Bloom v. City of Oakley, 92,305.
| Decision Date | 28 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 92,305.,92,305. |
| Parties | J. M. BLOOM, Appellee, v. CITY OF OAKLEY, KANSAS, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Jeffery A. Mason, of Vignery & Mason, L.L.C., of Goodland, for appellant.
James C. Spencer, of Spencer & Spencer, P.A., of Wichita, for appellee.
Before, ELLIOTT, P.J., CAPLINGER, J., and WAHL, S.J.
Petition for review denied 279 Kan. 1005 (2005).
The City of Oakley, Kansas (City), appeals from the district court's decision holding that the property of J. M. Bloom, who resided outside the City, was not properly included within an improvement district created by the City pursuant to K.S.A. 12-693(b) to allocate the cost of improving a boundary line road located entirely within the City. We affirm the district court and find that because the City failed to enter into an interlocal agreement with Logan County (County) prior to assessing property located outside City boundaries, Bloom's property was not properly included within the improvement district.
The material facts were not disputed, and this case was resolved based on cross-motions for summary judgment.
On July 1, 2002, various landowners filed a petition with the City pursuant to K.S.A. 12-6a01 et seq. The petition requested a specified portion of Royal Avenue be paved and that approximately 85% of the costs of the improvement be assessed to the landowners within an identified improvement district; the City would bear the remainder of the costs. The petition was signed by various landowners within the proposed improvement district. Bloom did not sign the petition.
The portion of Royal Avenue that was subject to the proposed improvement fell entirely within the corporate limits of the City. Bloom's property ran alongside a lengthy portion of Royal Avenue, but his property lay entirely outside the city limits. The city limits terminated at the side of Royal Avenue adjacent to Bloom's property.
The same date the petition was filed, the City Council passed a resolution finding it advisable to pave Royal Avenue and to assess the cost of the improvement to landowners in the improvement district and the City as provided in the petition. The resolution proposed that the improvement district include the property identified in the petition, which included real estate located both within and outside the city limits.
The paving of Royal Avenue was completed by the City before November 28, 2002. On December 2, 2002, the City passed an ordinance assessing $36,287.80 against Bloom's property for the improvements.
On December 23, 2002, Bloom filed a petition in Logan County District Court against the City seeking to enjoin the assessment against him under K.S.A. 60-907(a). Bloom asserted that the City could not create an improvement district under K.S.A. 12-6a01 et seq. that included property outside the corporate limits of the municipality.
After a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that while 1988 amendments to the pertinent statutes permitted the City to form improvement districts that include land both inside and outside the city limits, that power was restricted by K.S.A. 12-693(b). According to the district court, that provision "requires that the governing body of the City enter into an agreement with the Board of County Commissioners in order to initiate such improvements and . . . assessments therefor." Because the City failed to enter into an agreement with the County, the trial court found the City lacked the statutory authority to levy an assessment against Bloom's property. The City appealed.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the City has the power to create an improvement district that includes property both inside and outside the city limits under the facts of this case. The power of a municipality to create special benefit or improvement districts and assess the property in the district for improvements is completely controlled by statute; a municipality has no powers except those expressly granted and those necessary to make the express powers effective. Madden v. City of Lenexa, 239 Kan. 397, 400, 721 P.2d 261 (1986).
Because the interpretation of statutes involves a question of law, our review is unlimited. See In re Tax Appeal of City of Wichita, 277 Kan. 487, 490, 86 P.3d 513 (2004).
The statute at issue, K.S.A. 12-693(b), provides in relevant part:
(Emphasis added.)
Before considering the application of K.S.A. 12-693(b), this court first notes that both parties agree that K.S.A. 12-693(a) is not applicable here. That section allows for improvements to be made in unincorporated areas beyond a city's corporate limits and within 3 miles thereof and for assessments to be made in "improvement districts" either partially within or wholly outside the corporate limits. While the improvement district in this case is located partially within and partially outside the city limits, the improvements are located solely within the city limits. Because K.S.A. 12-693(a) applies only when improvements are made outside the city limits, this court agrees that section need not be considered here.
Bloom contends that K.S.A. 12-693(b) does not permit the assessment the City imposed against his property because the City had no agreement with the County; he claims such an agreement is necessary when all the improvements are within the city limits but the improvement district includes property outside the city limits. The City, however, asserts such an agreement with the County is discretionary, not mandatory.
The fundamental principal of statutory interpretation is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme it enacted. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed. Williamson v. City of Hays, 275 Kan. 300, 305, 64 P.3d 364 (2003). In construing statutes and determining legislative intent, various provisions in an act must be construed together, in pari materia, with a view of reconciling and harmonizing the provisions, if possible. Effect must be given, if possible, to every part of the act. State ex rel. Morrison v. Oshman Sporting Goods Co. Kansas, 275 Kan. 763, 768, 69 P.3d 1087 (2003).
The scope of municipal powers under K.S.A. 12-693(b) is less than clear. The subsection clearly pertains to (1) improvement districts that include property both inside and outside the city limits, (2) where the benefit is the improvement to city streets located on the city boundary. Those are the facts of this case. Nevertheless, the meaning of the statute is much less apparent when considering the application of the phrase: "[T]he governing body of the city and the board of county commissioners of the county may enter into agreements whereby" either entity may initiate such improvements under K.S.A. 12-6a04. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 12-693(b). The City argues the term "may" indicates the City is permitted, but not required, to enter into an agreement with the County to create the benefit district. The City also asserts that K.S.A. 12-693(b) was added after the Supreme Court's...
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