McGaster v. Saul, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-00321-N

• Decision Date: 19 September 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-00321-N
• Parties: MARLON J. McGASTER, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

MARLON J. McGASTER, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security,¹Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-00321-N

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

September 19, 2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PlaintiffMarlon J. McGaster brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)and1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying his applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq., and for supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq.²Uponconsideration of the parties' briefs (Docs. 13, 14) and those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 12)(hereinafter cited as "(R. [page number(s) in lower-right corner of transcript])") relevant to the issues raised, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Court finds that the Commissioner's final decision is due to be REVERSED and REMANDED under sentence four of § 405(g).³

I.Background

McGaster filed an application for a period of disability and DIB with the Social Security Administration ("SSA") on October 7, 2015, and an application for SSI on November 17, 2015.After they were initially denied, McGaster requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") with the SSA's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, which was held on February 22, 2017.On August 9, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on McGaster's applications, finding him not disabled under the Social Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits.(SeeR. 10 - 24).

The Commissioner's decision on McGaster's applications became final when the Appeals Council for the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review denied his request for review of the ALJ's decision on June 14, 2018.(R. 1 - 5).McGaster subsequently brought this action under § 405(g)and§ 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision.See42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3)("The finaldetermination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of this title.");42 U.S.C. § 405(g)("Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.");Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262(11th Cir.2007)("The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.").

II.Standards of Review

"In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is ' "supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." ' "Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178(11th Cir.2011)(quotingCrawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158(11th Cir.2004)(per curiam)(internal citation omitted)(quotingLewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439(11th Cir.1997))).However, the Court" 'may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].' "Id.(quotingPhillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8(11th Cir.2004)(alteration in original)(quotingBloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239(11th Cir.1983)))." 'Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s factual findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.' "Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260(quotingMartin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529(11th Cir.1990)).

"Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons.[The Court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]"Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239(citations and quotation omitted).See alsoOwens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516(11th Cir.1984)(per curiam)("We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us.Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts.").⁴"In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [acourt] must...tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision."Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131(11th Cir.1986).See alsoMcCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1548(11th Cir.1986)("We are constrained to conclude that the administrative agency here...reached the result that it did by focusing upon one aspect of the evidence and ignoring other parts of the record.In such circumstances we cannot properly find that the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence.It is not enough to discover a piece of evidence which supports that decision, but to disregard other contrary evidence.The review must take into account and evaluate the record as a whole.").

However, the "substantial evidence""standard of review applies only to findings of fact.No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]'s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims."MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053(11th Cir.1986)(quotation omitted).Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389(11th Cir.1982)("Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that '(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....'42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) ... As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary's conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims."(some quotation marks omitted)).This Court"conduct[s]'an exacting examination' of these factors."Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400(11th Cir.1996)(per curiam)(quotingMartin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529(11th Cir.1990))."'The [Commissioner]'s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.'"Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260(quotingCornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46(11th Cir.1991)).AccordKeeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066(11th Cir.1994).

In sum, courts"review the Commissioner's factual findings with deferenceand the Commissioner's legal conclusions with close scrutiny."Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278(11th Cir.2001).See alsoMoore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211(11th Cir.2005)(per curiam)("In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based.Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131(11th Cir.1986).However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence.Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59(11th Cir.2004).").

Eligibility for DIB and SSI requires that the claimant be disabled.42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E),1382(a)(1)-(2).A claimant is disabled if she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),1382c(a)(3)(A).

Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609(11th Cir.2015)(per curiam)(unpublished).⁵

The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity ("RFC") assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience.

Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178(citing20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v),416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v);Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).⁶

"These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work."Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211(citingSpencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093(11th Cir.1985))."In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4)the claimant's age, education, and work history."Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005(11th Cir.1986)(per curiam)(citingTieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253(11th Cir.1983)(per curiam))."These factors must be considered both singly...