Bleil v. State

Decision Date09 June 2016
Docket NumberNO. 02–15–00120–CR,02–15–00120–CR
Parties Leticia Bleil, Appellant v. The State of Texas, State
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Richard A. Henderson, Richard A. Henderson, P.C., Fort Worth, TX, for Appellant.

Sharen Wilson, Criminal District Attorney; Debra Windsor, Chief of Post Convictions; Mark Kratovil, J. Eric Nickols, Melinda Westmoreland, Assistant Criminal District Attorneys for Tarrant County, Fort Worth, TX, for State.

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; WALKER and SUDDERTH, JJ.

OPINION

BONNIE SUDDERTH, JUSTICE

I. Introduction

The State used the law of parties to convict appellant Leticia Bleil of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen on the theory that on multiple occasions over the course of several months, Bleil traded sex with her twelve-year-old child T. to Thomas Lyle Crick in exchange for drugs and money. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02 (West Supp.2015). In eight issues, ranging from suppression of evidence and specificity of the indictment to sufficiency of the evidence and charge error, Bleil appeals. We affirm.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Twelve-year-old T. first met twenty-nine-year old Crick when she accompanied her mother—Bleil—to Crick's residence to purchase drugs. Upon arrival, Bleil and Crick retreated into the garage together while T. and her younger brother remained in the vehicle. Approximately ten minutes later, Bleil and Crick emerged from the garage and returned to the vehicle. Crick took a look at T. through the car window, turned to Bleil, and said, “I can make a 14–year–old girl scream.” Bleil laughed in response.

Later that evening, Crick telephoned Bleil at her home, and after speaking with Crick for a few minutes, Bleil instructed T. to “pack a little bag” because, according to Bleil, T. was going to Crick's house “for babysitting.” T. did as she was told—she packed a bag with some clothing inside in preparation to go to Crick's house for babysitting—even though her mother had not made babysitting arrangements for her two younger brothers and was not even leaving her house that evening. Nevertheless, Crick's mother, Junita, arrived at Bleil's home to pick up T. and then drove her to the house where Crick resided.1 Crick was waiting at the door upon her arrival.

When she first entered the home, T. sat with Crick on the couch, and the two talked for a while. Eventually, they went into Crick's bedroom, where they sat on the bed and continued talking. At this point, T. said she realized that she would be staying overnight, so she offered to sleep on the floor. Crick declined her offer, assuring her that he would sleep on the floor instead, but when T. laid down on the bed, he laid down beside her, where, after having sex with her, he stayed for the remainder of the night.2

That night marked the first of many evenings over a four-month span that would begin with Junita delivering T. to Crick's doorstep and would conclude with sexual activities, including sexual intercourse, between Crick and T. After that first evening, Crick introduced T. to methamphetamine and began supplying her with it to smoke. With his mother's help, at some point, Crick also provided T. with “morning-after” pills, which T. would take after having sex with him.3 Sometimes the next morning, other times days later, Junita would drive T. back home.4 Crick also had T. take methamphetamine back to her mother.5

On the morning T. arrived home following her first visit to Crick's home, Bleil followed T. into her room and asked her if Crick had touched her or done anything to her. T. responded “no.”6 Bleil never inquired again. Also after that first occasion, Bleil never again referred to the arrangement between T. and Crick as “babysitting.”

Four months later, when the police responded to a 911 complaint about a child at Crick's residence, T. had been staying at Crick's house for a period of several days. T. was described as drowsy, reeking of drugs and still under their influence, and reluctant to admit to having had sex with Crick when questioned. Only when her aunt7 threatened to take her to the hospital for an examination did T. reveal the details about her frequent stays with Crick, the sexual assaults, and the drug use. Upon examination at Cook Children's Medical Center, T. tested positive for chlamydia.

The police conducted a search of Crick's home, and in his bedroom they found morning-after pills, condoms, petite- or child-sized lingerie, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. After a warrant was issued for his arrest, Crick, who was on parole at the time, cut off his ankle monitor and fled.

