Blodgett v. School Administrative Dist. No. 73

• Decision Date: 31 March 1972
• Citation: 289 A.2d 407
• Parties: Shannon BLODGETT et al. v. SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT #73 and Maine State Board of Education.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 407

289 A.2d 407

Shannon BLODGETT et al. v. SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT #73 and Maine State Board of Education.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 31, 1972.

Libhart & Ferris, by Wayne P. Libhart, Brewer, for plaintiffs.

Barry K. Mills, Blue Hill, Verrill, Dana, Phibrick Putnam & Williamson, by Roger A. Putnam, Portland, for defendants.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEBBER, WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.

WEBBER, Justice.

By their amended complaint the plaintiffs, eleven taxpaying inhabitants of School Administrative District #73 (District), seek a declaratory judgment and other appropriate relief. Specifically, they pray 'that the Court adjudge: (a) That School Administrative District #73 has not been properly formed; (b) That the vote to dissolve School Administrative District #73 was not properly taken; (c) That the Court grant such other and further relief as is just in the premises.' The matter comes before us on report upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts.

Although the statement of facts describes a number of technical irregularities in the procedures adopted by the member towns in the course of organizing the District and subsequently acting on a proposal to disolve the District, we recite only those facts which we deem dispositive of the issues presented. The District comprises the towns of Brooklin, Brooksville, Deer Isle, Sedgwick and Stonington. Pursuant to 20 M.R.S.A., Chap. 9 the question of organization was submitted to the voters in the several towns and the results certified by the respective town clerks ¹ to the State Board of Education (Board). In the case of each town the result was shown to be affirmative. On February 3, 1969 the Board certified that S.A.D. #73 was organized. From February 13, 1969 to the present time the directors of S.A.D. #73 have managed and controlled the public schools in said district. On April 24, 1970 the voters of the Town of Brooksville initiated a petition for dissolution of the District. On receipt of the petition the Board took the requisite actions pursuant to 20 M.R.S.A., Sec. 222 to prepare a dissolution agreement and submit the issue of dissolution to action by the voters in the several towns. The results of the voting as certified by the several town clerks indicated that a majority of the voters in the member towns had voted against dissolution. Certain ballots having been disputed, the Board conducted a hearing, made a determination with respect to each challenged ballot and found that, although the numerical margin was slightly decreased, the negative vote continued to prevail. No challenge is here made to the Board's resolution of the ballot issue. The Legislature subsequently enacted P. & S.L.1971, Ch. 93, effective September 23, 1971, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:

'Sec. 10. School Administrative District No. 73 reconstituted and established; validation of proceedings in member municipalities. The municipalities of Brooklin, Brooksville, Deer Isle, Sedgwick and Stonington are constituted to be and to have been since February 13, 1969, a School Administrative District, known as School Adminiatrative District No. 73, with all of the powers, privileges and franchises granted to School Administrative Districts according to the Revised Statutes of 1964, Title 20, sections 211 to 307. The proceedings taken in the town meetings held in the municipalities of Brooklin, Brooksville, Deer Isle, Sedgwick and Stonington, wherein it was voted to join in the formation of a School Administrative District, are validated, confirmed and made effective.

'Sec. 11. Validation of election and proceedings of school directors and action by officers and agents. The school directors of School Administrative District No. 73, selected in the said municipalities to serve as such, are declared to be and to have been duly elected and qualified for the respective terms for which each was elected, and all of the proceedings of the board of school directors of said district as said board was from time to time constituted and as shown by the records of said district and all of the action duly taken in accordance therewith by the officers and agents of said district with regard to the issuance of capital outlay bonds or any borrowing in anticipation of the sale thereof, or the preparation, presentation and acceptance of any school budget or any borrowing for current operating expenses, are validated, confirmed and made effective.

'Sec. 12. Amendments. Any amendments of, additions to or changes in said sections 211 to 307 which may hereafter be enacted shall, unless otherwise specifically provided therein, be deemed to apply to and to govern said School Administrative District No. 73.'

At the outset defendants District and Board challenge the standing of these plaintiffs to bring this action in its present form. They assert that plaintiffs must special injury to themselves not common to other taxable inhabitants of the District. For reasons which will appear we conclude that these plaintiffs have standing to launch their attack upon the validity of the organization of the District but not upon the dissolution procedure.

