Blende v. Stanford

• Decision Date: 14 July 1965
• Docket Number: No. 8645,8645
• Citation: 403 P.2d 807,98 Ariz. 251
• Parties: O. J. BLENDE, Petitioner, v. The Honorable R. C. STANFORD, Jr., Judge of the Superior Court, Maricopa County, Arizona, the Maricopa County Medical Society, John A. Eisenbeiss, Jr., Paul L. Singer, Clyde J. Barker, Jr., as former members of the Board of Censors of Maricopa County Medical Society, Respondents.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 807

403 P.2d 807

98 Ariz. 251

O. J. BLENDE, Petitioner, v. The Honorable R. C. STANFORD, Jr., Judge of the Superior Court, Maricopa County, Arizona, the Maricopa County Medical Society, John A. Eisenbeiss, Jr., Paul L. Singer, Clyde J. Barker, Jr., as former members of the Board of Censors of Maricopa County Medical Society, Respondents.

No. 8645.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

July 14, 1965.

Lewis, Roca, Scoville, Beauchamp & Linton and Roger W. Kaufman, Phoenix, for petitioner.

Snell & Wilmer and Roger W. Perry, Phoenix, for respondents.

STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice.

On February 4, 1965, petitioner filed with this Court his petition for alternative writ of mandamus, alleging in effect the failure of the court below to comply with the mandate of this Court. Blende v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 96 Ariz. 240, 393 P.2d 926. We ordered that the alternative writ issue, directing the trial court to immediately proceed to trial upon the issues as stated in this Court's opinion or, in the alternative, show cause why the writ should not be made permanent.

Originally O. E. Blende filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the superior court against the County Medical Society and its Board of Censors to review denial of his application for permanent membership in the Society. Respondent's motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted for the reason that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Upon appeal of that judgment to this Court we found that the complaint did '* * * set forth a cause of action for which relief could be granted--if denial of membership in the Society will deprive [petitioner] of hospital staff privileges, then the Society may not arbitrarily deny him membership.' 96 Ariz. at 244, 393 P.2d at 929. In reversing and remanding the case for further action, we stated the issues upon which the trial should proceed:

'But there still may exist the question of a definite, though informal relation between membership in the Society and maintenance of staff privileges in local hospitals. If [petitioner] can show the existence of such a relation, then his membership application may not be denied arbitrarily, but only on a showing of just cause established by the Society under proceedings embodying the elements of due process.' Ibid. 244-245, 393 P.2d 930.

There are two principal issues for determination in the litigation. First, whether membership in the Society was a prerequisite for maintenance of staff privileges in local hospitals and, if so, second, whether petitioner's application for membership was denied without just cause established in proceedings embodying the elements of due process. Instead of proceeding with the matter on the issues as we directed, the trial court granted respondents' motion for a separate hearing on this issue:

'* * * whether the Petitioner, O. J. Blende, has been deprived of staff membership in the hospitals of Maricopa County, Arizona, by reason of a definite relationship between membership in the Society and maintenance of staff privileges in the hospitals, * * *.'

This changed the issues by requiring petitioner to prove not only the existence of an informal relationship but also that such relationship was the cause of his being deprived of staff membership in local hospitals. of the law of the case.

Respondents urge that petitioner is attempting to compel the superior court to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular manner or to reach a particular result. They also maintain that this, in effect, is an appeal of an interlocutory and preliminary ruling. These arguments would be valid as to matters which were not disposed of by us in our former decision but, having become the law of the...