Bloodworth v. State
Decision Date | 03 April 1911 |
Docket Number | (No. 3,141.) |
Parties | BLOODWORTH. v. STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
"The opening of a door, though it may not be latched or fastened by bolts or locks, and effecting an entrance thereby, " is a "breaking, " within the meaning of the law relating to burglary. Grimes v. State, 77 Ga. 762, 4 Am. St. Rep. 112,
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Burglary, Cent. Dig. §§ 6-12; Dec. Dig. § 9.*
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 1, pp. 862-866; vol. 8, pp. 7592, 7593.]
The testimony unequivocally disclosed that the prosecutor's house had been broken (using the word "broken" in the sense indicated in the preceding headnote), and, the only issue under the evidence being as to whether the defendant was the person who was guilty of the burglary, the court did not err in failing to charge on the subject of larceny from the house.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Burglary, Cent. Dig. §§ 111-120; Dec. Dig. § 46.*]
Error from Superior Court, Taylor County; S. P. Gilbert, Judge.
Oscar Bloodworth was convicted of burglary, and brings error. Affirmed.
Perry, Foy & Monk, for plaintiff in error.
Geo. C. Palmer, Sol. Gen., for the State.
POWELL, J. Judgment affirmed.
*. For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
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