Blocker v. Boswell
| Decision Date | 08 November 1899 |
| Parties | BLOCKER v. BOSWELL. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Under paragraph 2, § 7, art. 6, of the constitution of this state (Civ. Code, § 5856), defining and limiting the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, a justice's court has no jurisdiction in actions of trover. This question was not involved in James v. Smith, 62 Ga. 345, and consequently what was there said concerning it was obiter.
2. This case turns on the ruling above announced, and, in view thereof, the presiding judge erred in sustaining the certiorari.
Error from superior court, Greene county; John C. Hart, Judge.
Action by E. T. Boswell against Jake Blocker. A judgment for defendant was reversed on certiorari, and he brings error. Reversed.
Geo. A Merritt, for plaintiff in error.
J. B Park, Jr., for defendant in error.
Boswell brought suit in trover against Blocker in the justice's court for the purpose of recovering certain personal property. An appeal was had to a jury in that court, and a verdict was rendered for the defendant, whereupon plaintiff brought his petition for certiorari in Greene superior court alleging, among other things, that the verdict was contrary to law and the evidence. The judge sustained the certiorari and granted petitioner a new trial. The defendant in certiorari filed his bill of exceptions, alleging error in this judgment of the court.
The controlling question which arises in this case is whether or not, under the present constitution of this state, a justice's court has jurisdiction to try an action in trover. That constitution (article 6, § 7, par. 2) declares, "Justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction in all civil cases arising ex contractu, and in cases of injuries or damages to personal property, when the principal sum does not exceed one hundred dollars." This provision was evidently intended to define and limit the jurisdiction of a justice's court in civil actions. The simple question for consideration, then, is whether, by a fair construction of these words in the constitution, an action of trover is embraced in the class of cases mentioned. Obviously such an action is not a case arising ex contractu, but it is an action ex delicto, founded upon a tort committed by a direct invasion of the owner's legal right to the possession and use of his chattels. It is based upon the title of the plaintiff to the property sued for, and upon the wrongful conversion thereof by the defendant, and is, strictly speaking, an action ex delicto. We think it is equally clear that such a suit cannot properly be classified among "cases of injuries or damages to personal property." The words "injuries or damages" were evidently intended to be synonyms, and, when applied to property, they mean some physical injury to the property itself,--some trespass upon it,--by virtue of which its value has become diminished or destroyed. Conversion implies no such injury. An action of trover, therefore, has no reference to any injury or damage which the property itself may have sustained. Indeed, after its conversion it may actually be enhanced in value by the wrongdoer; yet, even if this were done at his expense, it would have no effect upon the owner's right to recover back his property by trover. On the other hand, if the personalty while in the unlawful possession of the defendant should be materially injured or damaged by him, and the plaintiff should discover this fact after recovering the property itself by an action of trover, we see no reason why he would not have the right to institute another and an independent action for damages resulting from such physical injuries. His recovery in trover would be no bar to such an action, for the simple reason that the two causes of complaint would be entirely distinct and separate. It would be just as reasonable to contend that a suit in ejectment, or an ordinary complaint for the recovery of land, could be properly designated as an action for injuries or damages done the freehold, as to say that a suit in trover is an action for damages done to personalty. The main issues in an action of ejectment and of trover are practically the same; both involving title to the property in the plaintiff, and a wrongful possession thereof by the defendant. Applying, then, the ordinary and natural meaning of the words employed in the constitution, and they necessarily deprive a justice's court of jurisdiction over any civil case arising ex delicto, except in suits for injuries or damages to personal property; and, trover not being an action to recover such damages, it follows that a justice's court has no jurisdiction in such a case. It is a cardinal rule in the construction of language that words are presumed to be employed in their natural and ordinary meaning. This rule almost invariably is a legal and safe guide in the construction of the constitution of a state, as well as all other written instruments, whether relating to legislation or contracts. 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 924. The correct doctrine is also announced on page 925 of the same work,--that, "where a word has acquired a fixed technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that sense in a written constitution."
In an able brief and argument before us, filed on this question by counsel in another case involving the same question, it is contended, in effect, that the words of the constitution we have been considering, construed in the light of the legal history of this state bearing on the subject, have a technical meaning, and were intended to embrace an action of trover. In this connection our attention has been called to the stenographic report of the proceedings of the constitutional convention of 1877, a printed copy of which is before us. In section 7, par. 2, of the report (page 163), appears the report of the judiciary committee on the subject. This committee recommended to the convention that the jurisdiction of a justice's court be limited to civil actions arising ex contractu. When this particular clause in the report was before the convention, it seems, three amendments were offered to it: One to strike it out, and leave the matter of the jurisdiction of a justice's court entirely with the legislature; another was to retain the broad jurisdiction conferred by the constitution of 1868, which gave a justice's court jurisdiction over all civil cases, without any exceptions as to actions ex delicto; the third amendment, introduced by Mr. Moore, was to add to the report of the committee the words, "and in cases of trespass of injuries to personalty." The last amendment finally prevailed. We see nothing in the argument of Mr. Moore, in the stenographic report referred to by counsel, at all in conflict with our views as to the meaning of the words "injuries or damages to personal property." We quote the following from his speech, explaining what would be the result if the report of the committee were adopted without his proposed amendment: Hence, if the views of any debater in a deliberative body as to the meaning of a measure which he advocates should have special weight with the courts in construing the words of the measure finally adopted, then we may gather from the language above quoted a very clear idea of what is meant by the words "injuries to personal property." From the illustration used in reference to the killing of stock, physical injury to the property was in the mind of the speaker, and he evidently was not contemplating a tort which did not involve any direct injury to the property itself. It seems, however, from this same stenographic report, that, a day or two after the adoption of this amendment offered by Mr. Moore, it was reconsidered by the convention, and during its reconsideration another effort was made by members not to restrict the jurisdiction of a justice's court to such narrow limits, and also to provide for appeals of cases in that court. The result of this reconsideration was the final adoption of the clause that now appears in the constitution, which, it will be noted, embodies the appeal feature. But a significant fact is that, as finally adopted, the word "trespass," used in the original amendment, was omitted, and the words "injuries or damages to personalty" employed. We do not mean to say that, even if the word "trespass" had remained, it would have given a justice's court jurisdiction in trover cases. But a wrongful conversion could be more properly called a trespass upon property than it could be designated as an injury to property. Hence we think it more reasonable to presume the constitutional convention of 1877 acted advisedly, instead of inadvertently, as contended, by omitting the word "trespass" and substituting those finally adopted. We therefore conclude that there was nothing in the proceedings before the constitutional convention of 1877 authorizing the view that the members of that convention entertained any different idea with reference to the meaning of the words they finally adopted on this subject than what is herein expressed.
We are not aware of any legislation in the history of this state which would authorize the conclusion that an action of trover was ever treated or classified as a case involving injuries to personal property....
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