Bloate v. US
| Decision Date | 08 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-728.,08-728. |
| Parties | Taylor James BLOATE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
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Mark T. Stancil, Washington, DC, for petitioner.
Matthew D. Roberts, Washington, DC, for respondent.
Stephen R. Welby, The Welby Law Firm, LLC, St. Louis, MO, Daniel R. Ortiz, University of Virginia School of Law, Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, Charlottesville, VA, Mark T. Stancil, Counsel of Record, Brian A. Pérez-Daple, Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, Washington, DC, David T. Goldberg, Donahue & Goldberg LLP, New York, NY, for petitioner.
Elena Kagan, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Matthew D. Roberts, Assistant to the Solicitor General, David E. Hollar, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for United States.
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Speedy Trial Act or Act), 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., requires that a criminal defendant's trial commence within 70 days after he is charged or makes an initial appearance, whichever is later, see § 3161(c)(1), and entitles him to dismissal of the charges if that deadline is not met, § 3162(a)(2). The Act, however, excludes from the 70-day period delays due to certain enumerated events. § 3161(h). As relevant here, "delay resulting from ... proceedings concerning the defendant" is automatically excludable from a Speedy Trial Act calculation.1 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(1) (Supp. 2009) (hereinafter subsection (h)(1)). In addition, "delay resulting from a continuance" granted by the district court may be excluded if the district court makes the findings required by § 3161(h)(7) (hereinafter subsection (h)(7)).
This case requires us to decide the narrow question whether time granted to a party to prepare pretrial motions is automatically excludable from the Act's 70-day limit under subsection (h)(1), or whether such time may be excluded only if a court makes case-specific findings under subsection (h)(7). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that pretrial motion preparation time is automatically excludable under subsection (h)(1).2 534 F.3d 893, 898 (2008). We granted certiorari, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1984, 173 L.Ed.2d 1082 (2009), and now reverse.
On August 2, 2006, police officers surveilling an apartment building for drug activity saw petitioner and his girlfriend enter a car parked in front of the building and drive away. After observing petitioner commit several traffic violations, the officers stopped the vehicle. They approached the car and noticed two small bags of cocaine on petitioner's lap. After the officers read petitioner his Miranda warnings, petitioner made inculpatory statements. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Petitioner denied any association with the apartment building where the car had been parked, but his girlfriend admitted that she lived there and consented to a search of her residence. The officers who conducted the search uncovered several items that belonged to petitioner, including an identification card, cocaine, three firearms, ammunition, and a bulletproof vest. The police arrested petitioner the next day.
On August 24, a grand jury indicted petitioner for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and for knowing and intentional possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The August 24 indictment started the Speedy Trial Act's 70-day clock. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). After petitioner's arraignment on September 1, a Magistrate Judge entered a scheduling order requiring, inter alia, that the parties file pretrial motions by September 13.
On September 7, petitioner filed a motion to extend the deadline to file pretrial motions from September 13 to September 21. The Magistrate Judge granted the motion and extended the deadline by an extra four days beyond petitioner's request, to September 25. On September 25, however, petitioner filed a "Waiver of Pretrial Motions" advising the court that he did not wish to file any pretrial motions.
On October 4, the Magistrate Judge held a hearing to consider petitioner's "waiver," at which petitioner confirmed that he wished to waive his right to file pretrial motions. After a colloquy, the Magistrate Judge found that petitioner's waiver was voluntary and intelligent.
Over the next three months, petitioner's trial was delayed for several reasons. Though these delays are not directly relevant to the question presented here, we recount them to explain the full context in which that question arises. On November 8, petitioner moved to continue the trial date, stating that his counsel needed additional time to prepare for trial. The District Court granted the motion and reset the trial for December 18.
The parties then met informally and prepared a plea agreement, which they provided to the court. The District Court scheduled a change of plea hearing for December 20. At the hearing, however, petitioner declined to implement the agreement and requested a new attorney. The District Court rescheduled the trial for February 26, 2007, granted petitioner's attorney's subsequent motion to withdraw, and appointed new counsel.
On February 19, 2007—179 days after petitioner was indicted—petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the Act's 70-day limit had elapsed. The District Court denied the motion. In calculating how many of the 179 days counted toward the 70-day limit, the District Judge excluded the period from September 7 through October 4 as "within the extension of time granted to file pretrial motions."3 Order in No. 4:06CR518-SNL (ED Mo.), Doc. 44, p. 2.
In late February, a matter arose in an unrelated case on the District Court's docket, which required the court to reschedule petitioner's trial. After obtaining the consent of the parties and finding that a continuance would serve the public interest, the District Court continued petitioner's trial from February 26 to March 5, 2007. Petitioner's 2-day trial began on that date. The jury found petitioner guilty on both counts and the District Court later sentenced him to concurrent 30-year terms of imprisonment.
Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the denial of his motion to dismiss for a Speedy Trial Act violation. As relevant, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the time from September 7 (the original deadline for filing pretrial motions) through October 4 (when the trial court held a hearing on petitioner's decision to waive the right to file pretrial motions) was excludable from the Act's 70-day limit. Although the District Court did not identify which provision of the Act supported this exclusion, the Court of Appeals held that "pretrial motion preparation time" is automatically excludable under subsection (h)(1)—which covers "delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant"—as long as "the [district] court specifically grants time for that purpose." 534 F.3d, at 897.4 In reaching this conclusion, the Eighth Circuit joined seven other Courts of Appeals that interpret subsection (h)(1) the same way.5 Two Courts of Appeals, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, interpret subsection (h)(1) differently, holding that time for preparing pretrial motions is outside subsection (h)(1)'s scope.6 We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict.
As noted, the Speedy Trial Act requires that a criminal defendant's trial commence within 70 days of a defendant's initial appearance or indictment, but excludes from the 70-day period days lost to certain types of delay. Section 3161(h) specifies the types of delays that are excludable from the calculation. Some of these delays are excludable only if the district court makes certain findings enumerated in the statute. See § 3161(h)(7). Other delays are automatically excludable, i.e., they may be excluded without district court findings. As relevant here, subsection (h)(1) requires the automatic exclusion of "[a]ny period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to" periods of delay resulting from eight enumerated subcategories of proceedings.7 The Government contends that the time the District Court granted petitioner to prepare his pretrial motions is automatically excludable under subsection (h)(1). We disagree, and conclude that such time may be excluded only when a district court enters appropriate findings under subsection (h)(7).
The eight subparagraphs in subsection (h)(1) address the automatic excludability of delay generated for certain enumerated purposes. Thus, we first consider whether the delay at issue in this case is governed by one of these subparagraphs. It is.
The delay at issue was granted to allow petitioner sufficient time to file pretrial motions.8 Subsection (h)(1)(D) (hereinafter subparagraph (D)) renders automatically excludable "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion." Read, as it must be, in the context of subsection (h), this text governs the automatic excludability of delays "resulting" from a specific category of "proceedings concerning the defendant," namely, proceedings involving pretrial motions.9 Because the delay at issue here results from a decision granting time to prepare pretrial motions, if not from a pretrial motion itself (the defendant's request for additional time), it is governed by subparagraph (D). But that does not make the delay at issue here automatically excludable.
Subparagraph (D...
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