Reller v. Reller

• Decision Date: 16 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. 20110457–CA.,20110457–CA.
• Citation: 721 Utah Adv. Rep. 29,291 P.3d 813
• Parties: Micah John RELLER, Petitioner and Appellee, v. Karine Anesia Schlagel Toledo RELLER, Respondent and Appellee. Francis J. Argenziano, Intervenor and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

291 P.3d 813

721 Utah Adv. Rep. 29

Micah John RELLER, Petitioner and Appellee,

v. Karine Anesia Schlagel Toledo RELLER, Respondent and Appellee.Francis J. Argenziano, Intervenor and Appellant.

No. 20110457–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Nov. 16, 2012.

James A. McIntyre and Richard R. Golden, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

Nathan B. Wall and Cobie W. Spevak, Salt Lake City, for Appellee Micah John Reller.

Laura J. Hansen–Pelcastre, Jessica S. Couser, and Ben W. Lieberman, Salt Lake City, for Appellee Karine Anesia Schlagel Toledo Reller.¹

Before Judges ORME, DAVIS, and VOROS.

OPINION

ORME, Judge:

¶ 1 Appellant Francis Argenziano (Intervenor) intervened in the divorce proceedings of appellees Micah Reller (Husband) and Karine Reller (Wife), in an effort to ensure that Husband is held to be the legal father of Wife's child born during their marriage but actually fathered by Intervenor. We affirm the district court's final divorce decree determining that there were no children born of the marriage.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Husband and Wife were first divorced via a default decree in September 2006. That decree stated that there was one child resulting from the marriage. In June 2007, Husband petitioned to modify custody. At that time, Wife had sole physical custody of the child and Husband had visitation rights, as set by the default decree. That same month, Wife filed a response opposing Husband's petition to modify. In October 2007, Wife then filed her own petition to modify, wherein she asserted for the first time that Husband was not actually the father of her child.

¶ 3 Wife then sought to join Intervenor in the case so that he could be adjudicated as the father of her child. Intervenor was joined in the action in December 2007. In January 2008, Intervenor filed a motion to vacate the order joining him as a party. The commissioner recommended granting Intervenor's motion in May 2008, and the court entered an order to that effect. The last recommendation by the commissioner stated:

If the existing adjudication of paternity was vacated, set aside, terminated, or dissolved in any manner under the laws of this state, then this court would have jurisdiction under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act to consider the issue of paternity and the respective rights and obligations of all parties under the relevant provisions of the Utah Code.

Husband and Wife then filed a stipulation to set aside the default divorce decree, which relief the district court granted in July 2008. In October of that year, Husband filed a motion to admit genetic testing, pursuant to the Utah Uniform Parentage Act. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78B–15–613 (2008). At a hearing in December 2008, the commissioner found the genetic testing sufficient to exclude Husband as the father of Wife's child. In March 2009, the district court entered a stipulated partial decree of divorce, effectively divorcing Husband and Wife and setting forth findings adequate to rebut the parental presumption as to Husband, excluding him as the father of the child born during the marriage.

¶ 4 In September 2009, the State commenced a child support and paternity action against Intervenor. Intervenor filed a motion to dismiss, contending that parentage had already been adjudicated in Husband and Wife's divorce proceeding. The court denied that motion in May 2010, holding that paternity had not been conclusively determined before it was specifically raised by the parties. The court ruled:

While the parties to the proceedings ... did not raise the issue of paternity to the court and the original decree did not therefore meet the requirements for a binding determination of paternity, this changed when the parties brought the issue of paternity to the Court to review through their subsequent stipulation. The Court reviewed the stipulation, entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and then a bifurcated decree in 2009. That bifurcated decree was based on genetic test results that excluded [Husband] as the presumed father of the child. Utah Code Ann. § 78B–15–607(3)(a). Because, in the context of the bifurcated decree, the question of paternity was raised, adjudicated and because the bifurcated decree specifically disclaims [Husband] as the father, under Utah Code Ann. § 78B–15–623, the Court adjudicated the child's paternity in that case. The bifurcated decree is thus a binding determination of paternity under Utah Code Ann. § 78B–15–623.