14 M.R.S.A., Sec. 6051, subs. 12 and 13, dealing with the equity jurisdiction of the Superior Court, reads as follows:

'12. Pledging credit of public corporation for purpose not authorized by law. When * * * School Administrative Districts, * * *, for a purpose not authorized by law, vote to pledge their credit or to raise money by taxation * * * or to pay money from their treasury, or if any of their officers or agents attempt to pay out such money for such purpose, the court shall have jurisdiction on complaint filed by not less than 10 taxable inhabitants thereof, briefly setting forth the cause of complaint.

'13. Equity jurisdiction. And the full equity jurisdiction, according to the usage and practice of courts of equity, in all other cases where there is not a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law.' (Emphasis ours)

Sub. 12 antedated the broader provisions of sub. 13 which was enacted in 1874. ² Both provisions, however, have been relied upon to confer jurisdiction upon the court to grant preventive relief in appropriate cases to persons showing themselves interested as taxable inhabitants.

It is revealing to discover that from its very inception the predecessor of Sub. 12 was carefully phrased to provide only preventive relief at the behest of ten taxable inhabitants. The law was first enacted as P.L.1864, Ch. 239, Sec. 1 in these terms:

'Chapter 239

An act to restrain illegal appropriations of public money.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative in Legislature assembled, as follows:

Sect. 1. When any county, city, town or school district votes to pledge its credit, or to raise by taxation, or to pay from its treasury, any money, for any purpose other than those for which it was the legal right an power, or any agent or officer thereof attempts pay out the money of such county, city, town or school district without authority, the supreme judicial court may, upon the suit or petition of not less than ten taxable inhabitants thereof, briefly setting forth the cause of complaint, hear and determine the same in equity. Any justice of said court may in term time or vacation, issue injunctions and make such orders and decrees as may be necessary or proper to restrain or prevent any violation or abuse of such legal right or power until the final determination of the cause by said court.' (Emphasis ours)

The three cases decided under the 1864 law prior to 1874 were Clark v. Wardwell (1867) 55 Me. 61; Johnson v. Thorndike (1868) 56 Me. 32; and Marble v. McKenney (1872) 60 Me. 332. All involved applications for preventive relief by injunction.

In Blood v. Beal (1905) 100 Me. 30, 60 A. 427 the plaintiffs were 14 taxable inhabitants of the City of Bangor. The defendants were officers and committee members with delegated authority, the City of Bangor not being a party. The Court prevented the making of a contract, the performance of which would have exceeded the City's authorized debt limit. Recognizing that this was not a case involving 'a purpose not authorized by law,' (Sub. 12), the Court rested jurisdiction squarely upon its board equity powers, (Sub. 13).

In Eaton v. Thayer (1925) 124 Me. 311, 314, 128 A. 475, however, in an action brought by 'fourteen citizens living and owning property' in the Kennebec Water District, the Court declined to accord the plaintiffs standing to obtain remedial relief. The Court said, 'But this bill does not seek preventive relief against anticipated or threatened unauthorized action by the Trustees. It seeks remedial action only after the commission of an alleged illegal act.' (Emphasis ours). The Court indicated that remedial action might be instituted by the Attorney General upon the relation of persons interested where the public is affected. The Court noted that if these plaintiffs and others similarly situated could seek remedial relief, there would exist an 'opportunity for multiplicity of suits' which 'is not the public interest.'

The standing of ten taxable inhabitants to seek preventive relief was challenged in Tuscan v. Smith (1931) 130 Me. 36, 43, 153 A. 289, 293. Concluding that on the facts of the case the Court must base jurisdiction on its broad equity powers, Thaxter, J., carefully enunciated the liberal Maine view and the limits imposed thereon. The opinion stated:

'In 1874 the Supreme Judicial Court was given full powers, and since that time equitable remedies have been available to taxable inhabitants against cities and towns, except in so far as considerations of public policy and the discretionary powers of the courts may restrict them. It always been conceded that the attorney general in the name of the state or on the relation of interested parties could bring a bill in equity in a case properly within the equity...