Bloodsworth v. Heckler

Decision Date25 April 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82-5071,82-5071
Citation703 F.2d 1233
PartiesJack BLOODSWORTH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

James F. McKenzie, Pensacola, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

Thomas R. Santurri, Asst. U.S. Atty., Pensacola, Fla., Elyse Sharfman, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Before VANCE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and JONES, Senior Circuit Judge.

VANCE, Circuit Judge:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is an appeal of an affirmance of the Secretary of Health and Human Services' denial of a claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act.

Claimant Bloodsworth filed applications for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income on June 1, 1979. The applications were denied initially, on reconsideration, and by an administrative law judge after a hearing. Claimant inadvertently missed the sixty day time limit for appeals to the Appeals Council, and a request for review by the Appeals Council filed approximately two weeks after the deadline was dismissed on the basis of untimeliness without good cause.

Claimant filed his complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, alleging that the denial of the extension of time to file was not supported by substantial evidence. The Secretary filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). The district court found jurisdiction to review the denial of an extension of time under Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) and remanded the case to the Appeals Council. The Secretary has never appealed the district court's assumption of jurisdiction to review the Appeals Council's discretionary denial of the extension. On remand, the Appeals Council restated its position that Bloodsworth's request for review was untimely filed, but, in compliance with the court's order, considered the appeal on the merits and on the merits denied claimant's request for review. The district court affirmed the Appeals Council decision and Bloodsworth now appeals on the grounds that the decision to deny benefits is not supported by substantial evidence.

FACTS

Jack Bloodsworth, a minimally literate man in his mid-fifties with a fourth grade education, was retired in 1975 on a permanent total disability from his occupation as a drawbridge tender for the State of Florida. This work requires operating the bridge controls with hands and feet and Bloodsworth had surgery in 1962 and 1964 for lumbar disc disease and a herniated nucleus pulposus (ruptured disc). X-rays taken on December 31, 1978 and September 29, 1978 showed scoliosis of the spine. A lumbar myelogram of September 10, 1975 showed a laminectomy (disc surgery) defect, scoliosis and narrowing of L5-S1 in the lumbar spine.

four hours of standing and four hours of sitting each day. Mr. Bloodsworth has also had previous gainful employment as a park attendant and as a welder.

All examining physicians agreed as to the presence of degenerative osteoarthritis and marked limitation of motion accompanied by severe pain. Bloodsworth's treating physicians also found the presence of degenerative lumbar disc disease.

Appellant has constant back pain which keeps him awake at night and forces him to lie down three or four times daily, for from twenty minutes to an hour. He uses a hot pad for his right shoulder, and, at the time of the hearing, was having difficulty using his right hand.

THE JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION

The Secretary of Health and Human Services argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under sections 205(g) and (h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g) and (h). Section 405(g) states that appeal to the federal district court is available as follows:

Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow.

Section 405(h) prohibits federal court review of administrative decisions except as provided in section 405(g).

The Secretary does not squarely confront the correctness of the district court's original determination resulting in the remand to the Appeals Council for consideration of the merits of Bloodsworth's claim. Rather, the Secretary argues that appellant failed to meet the "final decision" and "made after a hearing" requirements. He contends that (1) dismissal of a request for review on the basis of untimeliness without "good cause" is not a "final decision" because it does not constitute a determination on the merits, and (2) it is not "made after a hearing" because no hearing is granted solely and specifically on the request for review itself.

This position is directly contradictory to our holding in Langford v. Flemming, 276 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.1960). In Langford we held that the

administrative decision declining to extend time and review the merits ... certainly is "final"

id. at 218, and allowed review of an Appeals Council decision to dismiss for untimeliness without good cause. The Secretary contends, however, that Langford is implicitly overruled, or at least "diluted," by the Supreme Court holding in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). The Secretary also cites Sheehan v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 593 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.1979), and Watters v. Harris, 656 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1980), as persuasive authority. The Sanders Court held that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g) could not be construed to authorize judicial review of alleged abuses of agency discretion in refusing to reopen claims for social security benefits. The Court reasoned that requests to reopen were not covered by section 405(g) because such requests could be denied without hearing. The question of the propriety of federal court review following an Appeals Council decision not to entertain an untimely review request was not considered in Sanders.

Nevertheless, the Secretary urges us to apply the reasoning of Sanders, contending appeal to the federal district court of refusals to renew requests for untimeliness without good cause similarly frustrates the legislative interest in the finality of administrative decisions. The Secretary's argument is premised upon the statement in Sanders that:

[A]n interpretation that would allow a claimant judicial review simply by filing--and being denied--a petition to reopen his claim would frustrate the congressional purpose, plainly evidenced in Sec. 205(g), to impose a 60-day limitation upon judicial review of the Secretary's final decision on the initial claim for benefits.

Id. 430 U.S. at 108, 97 S.Ct. at 986.

The Secretary argues that appeals from denials of requests for review and appeals from denials of requests to reopen are equivalent procedural vehicles which may be used to circumvent the time limitations for judicial review.

The difficulty with the Secretary's position is that review and reopening play fundamentally different roles in the process of administrative decision making and have significantly different effects upon the finality of administrative decisions. The first review by the Appeals Council is a normal stage in the administrative review procedure, available as of right to any party dissatisfied with the hearing decision or the dismissal of a hearing request. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.967 (1982). 1 The dismissal of a request for Appeals Council review is binding and not subject to further administrative review. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.981 (1982). The Appeals Council decision, whether it is a determination on the merits or a denial of request to review, is binding and final and appeal therefrom is available to any party as a matter of statutory right under section 405(g) and the accompanying administrative regulation. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.981 states:

The Appeals Council's decision, or the decision of the administrative law judge if the request for review is denied, is binding unless you or another party file an action in Federal district court, or the decision is revised. You may file an action in a Federal district court within 60 days after the date you receive notice of the Appeals Council's action.

Neither the statute nor the regulations make any distinction in regard to rights of judicial appeal between dismissals and determinations on the merits by the Appeals Council. Both are equally final and both trigger a right to review by the district court. The Supreme Court appears to have recognized this in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2466, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975):

[T]he finality required for judicial review is achieved only after the ... steps of a hearing before an administrative law judge and, possibly, consideration by the Appeals Council.

By 20 C.F.R. Secs. 404.972 2 and 404.981, an Appeals Council review determination, on whatever grounds, is perceived as the appropriately "final decision" from which to take an appeal to the district court under section 405(g). As the Supreme Court emphasized in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 766, 95 S.Ct. at 2467, "final decision" is not synonymous with complete exhaustion of administrative remedies. See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328-30, 96 S.Ct. 893, 899-900, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Rather, it is to be understood in conjunction with the regulatory structure promulgated in Title 20 of the C.F.R. and the underlying policies behind the requirement.

[T]he doctrine of administrative exhaustion should be applied with a regard for the particular...

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