Blennerhassett v. Town of Forest City

• Citation: 117 Iowa 680,91 N.W. 1044
• Parties: BLENNERHASSETT v. TOWN OF FOREST CITY ET AL.
• Decision Date: 24 October 1902
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

117 Iowa 680

91 N.W. 1044

BLENNERHASSETT

v.TOWN OF FOREST CITY ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 24, 1902.

Appeal from district court, Winnebago county; C. H. Kelley, Judge.

Suit in equity to enjoin defendants from opening an alley in defendant town, which plaintiff has improved, used, and occupied for many years. The defendants claim that plaintiff was unlawfully obstructing the same, and that it was their duty to open and improve it for the benefit of the public. The case was tried to the court, resulting in a decree dismissing plaintiff's petition, and she appeals. Reversed.L. S. Butler and L. O. Hatch, for appellant.

Geo. D. Peters and Andrew Miller, for appellees.

DEEMER, J.

In the year 1857 the town of Forest City was platted by the owners of the soil on which the town now stands. The land so platted was divided into lots and blocks in the ordinary manner, and said plat shows an alley 33 feet wide running east and west through block No. 49. The west half of this alley was between what were denominated lots 3, on the north line, and lot 6, on the south side thereof. Appellant's husband became the owner by purchase of lot 3 in the year 1871, and he sold the same to his wife, the plaintiff herein, February 11, 1884. Her deed was not recorded, however, until March 25, 1895. Appellant also became the owner of 22 feet on the north side of lot 6 by deed of conveyance dated September 19, 1879. The dedication of the alley in question by the original proprietors was never accepted by ordinance, and, if there was any acceptance thereof, it is to be implied from use thereof. Some time prior to the year 1880 the plaintiff and her husband fenced the west end of said alley, set out trees and shrubbery, and established a private driveway thereon, dug a well, built a summerhouse, and otherwise used and improved it as a constituent part of the property owned by them on either side of the platted alley. They were not disturbed in their possession, which was continuous and without interruption, until about June 8, 1899, when defendants caused a notice to be served on plaintiff--her husband having died in the meantime--to remove the fences and all other obstructions from said alley. After receiving said notice, she commenced this action to restrain defendants from interfering with her possession of the property. Defendants contend that plaintiff never in fact owned any part of said alley, and has no title on which to base a claim of adverse possession; that the alley was duly accepted by the public; that the statute of limitations will in no event run against a municipality; that there are no facts in the case constituting an estoppel; and that appellant's claim has not been in good faith, but in recognition of the alley. On the other hand, plaintiff denies that the town ever accepted the dedication of the alley; says that, if it ever was accepted, it was abandoned, both by express act of the town, and by conduct from which an abandonment or vacation should be inferred; that plaintiff put large expense upon the property with full knowledge on the part of the town, and that the town is now estopped from asserting that it is a public alley; that both she and her husband claimed the property as theirs, not only under their deeds, but by reason of the vacation thereof by the board of supervisors of Winnebago county and by the town council of the defendant town. These are the issues on which the case was tried in the lower court, and upon which it must be determined here.

It must be conceded that plaintiff has neither the legal nor the paper title to the portion of the alley in dispute, unless that title has been acquired by adverse possession, or by an estoppel which, under the facts disclosed by this record, is akin to adverse possession. The platting of the ground, and the designation thereon of certain tracts as streets and alleys, was equivalent to a deed in fee simple thereof to the public; and the purchaser of lots abutting thereon took only to the lot line, and not to the center of the alley or street. Code 1851, § 637; Milburn v. City of Cedar Rapids, 12 Iowa, 247. An abutting property owner might, however, so use or occupy the street or alley under a claim that it was covered by his deed as to hold it by estoppel or adverse possession. Uptagraff v. Smith, 106 Iowa, 385, 76 N. W. 733, and cases cited. While there was undoubtedly a dedication of the entire alley in question to the public, there was no formal acceptance thereof by the town; nor has the municipality ever expended any money thereon, or done anything to fit it for public use. True, there is evidence that before plaintiff and her husband purchased the adjoining lots there was some travel over and through the block, and near to, along, and across this alley; but there was no definite line of travel, and, as one of the witnesses expressed it, “it was done just the same as a person would drive across the prairie when he wishes to.” We doubt very much whether there has been such an acceptance of the dedication as the law requires. City of Waterloo v. Union Mill Co., 72 Iowa, 437, 34 N. W. 197;Orr v. O'Brien, 77 Iowa, 253, 42 N. W. 183, 14 Am. St. Rep. 277;Town of Cambridge v. Cook, 97 Iowa, 599, 66 N. W. 884. But however that may be, in January of the year 1880 the town council of the...