Block v. Valley Mut. Ins. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 09 November 1889
• Citation: 12 S.W. 477
• Parties: BLOCK <I>et al.</I> <I>v.</I> VALLEY MUT. INS. ASS'N.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

12 S.W. 477

BLOCK et al.

v. VALLEY MUT. INS. ASS'N.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

November 9, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Cross county; J. E. RIDDICK, Judge.

Sanders & Watkins and J. D. Block, for appellants. N. W. Norton, for appellee.

HEMINGWAY, J.

One Charles B. Guthrie obtained a policy of insurance upon his life from the Valley Mutual Insurance Company. It undertook, upon the conditions therein named, to pay to Mrs. Martha A. Guthrie, James M. Harvey, and Alice Guthrie $1,000 within 90 days after proof of the death of Charles B. Subsequently, Charles B. and Mrs. Martha A. Guthrie assigned the policy to the plaintiffs, who thereafter paid all dues and premiums as they matured, according to its terms. Upon the death of the said Charles B., the plaintiffs claimed the amount due upon the policy, by virtue of the assignment; and the beneficiaries therein named, by virtue of the provisions of the policy. The court found that the plaintiffs acquired, by the assignment, the interest of Martha A. Guthrie, and no more; that they were entitled to recover her interest in the fund, and three-fourths of what they had advanced in keeping the policy alive; while James M. Harvey and Alice Guthrie were entitled to recover the balance. Judgment was rendered accordingly. As grounds for reversal, the appellants urge — First, that the insuring company is not a regular insurance company, but a mutual benefit company; second, that the policy of an insurance company differs from the certificate of a mutual benefit company in this: that the rights of the beneficiary in the one are vested upon its execution, while those rights in the other are subject to be divested, at any time until the death of the insured, by the substitution of another beneficiary. The record contains no part of the company's charter or articles of association, and but one clause of its by-laws. It is as follows: "The object of this association shall be for the purpose of mutually associating together a number of individuals into an agreement whereby the survivors mutually contribute for the relief of the representatives, legal heirs, or assignees of those of their number whom death may strike down." The policy sued on contains no reference to any other purpose than one of insurance, and provides the ordinary safeguards against the acceptance of bad risks, as well as against the continuance of risks accepted, unless the stipulated payments upon it are promptly made as they mature. These payments include "annual dues" and "mortality assessments," and a failure to pay either for 30 days after call effects a cancellation of the policy. It contains this clause, upon which appellant relies especially: "This certificate may be assigned, transferred, or set over, by and with the consent of the association, granted by its president or secretary."

The record discloses nothing further as to the character of the company. Upon this, the learned counsel for appellants say that they assume that it will be conceded to be a mutual benefit society. What feature is disclosed that does not belong to a mutual insurance company? The first by-law, in making a general declaration of its purpose, declares that it is to afford relief, but also declares that the relief will be given to "the representatives, legal heirs, or assigns of those of their number whom death may strike down;" and this is exactly what insurance companies are required to do. Yet this is not benevolence, for it is undertaken for a stipulated profit, the continued payment of which is a continuing condition to its existence. If any other character of benevolence was contemplated by the company, the record does not disclose it. Certain it is...