Blondell v. Baltimore City Police Dept.

• Decision Date: 01 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 68,68
• Citation: 672 A.2d 639,341 Md. 680
• Parties: Charles R. BLONDELL v. BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 680

341 Md. 680

672 A.2d 639

Charles R. BLONDELL v. BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT.

No. 68, Sept. Term, 1995.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 8, 1996.

Reconsideration Denied April 10, 1996.

Michael Marshall (Schlachman, Belsky & Weiner, P.A., on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Gary May, Assistant City Solicitor (Neal M. Janey, City Solicitor, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI, BELL and RAKER, JJ.

RAKER, Judge.

In this case, we are asked to interpret §§ 727, 733, and 734A of the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR), which govern punishment for violations of police regulations. ¹ The question presented is whether the LEOBR prohibits the Police Department from adding new charges against an officer after the officer rejects the Department's initial offer of punishment. We shall hold that in this case, the Department's decision to add a new charge did not violate the LEOBR.

I.

In December, 1990, Captain Charles Blondell of the Baltimore City Police Department was accused of reporting a fabricated sexual harassment complaint against one of his subordinates. The Police Department's Internal Investigation Division (IID) conducted an investigation and concluded that Blondell knew the complaint lacked merit when he filed it. IID therefore sustained a charge of general misconduct against Blondell. Both IID and Blondell's commanding officer, Colonel Christian, recommended a severe letter of reprimand as punishment. On review, the Deputy Commissioner of the Administrative Bureau concluded that the offense warranted additional punishment, adding three days' loss of vacation leave to the penalty. ²

On October 15, 1990, the Deputy Commissioner informed Captain Blondell of the findings of the IID investigation and offered him punishment of a severe letter of reprimand and three days loss of vacation leave if Blondell agreed to forego a hearing. See § 734D. ³ Blondell declined the offer, exercising his statutory right to a hearing under the LEOBR. See § 730(a); see also Baltimore City Police Department, General Order 48-77, at C-2 (July 1, 1977) (Annex C) [hereinafter Gen'l Order 48-77 ]. ⁴ In accord with police regulations, IID forwarded the case file to the Legal Affairs Division for review in preparation for the hearing. See Gen'l Order 48-77, at C-2 and H-1. ⁵ In conducting the review, Legal Affairs noted that Blondell had made several false statements in the course of the conduct that led to the general misconduct charge and, therefore, requested that IID conduct further investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation, IID recommended adding a charge of false statements to the charge of general misconduct. The Deputy Commissioner approved addition of the false statements charge. Legal Affairs notified Captain Blondell of the two charges against him on February 19, 1991.

On March 28, 1991, before any hearing board was convened, Captain Blondell filed a complaint and petition to show cause in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City pursuant to LEOBR § 734. ⁶ Blondell requested ex parte, interlocutory, and permanent injunctive relief to prevent the Police Department from proceeding with the hearing. Blondell contended that the Police Department's addition of the false statements charge after he had been offered what he termed "summary punishment" for the general misconduct charge violated §§ 727(d)(3) and 733 of the LEOBR. The Police Department moved for dismissal or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, but the Circuit Court denied the Department's motion.

The Circuit Court held a hearing on April 20, 1994, and denied Blondell's request for an injunction. At the conclusion of Captain Blondell's case, the trial judge granted the Police Department's motion for judgment because she concluded the punishment offered to Captain Blondell was not summary punishment and, therefore, the statutory limitations on summary punishment did not apply. In explaining her ruling, the trial judge stated:

I find based on the evidence in this case that the punishment that was offered was not summary punishment, for a number of reasons[.] [F]irst of all, it is arguably not a minor infraction for which Detective Captain Blondell was investigated.... The Commissioner has not delegated the authority to anyone else. He retains the authority in himself. The offense is and remains in dispute. And the punishment was greater than the limitation that is placed on it in the summary punishment definition in section F of subsection 727. And what makes it greater is not the issue of whether a three day loss of vacation is greater or less than a three day suspension. But it's the fact that a severe letter of reprimand was recommended. That certainly is much greater than just a three day suspension or fine of $150.00. So in this case, I find that summary punishment was not invoked, and therefore, ... the hearing board of the department is not limited to recommending sanctions offered in the memorandum of October 18th, 1990.

