Blodgett v. Zions First Nat. Bank
| Decision Date | 11 April 1988 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 860178-C,860372-CA,s. 860178-C |
| Citation | 752 P.2d 901 |
| Parties | William D. BLODGETT and Florence G. Blodgett, his wife, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, Stanley L. Pace and Allan D. McComb, individually and dba Alco Investment, and Does 1-10, Defendants and Appellants. William D. BLODGETT and Florence G. Blodgett, his wife, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Joe MARTSCH, Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, Doyle Nease, Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation, Wayne A. Ashworth, trustee, Carl W. Tenney, Valley Bank Trust Company, and First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A., Defendants and Appellants. William D. BLODGETT and Florence G. Blodgett, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Betty PURCELL aka Betty Purcell, Martsch and Water Park Corporation, a Utah corporation, Defendants and Appellants. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Walter P. Faber, Jr., Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants, Pace and McComb.
Robert M. Dyer, Lester A. Perry, James J. Cassity, M. Karlynn Hinman (argued), Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents, Blodgett.
James A. Arrowsmith, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant, Betty Purcell.
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and BENCH, JJ.
Because of common issues of fact and law, the cases before us were consolidated for purposes of appeal. The litigation underlying the appeals commenced in 1974 and centers around the ownership of certain real property. Its complexity and duration stem, to a considerable extent, from conflicting court orders and subsequent modifications thereto. The history of this controversy will be set out only to the extent warranted in resolving the issues before us.
In the early 1970's, the Blodgetts agreed to pledge one of two tracts of their property as security for a loan to Raco Car Wash Systems, of which Betty Purcell was president. The Blodgetts, however, mistakenly pledged the two tracts of land as security. When Raco defaulted on the loan, the lending institution foreclosed on both tracts of land.
Extensive litigation followed the foreclosure, which we will refer to collectively as Blodgett I. On November 4, 1974, the Blodgetts recorded a lis pendens on the property as a result of their claims in Blodgett I. After trial, and an appeal to the Supreme Court with a remand to the district court, the Blodgetts, Purcell, and the other parties involved in the litigation stipulated in court that Purcell would, among other things, convey any interest she had in the property to the Blodgetts. The oral stipulation provided in pertinent part:
Mr. Rust [attorney for the Blodgetts]: Yes, we represent the [Blodgetts], and we accept the offers making a total cash settlement of $20,000.00 plus the releases as mentioned here.
....
Mr. Bushnell [attorney for the Blodgetts]: We'll get the quit-claims we want signed, you get the releases and satisfactions you want signed. Why don't you prepare the release you want for the bank and get the check and we'll go from there. Will that be all right?
The Court: A dismissal with prejudice of the action.
Mr. Bushnell: We'll prepare the dismissal.
Mr. Barker [attorney for Purcell]: If you want quit-claim deeds, we are going to mail them to Idaho and get them back. That is a few days mail time.
Mr. Bushnell: Let[']s get all of it done plus that--well--
Mr. Barker: If you can do it by the Court Order and quiet title to the matter--
Pursuant to the stipulated settlement, Purcell executed a quit-claim deed and delivered it to the Blodgetts on January 15, 1980. Unfortunately, in reducing the stipulated settlement to writing, the Blodgetts failed to specifically quiet title in themselves. This order, entered May 5, 1980, provided in relevant part:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that to the extent judgment has not heretofore been entered, the Complaint of plaintiffs against defendants Betty Purcell Martsch, Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc., and Water Park Corporation is hereby dismissed with prejudice and any and all counterclaims of said defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice, and each party to bear its own costs.
While Blodgett I was pending, a companion case was commenced, which concerned judgment liens based upon a promissory note, which we will refer to as Zions I. On July 7, 1971, Lorin Pace and Betty Purcell, as co-makers, executed a promissory note with a face value of $27,262.59 to Zions First National Bank. Pace and Purcell subsequently defaulted. Consequently, on January 16, 1976, Zions initiated suit against Pace and Purcell seeking the principal amount of the note, plus interest, attorney fees, and costs. On March 3, 1976, a default judgment was entered against Pace. Over three years later, on June 1, 1979, a final default judgment was entered against Purcell. These judgments were renewed on March 14, 1984. On August 31, 1984, Zions assigned any interest it had in the judgments to Alco Investment, Inc., a dba comprised of Stanley L. Pace (Lorin Pace's son) and Allan D. McComb. 1 To enforce the judgment against Purcell, Alco sought to foreclose on certain real property in which it believed Purcell had an ownership interest but which the Blodgetts claimed they owned outright. Alco believed Purcell had an interest in the subject property because the May 5, 1980 order in Blodgett I did not, on its face, quiet title in anyone.
