Blinn v. Arry Dewayne Bailey Miscovitch

• Decision Date: 16 May 2022
• Docket Number: 21-P-773
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts
• Parties: NELSON D. BLINN, trustee, [1] & another [2] v. ARRY DEWAYNE BAILEY MISCOVITCH & another. [3]

NELSON D. BLINN, trustee, ^[1] & another ^[2] v. ARRY DEWAYNE BAILEY MISCOVITCH & another. ^[3]

No. 21-P-773

Appeals Court of Massachusetts

May 16, 2022

Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendants, Larry Dewayne Bailey Miscovitch (Miscovitch) and Cody Bailey, appeal from a judgment entered after the denial of their motion for summary judgment and allowance of the cross motion for summary judgment brought by the plaintiffs Nelson D. Blinn and Carolyn A. Mix, trustees of the Thomas R Mix Family Trust of 1996. The defendants contend that the judge erred in concluding that Fla. Stat. § 63.172(1)(c) precludes Miscovitch, who was adopted as an adult, from inheriting from his adoptive parent. We vacate the order granting the plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

Background.

We summarize the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judge allowed summary judgment, here the defendants. See Marhefka v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Sutton, 79 Mass.App.Ct. 515, 516 (2011) . The settlor, Thomas R. Mix, created both the Mix Family Trust (Family Trust) and the Mix Life Insurance Trust (Life Insurance Trust) on January 17, 1996. Thomas ^[4] died in Florida on August 1, 2006, survived by his wife, Carolyn, his two daughters, Sally and Susan, and three grandchildren (Sally's biological children), Kelly, Lila, and Scott. Carolyn had a daughter from a previous relationship, Patricia, and Susan had no biological children. Carolyn was a beneficiary of the Family Trust, and Sally, Susan, Kelly, Lila, Scott, and Patricia were beneficiaries of both trusts.

In 2015, Thomas's daughter, Susan, and Susan's husband adopted defendant Miscovitch in Tennessee. Miscovitch was forty-five years old at the time of the adoption. Susan died shortly thereafter on July 20, 2015. Defendant Cody Bailey is Miscovitch's adult son.

On May 1, 2020, Thomas's wife, Carolyn, died. The Family Trust provided income for Carolyn upon Thomas's death, and upon Carolyn's death for distribution of the trust's principal into three shares: the "Children's Share" comprised eighty percent of the trust property; the "Grandchildren's Share" comprised fifteen percent of the trust property; and "Patricia's Share" comprised five percent of the trust property. The Grandchildren's Share was held in a continuing trust, income payable in equal or unequal parts, until such time as all grandchildren reached the age of twenty-five, at which point the principal was divided among the then-living grandchildren. A 2002 amendment to the Family Trust provided that upon Susan's death, Susan's share would be added to the Grandchildren's Share. ^[5]

Upon Carolyn's death the principal of the Life Insurance Trust was to be similarly distributed into three shares in the same proportions as the Family Trust: the Children's Share comprised eighty percent of the trust property; the Grandchildren's Share comprised fifteen percent of the trust property; and Patricia's Share comprised five percent of the trust property. Both trusts state, "[i]n interpreting the words 'child,' 'children,' and 'issue' and similar words, a person who is legally adopted shall be deemed to be the child of his adoptive parents." All parties now agree that the Mix Family Trust and Life Insurance Trust are governed, administered, and interpreted according to Florida law.

The plaintiffs brought a complaint for declaratory judgment requesting a declaration that Susan's adult adopted child Miscovitch did not qualify as a grandchild under the trusts because inheritance by an adult adopted grandchild was inconsistent with Thomas's intent, and that Thomas did not intend to provide an inheritance for "unknown" grandchildren who were adopted as adults. ^[6] The plaintiffs requested a declaration that Miscovitch was not entitled to inherit under the trusts and a modification of both trusts to prevent Miscovitch from inheriting.

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts, requesting a declaration that Miscovitch was entitled to distributions under the terms of both trusts and that the court decline to modify the trusts' language. The plaintiff trustees filed a cross motion for summary judgment on all counts, requesting a judgment declaring that Miscovitch is not a child or grandchild under the terms of the trusts and thus is not entitled to trust distributions.

After a hearing, the judge granted the plaintiff trustees' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Miscovitch was not entitled to distributions under the trusts because Fla. Stat. § 63.172, as the judge interpreted it, "prohibits an adoptee from automatically gaining inheritance." The judge further rejected the trustees' assertion that trust beneficiaries Scott, Kelly, and Lila should have been notified of Miscovitch's adoption under Florida and Tennessee law, instead agreeing with the defendants' contention and reasoning that "Scott, Kelly, and Lila's interest in the Trusts were not present, immediate, and direct." ^[7] Concluding that Fla. Stat. § 63.172 barred Miscovitch from receiving under the trusts, the judge did not address the trustees' remaining claims. ^[8]

On appeal, the parties no longer rely on Tennessee law. The defendants contend that the judge's interpretation of Florida law was incorrect because the inheritance rights of adopted individuals are controlled by the Florida Probate Code, Fla. Stat. § 732.108(1), and Florida Trust Code, Fla. Stat. § 736.1102, as well as Fla. Stat. § 63.172, and that adopted persons are permitted to inherit under Florida law. The plaintiff trustees maintain that the judge's interpretation was correct and, alternatively, if the interpretation was incorrect, that disputes over genuine issues of material fact exist and preclude a grant of summary judgment in the defendants' favor.

Discussion.

We review a summary judgment record de novo to determine "whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991). Furthermore, since the trusts so dictate, and the parties agree, Florida law governs our analysis.

1. Law in effect.

As a matter of Florida law, "courts look to the law in effect when a testamentary trust terminates rather than the law at the time the will was written or when the testator died to determine whether an individual comes within a class of remaindermen designated by will to take at the expiration of an intermediate or life estate." In re Will of Martell, 457 So.2d 1064, 1066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Here, the terms of the trusts state that the principals will be disbursed upon Carolyn's death. Carolyn died in May 2020, after Miscovitch's adoption. The date of her death is the controlling date for purposes of the applicable law, and we therefore must consider whether Miscovitch was entitled to inherit under the terms of the trusts as of that date.

2. Inheritance rights of adoptees.

Florida Stat. § 63.172 provides in pertinent part:

"(1) A judgment of adoption, whether entered by a court of this state, another state, or of any other place, has the following effect:

"(b) It terminates all legal relationships between the adopted person and the adopted person's relatives, including the birth parents, except a birth parent who is a petitioner or who is married to a petitioner, so that the adopted person thereafter is a stranger to his or her former relatives for all purposes, including the interpretation or construction of documents, statutes, and instruments, whether executed before or after entry of the adoption judgment, that do not expressly include the adopted person by name or by some designation not based on a parent and child or blood relationship, except that rights of inheritance shall be as provided in the Florida Probate Code.

"(c) Except for rights of inheritance, it creates the relationship between the adopted person and the petitioner and all relatives of the petitioner that would have existed if the adopted person were a blood descendant of the petitioner born within wedlock. This relationship shall be created for all purposes, including applicability of statutes, documents, and instruments, whether executed before or after entry of the adoption judgment, that do not expressly exclude an adopted person from their operation or effect"

(Emphasis added). The judge construed the phrase "[e]xcept for rights of inheritance" in subsection (c) to mean that the statute "prohibits an adoptee from automatically gaining inheritance." However, the judge also went on to construe the statute to preclude an adopted adult from inheriting under any circumstances. This was error.

The phrase "except for rights of inheritance" in subsection (c) should be construed in conjunction with all provisions of the statute. "[I]t is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that 'all parts of a statute...