Blevins v. Com., Record No. 031022.
Decision Date | 16 January 2004 |
Docket Number | Record No. 031022. |
Citation | 590 S.E.2d 365,267 Va. 291 |
Parties | Lawrence Kevin BLEVINS v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Robert D. Finch, Jr., Richmond, for appellant.
Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: HASSELL, C.J., LACY, KEENAN, KINSER, and LEMONS, JJ., and COMPTON and STEPHENSON, S.JJ.
OPINION BY Senior Justice ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
The issue in this appeal involves a trial court's refusal to declare a mistrial based on alleged juror partiality.
In a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the City of Roanoke, Lawrence Kevin Blevins was convicted of object sexual penetration, malicious wounding, and abduction with intent to defile. Blevins was sentenced to a total prison term of life, plus 40 years.
Thereafter, Blevins appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals. On April 29, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming the convictions. Blevins v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 412, 579 S.E.2d 658 (2003). We awarded Blevins an appeal, limited to the assignment of error as follows: "The trial court erred in overruling the [defendant's] motion for mistrial based on juror untruthfulness during voir dire."
A brief summary of the facts relating to the crime will suffice. On the evening of January 16, 2001, the victim had finished her work and was walking to her automobile, parked in a parking garage in the City of Roanoke. She was alone, and, as she put her key into her car door lock, "all hell broke loose." At that moment, the victim came face to face with the accused, who began to strike her with his fists. The accused told the victim that, if she would cooperate by performing a sex act with him, he would stop hitting her. The beating stopped, and the accused unzipped the victim's pants and inserted a finger into her vagina. He also fondled the victim's breasts.
Several minutes later, and before the accused could rape the victim, a car approached the victim's vehicle. When the approaching car stopped, the victim was able to escape to it, and the accused fled the scene.
The facts pertaining to the issue in this appeal are as follows. During voir dire, the trial court asked the prospective jurors whether "any of you or any members of your immediate family [have] ever been the victim of a serious offense?" All members of the venire answered negatively.
Immediately following the conclusion of Blevins' trial, Deputy Jessie W. Roberts encountered juror Bonnie Divers in the jury room. Divers told Roberts that she was waiting for someone to walk with her to her car, which was parked in a lot several blocks away. Roberts offered to escort Divers to her car. Roberts informed Divers that, if she had parked her car in a nearby parking garage, she would have been reimbursed for her parking expenses. Divers replied that she did not park in the parking garage because, 13 to 15 years previously, she had been the victim of an armed robbery in a parking garage.
Thereafter, Roberts informed the Commonwealth's Attorney of this conversation, and the Commonwealth's Attorney reported the information to defense counsel. Six days after the trial, Blevins filed a motion for a mistrial based upon Divers' failure to reveal that she had been the victim of a serious offense.
On September 4, 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion. At the hearing, the trial court asked Divers why she had not answered affirmatively when the court had asked, during voir dire, whether any prospective juror had been the victim of a serious offense. The following exchange then occurred:
Divers further stated, in answer to questions by the Commonwealth's Attorney, that her verdict "was strictly on the evidence, nothing about my personal life." She also said that she was "not bias[ed]."
The trial court also found that "there was no valid basis for a challenge for cause because the juror was not biased."
The court further found the following:
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the Court has determined that Juror Divers was not biased against the defendant and decided the case based solely on the evidence presented at trial. She testified that the robbery did not affect her ability to hear the Blevins case. She further testified that she was not biased against Mr. Blevins and did not deliberately deceive the Court. She based her decision strictly on the evidence. Thus, the Court finds that she was not biased and served as an impartial juror in the defendant's case. Therefore, Mr. Blevins' constitutional rights to due process and an impartial jury were not violated.
Finally, the trial court found "beyond a reasonable doubt that [Divers] gave [Blevins] a fair and impartial trial" and that, "[b]ased upon the lack of deception by [Divers], combined with the overwhelming guilt of [Blevins], . . . Divers' presence did not result in actual prejudice to . . . Blevins."
The Court of Appeals, after a meticulous review of the evidence and the applicable law, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The Court of Appeals concluded that, "[b]ecause the evidence supported the trial court's findings that the juror's failure to answer the subject voir dire question was accidental rather than intentional and that she stood impartial to the cause, its denial of [Blevins'] motion for mistrial was not error." Blevins, 40 Va.App. at 429, 579 S.E.2d at 666.
Blevins asserts that, if Divers had "honestly reveal[ed]" that she had been a robbery victim during jury voir dire, he would have had a valid basis to challenge Divers for cause. Blevins also asserts that he was denied the opportunity to use a peremptory strike in the event a challenge for cause was denied. Thus, Blevins contends, he was denied a fair jury trial.1
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides, in pertinent part, that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury." The right to an impartial jury is applicable to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); Manns v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 322, 323, 191 S.E.2d 810, 811 (1972). Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of Virginia also guarantees an accused the right to a trial by an impartial jury, and due process requires "a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 217, 102 S.Ct. 940.
Id. The Supreme Court also noted that it has long held that a litigant is entitled to a fair, but not perfect, trial, as there are no perfect trials. Id. at 553, 104 S.Ct. 845.
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