilated the vapors were able to form in sufficient concentration to ignite. He also stated that the vapors concentrated along the floor and were drawn by air currents toward the water heaters, where they were ignited by the pilot lights. It was his opinion that the use of warm water to wash the table further increased the chance of fire since it increased the rate of evaporation of the Kut-Koat.
Plaintiffs argued that defendants Day and Hardenbergh were negligent in labeling Kut-Koat because there was insufficient warning affixed to the Kut-Koat can of the danger of fire presented by the vapors. It is not clear from the record exactly what warning appeared on the can of Kut-Koat in use on the day of the fire. Phil Sampson testified that each 5-gallon can he used up until the date of the fire contained a single white label with red lettering. Several employees of defendants, however, testified that up until the time of the fire every can of Kut-Koat contained the following label, which consists of black lettering on a red background:
NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE
Phil Sampson denied that the black-on-red label appeared on any can of Kut-Koat purchased before the fire by his company. He also testified that it had been some years since he last read the Kut-Koat labels, and that he had not noticed any changes or apparent changes in the label for some time before the fire. Sampson also stated that he was not aware that the vapors presented any danger of fire and that he did not consider the room to be inadequately ventilated under the circumstances. Steven Johnson testified that he was not familiar with vapors, but did not know or believe that the vapors themselves were flammable. He also testified that he had read the Kut-Koat label some months previous to the fire.
Defendants further contend that all cans of Kut-Koat contained a yellow-and-black label that warned that the product should be used only with adequate ventilation. However, a study of the text of this particular label indicates that the warning was given in the context of the danger presented by breathing the vapors and not the danger presented by the flammable nature of the vapors. In any event, Phil Sampson testified that the yellow-and-black labels appeared only on cans of Kut-Koat purchased after the fire.
Defendants raise several issues on appeal: (a) Did defendants negligently fail to give adequate warning to users of Kut-Koat of the hazards...
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