On July 12, 2010, the State submitted notice of the results of additional genetic testing, confirming that Intervenor was the father of Wife's child. The odds of his being the child's father were placed at greater than 34 billion to one,² but Intervenor objected to the admission of those conclusive results on the basis that Husband had been adjudicated as the father in the divorce proceeding.

¶ 5 Intervenor was ordered in early February 2011 to pay significant child support to Wife, effective from November 2010. Later that month, having successfully resisted being joined in this action earlier, Intervenor filed his own motion to intervene, which was granted. Intervenor filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court order resolving all outstanding issues.

¶ 6 As it currently stands, Husband does not have a relationship with the child. Intervenor has ongoing child support obligations to his child. Both men seek to avoid being adjudicated as the father and to have any support obligations against them extinguished. Wife, who earlier led Husband to believe the child was his, now prefers to have Intervenor adjudicated as the child's father, apparently believing he has greater financial means.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 7 Intervenor argues that the modified divorce decree determining that there were no children born of the marriage should be set aside and Husband should be adjudicated the father of Wife's child. Specifically, Intervenor contends that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to revisit its previous default divorce decree. “Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law which we review under a correction of error standard, giving no particular deference to the trial court's determination.” Case v. Case, 2004 UT App 423, ¶ 5, 103 P.3d 171 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 8 Intervenor further argues that res judicata—specifically, claim preclusion—bars the new adjudication of parentage. Conversely, Husband argues that Intervenor is precluded from challenging the final judgment in this action because the same issue and argument were presented, argued, and ruled upon in the separate paternity action. “Whether res judicata, and more specifically claim preclusion, ‘bars an action presents a question of law’ that we review for correctness.” Mack v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, ¶ 26, 221 P.3d 194 (quoting Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ¶ 17, 16 P.3d 1214).

¶ 9 Intervenor also argues that the parties were estopped from raising the issue of parentage after the entry of the first divorce decree.

Claims based on equitable doctrines are mixed questions of fact and law. Accordingly, we defer to a trial court's factual findings unless there is clear error but review its legal conclusions for correctness. However, because of the fact-intensive nature of equitable doctrines, we grant the trial court broader discretion in applying the law to the facts.

Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315, ¶ 11, 222 P.3d 69 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), aff'd,2012 UT 14, 274 P.3d 911. Because the Uniform Parentage Act governs this dispute, resolution of this issue requires statutory interpretation, presenting a question of law that we review for correctness. See State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ¶ 6, 203 P.3d 984;Lilly v. Lilly, 2011 UT App 53, ¶ 6, 250 P.3d 994.

¶ 10 While the parties concentrate their arguments on the merits, Husband and Wife also contend that Intervenor lacks standing to challenge the final divorce decree involving Husband and Wife. Standing presents a question of law. See Blodgett v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah Ct.App.1988).

ANALYSIS

¶ 11 As an initial matter, we are not persuaded that Intervenor lacks standing. Indeed, it is curious that Husband and Wife would now so contend, Wife having earlier brought Intervenor into this proceeding so that his paternity could be adjudicated.³ It is enough for us that Intervenor “claims an interest relating to the ... transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest [.]” Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a). See Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶ 50, 123 P.3d 416 (“To satisfy the basic requirements of the traditional standing test, a party must allege that he or she suffered or will imminently suffer an injury that is fairly traceable to the conduct at issue such that a favorable decision is likely to redress the injury.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we consider Intervenor's appeal on its merits.

I. The District Court Retained Subject Matter Jurisdiction To Revisit Husband and Wife's Divorce Decree.

¶ 12 We must first determine whether the district court could revisit the terms of Husband and Wife's 2006 default divorce decree. Intervenor argues that that decree, which recited that there was one child resulting from the marriage, conclusively determined Husband to be the father of Wife's child.

¶ 13 A provision of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act states that “[i]f the question of paternity has been raised in the pleadings in a divorce and the tribunal addresses the issue and enters an order, the parties are estopped from raising the issue again, and the order of the tribunal may not be challenged on the basis of material mistake of fact.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B–15–607(1)(a) (2008). However, perfunctorily reciting in a default divorce...