Blenheim Homes, Inc. v. Mathews

• Decision Date: 19 February 1963
• Citation: 196 N.E.2d 612,26 O.O.2d 142,119 Ohio App. 44
• Parties: , 26 O.O.2d 142 BLENHEIM HOMES, INC., Appellee, v. MATHEWS et al., Appellants. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 44

119 Ohio App. 44

196 N.E.2d 612, 26 O.O.2d 142

BLENHEIM HOMES, INC., Appellee, v. MATHEWS et al., Appellants. ^*

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Feb. 19, 1963.

Rose, Young & Yearling, Columbus, for appellee.

Guy R. Martin, Columbus, for appellants.

DUFFEY, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County reversing the Municipal Court of Columbus. The suit was for forcible entry and detainer, and for rent. The Municipal Court decided in favor of the defendant-appellant. The Common Pleas Court reversed in favor of the plaintiff-appellee.

The petition merely alleges unlawful detention since August 1, 1961, alleges that the defendant is a purchaser under a land contract with plaintiff-appellee, and alleges default under the contract. A second cause of action alleges that there is 'rent' due at the rate of $106 per month (the amount of the contract monthly installment) from August 1, 1961, with interest at 8 per cent from that date.

The answer denies wrongful detention, admits late payment on two installments, offers to pay them and prays that the plaintiff be required to accept that payment. On the second cause of action the answer alleges the amounts paid on the contract the value of improvements, that the house was not in proper condition and prays for judgment for $1,730. No motions were filed to any of the pleadings.

While the pleadings are obviously inept, the answer here amounts to the assertion of an equitable 'defense' seeking affirmative relief and, therefore, constitutes a counterclaim. See Sections 2309.13, 2309.15 and 2309.16, Revised Code.

The equitable jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Columbus is limited to that provided in Section 1901.18, Revised Code. Under that statute the Municipal Court has been granted equitable jurisdiction coextensive with that of the Common Pleas Court to fully deal with all aspects and claims which may arise in actions at law based upon contract. In the present case the plaintiff pleaded the contract in his petition. In doing so he anticipated the defense of a right to possession based on contract. The answer, in turn, partially anticipates the claim of forfeiture and cancellation of the contract by seeking to void the contract forfeiture porvision, relying on the power of the court to grant equitable relief. Thus, in the pleadings and in the evidence the contract became a principal issue in the case. Under these circumstances we believe the provisions of Section 1901.18 (C) became applicable, and the Municipal Court was vested with equitable jurisdiction to enforce all rights, legal and equitable, involved in the action.

Appellee agrees that the Municipal Court had equitable powers in this case. However, it contends that the only question in forcible entry and detainer is the right to possession. It further argues that, there being a forfeiture clause and admitted default, it is entitled to judgment. Many cases so holding are cited. We think these cases distinguishable.

Proof of title would establish a prima facie case in forcible entry and detainer since, in the absence of anything else, the right to possession follows the title. If a land contract gives the right of possession to a purchaser, then the contractual right (or equitable title) becomes a complete defense. It is a complete defense for the simple reason that the purchaser-defendant has thereby shown his right to possession. Thus, when the land contract was injected into this case, the issue became one of determining whether the defendant-appellant had the right to possession under the contract and on the facts.

If the trial court had lacked equitable jurisdiction the contractual right to possession could only be determined on the face of the contract--relying on basic principles of contract law. The limited jurisdiction of such a lower court would necessitate duplication and circuity of action. The doctrines which permit relief against forfeiture, by voiding and rendering unenforceable contract provisions which constitute a penalty, are equitable in nature. Such relief previously had to be obtained by proceedings in a court of general jurisdiction (Common Pleas). This explains many of the earlier Ohio cases, and more recent cases involving the County Courts. See, for example, Martin v. Bircher (1933), 46 Ohio App. 239, 188 N.E.2d 365, and State ex rel. Jenkins, v. County Court of Hamilton County (1961), 114 Ohio App. 231, 173 N.E.2d 186.

However, the Municipal Court's equitable jurisdiction distinguishes this case from those where no such jurisdiction exists. The court here had the power to make, and the defendant-appellant was entitled to, a determination of whether the vendor was on the facts working such a forfeiture as warranted equitable relief. If so, then the court could void the forfeiture and cancellation. With these provisions unenforceable, the contract would remain valid and binding, giving the right to possession to the defendant and, therefore, a complete defense. In other words, where the court has equitable jurisdiction, the determination of the existence of a contractual right to possession is not limited to the face of the contract. Such a court may inquire into the validity and enforceability of the provisions.

In view of the broader authority of the Municipal Court under Section 1901.18, Revised Code, the Common Pleas Court reversal can only be upheld if the finding by the Municipal Court of an inequitable forfeiture was against the manifest weight of the...