Cognizant of the possible ambiguity in the May 5, 1980 order, the Blodgetts filed several motions in Blodgett I, seeking to correct the prior order. Initially, the Blodgetts filed a Rule 60(b) motion to amend the May 5, 1980 order. Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b). The court granted the Blodgetts' motion and, accordingly, entered an Order of Judgment of Quiet Title pursuant to Rule 60(b) on May 13, 1986. An amendment to that order was entered on August 13, 1986.
Purcell filed a motion to set aside the amended order, arguing that she was not given notice of the motion, and that the motion was not filed within the mandatory three months or a reasonable time after the final order was entered. Consequently, the Blodgetts then filed a motion to correct the original May 5, 1980 order under Rule 60(a) claiming clerical error. Utah R.Civ.P. 60(a). On September 26, 1986, the trial court granted the Blodgetts' motion and signed an order quieting title in Blodgetts pursuant to Rule 60(a). Purcell and Alco challenge this modified order in the related cases before us today.
On appeal the Blodgetts, as respondents, contend that Purcell lacks standing to object to the trial court's September 26, 1986 order and judgment in Blodgett I because she previously quit-claimed any interest she had in the property. While the issue of standing was not raised at trial, either party, or even the court on its own motion, may properly raise standing for the first time on appeal. See Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986); Utah Restaurant Ass'n v. Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Utah 1985); Health Tecna Corp. v. Sound Sys. Int'l, Inc., 588 P.2d 169, 170 (Utah 1978).
The Utah Supreme Court has established three tests to determine whether a litigant has standing. Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799; Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983). First, the litigant can show that he has suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. Second, the litigant may have standing if no one else has a greater interest in the outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to be raised otherwise. Even if he is unable to meet the first two tests, under the third test, a litigant may nonetheless have standing if the issues are unique and of such great public importance that they ought to be decided in the furtherance of the public interest. Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799; see also Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1148-50.
Purcell fails to satisfy any of the three tests. She has not alleged a particularized injury by virtue of the amendment of the final judgment under Rule 60(a). Purcell previously quit-claimed any interest she may have had in the land, which is the subject of the amended judgment to the Blodgetts. She thus suffers no injury by the court's subsequent order quieting title in the land to the Blodgetts. Purcell does not come before this court claiming an interest in the land nor does she dispute the validity of her quit-claim deed. Rather, she contends only that the trial court's amendment of the final order in Blodgett I exceeds the bounds of the court's statutory authority. Purcell fails to articulate a substantial or a legally protected interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Consequently, she lacks standing under the first test. See Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City Corp., 531 P.2d 866, 867 (Utah 1975).
The second test offers Purcell no further assistance. Under the second test, we must determine whether any one else has a greater interest in challenging the propriety of the Rule 60(a) amendment in Blodgett I. While in most instances there is no one in a stronger position to raise the issue of the correctness of a trial court's amendment of a final order than the original parties to the suit, this case presents a factual anomaly. There is a class of litigants better suited to bring the action, namely the judgment creditors who may be affected by the amended order.
Alco, as assignee of a judgment lien, is before this court in the companion case, Zions I, challenging the order. Alco seeks to foreclose on Purcell's interest, if any, in the land in question. Alco claims it would suffer a distinct and palpable injury because the amended order quieting title in the Blodgetts would cut off its judgment lien filed subsequent to the Blodgetts' lis pendens. As Alco has a greater interest in the outcome of the case, Purcell does not meet the second test. Purcell likewise fails the third...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Reller v. Reller
...to challenge the final divorce decree involving Husband and Wife. Standing presents a question of law. See Blodgett v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah Ct.App.1988).ANALYSIS ¶ 11 As an initial matter, we are not persuaded that Intervenor lacks standing. Indeed, it is curious ......
-
Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc.
...rule, all of which suggest that standing issues may be raised for the first time on appeal. 1 See, e.g., Blodgett v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah App.1988) (court or parties may raise standing concerns for the first time on appeal). But see State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880......
-
Estate of Hunt, Matter of
...716 P.2d at 798; Stromquist, 646 P.2d at 747; Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Blodgett v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah Ct.App.1988). If I were to reach the merits, however, I would 1 We note that even if Hunt had not resigned as personal representat......
-
C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey
...fact exists, we will reverse the trial court's determination and remand to the trial court on that issue. Blodgett v. Zion's First Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 905 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the parties intended the property at issue to ......