Blazek v. U.S. Cellular Corp.
| Decision Date | 28 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. C 11–4056–MWB.,C 11–4056–MWB. |
| Citation | 937 F.Supp.2d 1003 |
| Parties | Lisa BLAZEK, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES CELLULAR CORPORATION, USCC Payroll Corporation, Jeffrey Storey, Dave Sierck, Dennis Leroy, and Paul Daniels, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jay Elliott Denne, Stanley E. Munger, Munger, Reinschmidt & Denne, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiff.
Kerrie M. Murphy, Bret Alan Dublinske, Julie Tomka Bittner, Gonzalez, Saggio & Harlan, LLP, West Des Moines, IA, Tracy L. Farley, Adrianne C. Mazura, Quarles & Brady LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
This Twom-bal1 motion to dismiss in this garden-variety employment discrimination case raises a Mobius strip like question of whether the defendants' claim of implausibility of the plaintiff's claims is itself implausible. More specifically, has a female retail wireless consultant for a cellular telephone company adequately pleaded her claims of sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code Ch. 216? The defendants do not think so, so they have moved to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The defendants contend that the plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations of harassment, discrimination, and retaliation are insufficient to state claims for relief that are plausible on their face or to establish any basis for individual liability on her state-law claims. The plaintiff counters that her amended complaint and incorporated administrative charge set forth sufficient facts to make her claims plausible.
Twom-bal motions to dismiss, especially in run of the mill single-plaintiff Title VII cases like this one, raise the specter that they will become as ubiquitous in federal employment discrimination cases as motions for summary judgment. A major concern of this potential pleading revolution is that it will further drive up the already too high cost of litigation under important federal employment civil rights statutes, especially where the Twom-bal motions are mostly frivolous, like this one, notwithstanding that it was signed by three different attorneys from two national law firms.
It would be exceptionally rare, at least in a case where the plaintiff is represented by counsel, that even if allegations in a complaint are found to be implausible under Twom-bal, such implausibility could not be easily cured by amending the complaint. Indeed, in the most complex Twom-bal motions I have ruled on, after granting the motions, the 13 consolidated class action plaintiffs amended their complaint and the case quickly settled for 18 million dollars.2 So, pardon my skepticism in questioning whether the Twom-bal revolution has more to do with law firm economics than legitimate concerns about the adequacy of plaintiffs' initial pleading that are almost always so easily cured.
“When ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Thus, the factual background presented here is based, in the first instance, on the plaintiff's allegations in her Amended Complaint (docket no. 3).
Plaintiff Lisa Blazek alleges that, from April 17, 2007, until her constructive discharge on or about March 9, 2010, she was employed as a retail wireless consultant by defendants United States Cellular Corporation and USCC Payroll Corporation in Spencer, Clay County, Iowa. In her Amended Complaint, Blazek refers to these corporate defendants collectively as USCC, and I will do the same.3 Blazek alleges that she was subjected to a sexually hostile environment due to the behavior of USCC and its employees and was subjected to retaliation by them after engaging in protected activity.
More specifically, Blazek alleges the following:
The harassment of Plaintiff included, but is not limited to, the following:
personal sex lives and the sex lives of customers coming into the store;
b. Co-employees frequently asked Plaintiff sexually invasive questions related to her personal sex life;
c. Co-employees frequently asked Plaintiff about her private parts;
d. Co-employees frequently searched the phones of customers trying to find naked or sexually suggestive pictures and many times, those pictures were shown to Plaintiff;
e. Plaintiff repeatedly complained to management about the sexually hostile work environment and was told that she had to deal with it herself since she was the one bothered by it;
f. Following her complaints about the sexually hostile work environment, she...
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