The trial judge also concluded that Captain Blondell had not proven that the Department added the second charge in retaliation for his request for a hearing.

Blondell noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the punishment offered to Blondell was not summary punishment because his offense was not "minor." Blondell v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 104 Md.App. 69, 76, 655 A.2d 34, 38 (1995). The Court of Special Appeals also concluded that Captain Blondell had not met his burden of proving the Department's retaliatory motive under § 733. Id. at 79-80, 655 A.2d at 38-39; see also DiGrazia v. County Executive, 288 Md. 437, 448, 418 A.2d 1191, 1197 (1980) (employee must "show that the questioned conduct was a substantial or motivating factor" in the employer's decision). We subsequently granted Blondell's petition for a writ of certiorari.

II.

Captain Blondell contends that when an officer rejects an offer of summary punishment, the Chief of Police must form a hearing board pursuant to § 727(d)(3) of the LEOBR. ⁷ Section 727(d)(3) limits the penalty that the hearing board may impose to the maximum penalty available for summary punishment, i.e., up to three days suspension without pay or a fine of $150. Blondell argues that the punishment offered to him by the Police Department was summary punishment. Therefore he concludes that a hearing board may not impose a penalty on him that exceeds the maximum penalty available for summary punishment. He asserts that by adding a false statement charge to the initial charge of general misconduct, the Police Department subjected him to punishment that could exceed the summary punishment limits, violating § 727(d)(3) of the LEOBR. Blondell also argues that the Department added the false statement charge in retaliation for his decision to request a hearing, violating § 733 of the LEOBR.

The Police Department contends that its initial offer of punishment to Captain Blondell did not constitute summary punishment. Therefore, the Department argues, the statutory limitation on penalties for summary punishment does not apply. In addition, the Department contends that even if the initial offer did constitute summary punishment, the penalty cap does not automatically apply in all cases where an officer rejects summary punishment.

The central statutory interpretation dispute in this case is whether, in addition to the method prescribed in § 727(d)(3), the Police Chief may also choose to form a hearing board under § 727(d)(1) in cases of summary punishment. The Department contends that it may proceed to hearing under either § 727(d)(1) ⁸ or § 727(d)(3). The penalty limitations only apply when the Chief of Police elects to proceed via § 727(d)(3) rather than § 727(d)(1). Since no hearing has yet been held in this case, and no choice has been made between the two hearing board mechanisms, the Department contends that no violation has occurred. Finally, the Department argues that Captain Blondell offered no proof of retaliatory motive, as required to demonstrate a violation of LEOBR § 733.

III.

A.

In construing the LEOBR provisions at issue in this case, we apply the paradigm of statutory construction developed in numerous decisions of this Court. As we have often stated, "the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intention." Fikar v. Montgomery County, 333 Md. 430, 434, 635 A.2d 977, 979 (1994) (quoting Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471, 480, 578 A.2d 761, 765 (1990) (citations omitted)); Police Comm'r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 418, 379 A.2d 1007, 1010 (1977). The primary indicator of the Legislature's intent is the language of the statute. Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672, 659 A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995). We interpret statutes to give every word effect, avoiding constructions that render any portion of the language superfluous or redundant. Warsame v. State, 338 Md. 513, 519, 659 A.2d 1271, 1273 (1995); see also 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 119-20 (5th ed. 1992 & 1995 Cum.Supp.). In addition, we construe the statute as a whole, interpreting each provision of the statute in the context of the entire statutory scheme. Warsame, 338 Md. at 519, 659 A.2d at 1273 (citing GEICO v. Insurance Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 132, 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993)); see also 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05, at 103 (5th ed. 1992 & 1995 Cum.Supp.). If the statutory language, read in its entirety, is clear and unambiguous, and comports with the Legislature's purpose, we need not inquire further to discern the statute's meaning. Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991).

B.

Applying these principles to the statutory provisions at issue in this case, we first observe that the purpose of the LEOBR is "to guarantee that certain procedural...