The police questioned Bleil, who gave two interviews during the course of the investigation, both of which were recorded and portions of which were admitted into evidence and published to the jury at trial. During these interviews, Bleil admitted that Crick was her methamphetamine dealer. And, according to Detective Person, by way of explanation of the nature of the relationship between Crick, T., and herself—in an account that turns the commonly-understood concept of babysitting on its head—Bleil relayed that, as Crick had once explained to his father, Crick was paying Bleil so that Crick could babysit T.8 Detective Person testified that when asked if she had ever received drugs in return for sending T. to Crick's house, Bleil nodded her head up-and-down, indicating yes. In her audio-recorded statement, Bleil agreed that she received drugs and money after sending her child to Crick, but she denied the existence of an arrangement to that effect, stating that she never asked him what the drugs and money were in exchange for.

Bleil was charged with continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen. The jury convicted Bleil, and the trial court assessed her punishment at thirty years' confinement.

III. Sufficiency

In her first issue, Bleil argues that the trial court committed harmful error by overruling her motion for instructed verdict, asserting that there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law that she was a party to the offense.

A. Standard of Review

A challenge to the denial of a motion for instructed verdict is actually a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Canales v. State, 98 S.W.3d 690, 693 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1051, 124 S.Ct. 806, 157 L.Ed.2d 701 (2003) ; Pollock v. State, 405 S.W.3d 396, 401 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.). In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

To determine whether the State has met its burden under Jackson to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we compare the elements of the crime as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge to the evidence adduced at trial. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex.Crim.App.2014) ; see Crabtree v. State, 389 S.W.3d 820, 824 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (“The essential elements of the crime are determined by state law.”). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 8. The law as authorized by the indictment means the statutory elements of the charged offense as modified by the factual details and legal theories contained in the charging instrument. See id. ; see also Rabb v. State, 434 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex.Crim.App.2014) (“When the State pleads a specific element of a penal offense that has statutory alternatives for that element, the sufficiency of the evidence will be measured by the element that was actually pleaded, and not any alternative statutory elements.”). A person can be convicted as a party even if the indictment does not explicitly charge her as a party. Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d 503, 506 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).

The State charged Bleil with having, on or about September 22, 2012 through January 24, 2013,

intentionally or knowingly, during a period of time that is 30 days or more in duration, commit[ted] two or more acts of sexual abuse, to wit: aggravated sexual assault of a child by causing the sexual organ of Thomas Crick to contact the sexual organ of [T.] and/or by causing the mouth of Thomas Crick to contact the sexual organ of [T.], and/or by causing the mouth of [T.] to contact the sexual organ of Thomas Crick, and/or by causing Thomas Crick to penetrate the sexual organ of [T.] by inserting his finger into her sexual organ, and/or indecency with a child by causing [T.] to contact the genitals of Thomas Crick, and/or by causing Thomas Crick to contact the genitals of [T.], and at the time of the commission of each of these acts of sexual abuse the defendant was 17 years of age or older and [T.] was younger than 14 years of age.

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b). The statute defines “act of sexual abuse” as any act in violation of one or more of several penal laws—as pertinent here—penal code section 21.11(a)(2), indecency with a child, and penal code section 22.021, aggravated sexual assault of a child. Id. § 21.02(c)(2), (4).

Under the law of parties, the State is able to enlarge a defendant's criminal responsibility to include acts in which he or she may not have been the principal actor. Ryser v. State, 453 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd) (citing Goff v. State, 931 S.W.2d 537, 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) ). A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by her own conduct, by the conduct of another for which she is...

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    ...criminal responsibility to include acts in which he or she may not have been the principal actor. Bleil v. State, 496 S.W.3d 194, 202 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref'd) (citing Ryser v. State, 453 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd)); see also Goff v. State, ......
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    ...criminal responsibility to include acts in which he or she may not have been the principal actor. Bleil v. State, 496 S.W.3d 194, 202 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref'd) (citing Ryser v. State, 453 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd)); see also Goff v. State, ......
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