Bloodworth v. State, 29064
| Decision Date | 04 February 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 29064,29064 |
| Citation | 212 S.E.2d 774,233 Ga. 589 |
| Parties | Joseph BLOODWORTH v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Westmoreland, Patterson & Moseley, R. Robider Markwalter, Macon, for appellant.
Fred M. Hasty, Dist. Atty., Walker P. Johnson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Macon, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., John B. Ballard, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
This is an appeal from two convictions for rape and two life sentences. The appellant was convicted for a third rape, but the trial judge granted a new trial as to that conviction. The issues on appeal are the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the convictions and the admissibility of certain evidence tending to identify the appellants as the party who had committed the two crimes.
1. Five enumerated errors, basically the general grounds for a motion for a new trial, contend that the evidence does not sustain the convictions. Having reviewed the evidence, we hold that these enumerated errors are without merit.
2. Another enumerated error asserts that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence, over timely objection, material seized in a search without a warrant and not incident to a lawful arrest. The admitted evidence was obtained from the yard of a residence formerly occupied by the appellant. The appellant contended that he was in the process of moving from the residence but claimed that he was entitled to possession of the premises until the day after the search and seizure. The search and seizure were made without a warrant. The appellant is correct in asserting that the yard of a private residence is 'curtilage' within the protection of the Fourth Amerdment. However, the evidence authorized a finding by the trial judge that the premises searched had been abandoned. The appellant was no longer residing on the premises, although he may have retained a lawful interest in them. The question of abandonment for Fourth Amendment purposes does not turn on strict property concepts but on whether the accused has relinquished his interest in the property to the extent that he no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises at the time of the search. U.S. v. Brown, 473 F.2d 952, 954 n.5 (5th Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901, 902 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 868 (1973). This principle has been applied to find abandonment where a tenant has left residential premises even though he may retain the lawful right to possession. Parman v. U.S. 130 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 399 F.2d 559 (1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 858, 89 S.Ct. 109, 21 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968).
We conclude that the motion to suppress was properly denied, and the admission of this evidence upon the trial was not erroneous.
3. The other enumerated error contends that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of a witness for the state, over timely objection, concerning a separate and distinct offense which was not material to the issues on trial. The argument is that the admission of this testimony put the appellant's character in issue in violation of Code § 38-202. The state argues that this testimony was within the exceptions to the general rule and that it was admissible.
The witness' testimony was to the effect that in July, 1972, she was awakened in her apartment at North Napier Apartments in Bibb County; she was awakened in the early morning hours by a man who had his hands around her throat and told her that he would not hurt her if she did not say anything; he then talked to her for about an hour or an hour and a half; he did not assault her; he told her that he had come in through an open window; he told her that he had taken her pocketbook and given it to his little brother but that he would return it; later that same day, after working hours, a man telephoned and asked her to meet him at a shopping center to get her pocketbook; the man she met there was the defendant; he had her pocketbook, which he returned; she recognized his voice as the voice of the intruder, but she could not identify him on any other basis; and she became a friend of the defendant and saw him on numerous subsequent occasions.
This testimony was relevant only on the question of the identity of the appellant.
In Allen v. State, 201 Ga. 391, 395, 40 S.E.2d 144 (1946), two witnesses were permitted to testify as to prior criminal acts of the defendant. One of the prior acts was a rape committed in a manner similar to the alleged rapes in this case. The other...
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