Blatt v. University of So. California

• Decision Date: 25 March 1970
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Meyer BLATT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, a California corporation, University ofSouthern California Chapter of the Order of the Coif, an unincorporatedassociation, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 34523.

Page 601

85 Cal.Rptr. 601

5 Cal.App.3d 935

Meyer BLATT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, a California corporation, University ofSouthern California Chapter of the Order of the Coif, an unincorporatedassociation, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 34523.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

March 25, 1970.

Hearing Denied May 21, 1970.

Wirin, Rissman, Okrand & Posner, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

Musick, Peeler & Garrett, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

SCHWEITZER, Associate Justice.

Appeal from a judgment dismissing an action following an order sustaining a general demurrer without leave to amend to the second amended complaint. The complaint is for injunctive and declaratory relief and seeks to compel the admission of plaintiff to membership in the Order of the Coif, a national honorary legal society.

The Pleadings

Plaintiff was a June 1967 graduate of the School of Law, University of Southern California, and is a member of the California bar. Defendants are the University of Southern California, the national society known as the Order of the Coif, the local chapter of the society, and members of the committee of the local chapter having the authority and responsibility to elect members from graduating students.

The complaint alleges that the Order of the Coif (hereinafter referred to as the Order) gives recognition to high scholastic grade levels attained by law students; that members are elected from law students in the top 10 per cent in scholarship in those accredited law schools having a chapter; that defendant University of Southern California has a chapter; that '(e)lection to the Order of the Coif elevates the esteem, standing and position of the law student elected in the eyes of the school faculty, fellow students, judges, the legal profession and the public at large; and greatly enhances his employment possibilities and economic position after graduation and admittance to the Bar'; that plaintiff was a night law student at University of Southern California from September 1961 until graduation in June 1967; that the individual defendants were members of the selection committee of the local chapter of the Order and were authorized to establish the policy and rules for election of members within the limits of its constitution; ¹ that after plaintiff became a student the individual defendants represented to him that if he were in the top 10 per cent of his graduating class, he 'would be eligible for election to membership in the Order;' that plaintiff relied on these representations in order to attain membership in the Order, ranked fourth scholastically in his graduating class of 135 students, and was thereby in the top 10 per cent of his class in scholarship.

The complaint further alleges that in addition to his scholastic achievement plaintiff received awards for excelling in six classes and the highest grade in another class; that he was of good moral character, 'worthy of the honor,' and that his non-election 'was not due to his lack of worthiness, lack of character or unfitness'; that after his non-election the dean of the law school, who was also president of the local chapter of the Order, stated to plaintiff in a letter that plaintiff was 'obviously the sort of student who should qualify for election' and added: 'Both as your dean and as one of your instructors I wish to go on record as testifying to my pleasure and satisfaction in your performance throughout your law school career.'

Plaintiff alleges that in June 1967 the committee elected seven or eight mimbers to the Order who ranked below him in scholastic achievement; that plaintiff was not elected because 'membership was restricted to students who, being eligible for the school's Law Review, accepted the invitation to work on the Law Review and completed their assignments successfully'; that said reason 'was unreasonable, arbitrary and contrary to the representations' mentioned above, and was not applicable to plaintiff because it was a policy adopted after said representations were made to plaintiff; that prior to the adoption of the policy plaintiff served on the Law Review and submitted articles for publication therein; that after the adoption of the policy, plaintiff was not advised that it applied to him but was advised that the policy was applicable only to day students who thereafter became eligible for Law Review work; that plaintiff relied upon this advice and information and did not thereafter apply for or accept a Law Review assignment, although he did thereafter submit articles for publication in the Law Review, none of which, however, were published; and that other students who did not complete Law Review work and were in a similar position to plaintiff were elected to the Order.

The complaint concludes by alleging that plaintiff is qualified and entitled to membership in the Order, that defendants breached their promises and representations, and that he was denied membership therein by arbitrary and discriminatory action based upon erroneous and invalid reasons. The complaint seeks a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties, a determination that plaintiff is entitled to election to membership in the Order, and an order directing defendants to admit plaintiff to membership.

Contentions

On appeal plaintiff contends that the complaint sets forth a justiciable issue and that it sufficiently alleges a breach of contract and promissory estoppel. We hold that each contention is without merit and that defendants' demurrer to the second amended complaint was properly sustained without leave to amend.

Judicial Review of Membership Exclusion

Plaintiff argues that organizations whose membership offers the member educational, professional or financial advantage cannot arbitrarily and discriminatorily deny admission to one who has met and complied with all the stated and represented requirements of membership. He admits that the courts in the past have refused to interfere with professional and honorary societies to compel one's admission (89 A.L.R.2d 964) but calls our attention to recent cases where courts have interfered to compel admission to membership in voluntary associations that have some effect upon the applicant's professional or economic success, or where the association has a professional or economic interest. (Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, 1 Cal.3d 160, 81 Cal.Rptr. 623, 460 P.2d 495; James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329; Kronen v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, 237 Cal.App.2d 289, 46 Cal.Rptr. 808; and Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791, 89 A.L.R.2d 952.) He attributes this change in judicial attitude primarily to the recognition by the courts of the increasing effect that private and voluntary organizations have on the individual's ability and access to the economic marketplace and his opportunities to earn a living or practice his trade or profession.

In Kronen, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d 289, 46 Cal.Rptr. 808, the court determined preliminarily that a dentist whose application for membership in defendant professional associations had been rejected was entitled to judicial review of the circumstances surrounding the rejection to determine whether the rejection was an arbitrary or unlawful exercise of the power to exclude him. The evidence indicated that membership in the associations would entitle the plaintiff to be identified as a specialist, the court stating on page 304, 46 Cal.Rptr. on page 819: 'It is common knowledge that in this day of specialization, the doctor or dentist limiting his practice to a specialty enjoys a prestigious position with attendant economic advantages. It appears to us on this record that as a practical matter, an orthodontist like plaintiff cannot successfuly limit his practice to orthodontics unless he becomes an active member of defendant organizations.' The court found, however, that the rejection of plaintiff's application was proper because he failed to meet the requirement that he be recommended by two active members of the associations.

Unlike Kronen, supra, in Pinsker, supra, 1 Cal.3d 160, 81 Cal.Rptr. 623, 460 P.2d 495, plaintiff had met all the requirements of membership in the defendant professional associations except election to membership. The evidence indicated that membership would qualify him for the dental specialty of orthodontics, would enable him to command higher fees, would increase the number of dentists referrals, and would make him eligible to enroll in advanced professional courses. In reversing the judgment for defendants that had been based on the trial court's finding that there had been no showing of 'economic necessity' for membership, the Supreme Court stated at page 166, 81 Cal.Rptr. at page 627, 460 P.2d at page 499: 'Because of the unique position in the field of orthodontics occupied by defendant (American Association of Orthodontists) and its constituent organizations, membership therein, although not economically necessary in the strict sense of the word (as was the case in Falcone), would appear to be a practical necessity for a dentist who wishes not only to make a good living as an orthodontist but also to realize maximum potential achievement and recognition in such specialty. Defendant associations hold themselves out to the public and the dental profession generally as the sole organizations recognized by the (American Dental Association), which is itself a virtual monopoly, to determine standards, both ethical and educational, for the practice and certification of orthodontics. Thus, a public interest is shown, and the associations must be viewed as having a fiduciary responsibility with respect to the acceptance or rejection of membership applications. * * * Under the circumstances, an applicant for membership has a judicially enforceable right to...