State ex rel. Morrison v. Oshman Sporting Goods Co. Kansas, 86,035
Decision Date | 30 May 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 86,035,86,035 |
Citation | 69 P.3d 1087,275 Kan. 763 |
Parties | STATE OF KANSAS, ex rel. PAUL J. MORRISON, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Appellee v. OSHMAN SPORTING GOODS CO. KANSAS, D/B/A OSHMAN'S SUPERSPORTS USA, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Daniel O. Herrington, of Armstrong Teasdale LLP, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.
David L. Harder, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, and Paul J. Morrison, district attorney, were on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by:
Oshman Sporting Goods Co. Kansas, d/b/a Oshman's Supersports USA (Oshman) appealed the district court's imposition of civil penalties for overcharges on merchandise in violation of the weights and measures statutes, K.S.A. 83-201 et seq., and the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA), K.S.A. 50-623 et seq. The Court of Appeals reversed in a published decision with one judge dissenting, and this court granted the State's petition for review.
In 1998, the Kansas Department of Agriculture randomly chose Oshman as the subject of a price verification inspection. The inspector randomly selected 100 items to price test, wrote down the product number of each item, manually entered each item into the point-of-sale system, recorded the price retrieved by the point-of-sale system, and then compared it to the advertised price of each item, noting any discrepancies. A 98% accuracy rate, counting both overcharges and undercharges, was considered a passing rate. A score below 98% prompted additional follow-up inspections.
Between March 1998 and June 1999, Oshman failed seven price verification inspections. There were a total of 25 overcharges amounting to $142.64, and a total of 44 undercharges amounting to $435.57. In any single inspection, the highest failure rate was 8 overcharges totaling $49.24 and 14 undercharges totaling $112.03.
On January 13, 2000, the Johnson County District Attorney filed a petition alleging that the price discrepancies discovered during the inspections constituted violations of the KCPA and K.S.A. 83-219. After a bench trial, the trial court found that each of the 25 overcharges constituted a violation of K.S.A. 83-219(a)(16) and that each violation of K.S.A. 83-219(a)(16) was also a violation of the KCPA pursuant to K.S.A. 83-219(d). The court imposed a civil penalty of $2,000 per violation, for a total fine of $50,000. Oshman timely appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion, with one judge dissenting. State ex rel. Morrison v. Oshman Sporting Goods Co. Kansas, 30 Kan. App. 2d 383, 42 P.3d 197 (2002). The majority ruled that K.S.A. 83-219(a) applied only to the owner of a commercial weighing or measuring device, not the owner of a point-of-sale system; therefore, the statute did not apply to Oshman. 30 Kan. App. 2d at 387. The majority also rejected the State's alternative argument that Oshman's overcharges were violations of the KCPA independent of K.S.A. 83-219(a). The majority held that because an inspection by the Department of Agriculture was not a consumer transaction, no violations of the KCPA had occurred. 30 Kan. App. 2d at 387. This court granted the State's petition for review.
Oshman principal argument to both the trial court and Court of Appeals was that the State's allegations did not state a claim under K.S.A. 83-219(a). The trial court found that Oshman had violated K.S.A. 83-219(a)(16) which makes it unlawful for "(a) . . . any owner of a commercial weighing or measuring device: (16) . . . to charge or attempt to charge, at the time of the sale of an item or commodity, a value which is more than the price which is advertised, posted or quoted." Oshman argued that K.S.A. 83-219(a) did not apply because it was not the owner of a commercial weighing or measuring device; rather, it was the owner of a point-of-sale system that was not included within the definition of a measuring device. The trial court disagreed, finding that the legislature intended a point-of-sale system to be a weighing or measuring device under K.S.A. 83-219.
The Court of Appeals found the pivotal issue in the case to be whether a point-of-sale system was included within the definition of a weighing device. The majority acknowledged the parties' arguments regarding various uses of the terms "weights and measures," "weighing and measuring devices," and "point-of-sale systems" within the weights and measures statutes, finding that "under the present ambiguities of the statutory scheme it is less than clear that a point-of-sale system comes within the definition of a measuring device." 30 Kan. App. 2d at 385. The majority focused on legislative amendments to the statutes in 1994 and 1996 as the source of the ambiguity:
Judge Knudson dissented, finding it was not plausible that the legislature intended to negate the 1994 amendments necessary to inspect and regulate modern pricing computers by its enactment of the 1996 amendment to K.S.A. 83-219(a). Although he found no legislative history to explain the 1996 amendment, he opined that the term "person" may have been thought overly broad, subjecting a mere clerk to civil penalties. He also noted that the legislature had not rescinded K.S.A. 83-219(a) subsections (13) through (16) which address the misuse of point-of-sale systems and that the unifying definition of "weights and measures" at K.S.A. 83-201(a) continued to include point-of-sale systems. 30 Kan. App. 2d at 388-89.
In its petition for review, the State contends that the Court of Appeals' majority erroneously interpreted the weights and measures statutes, K.S.A. 83-201 and 83-219. Specifically, the State disagrees with the majority's findings regarding the legislative history and legislative intent behind the 1994 and 1996 amendments to those statutes.
The interpretation of statutes is a question of law, and this court's review is unlimited. Babe Houser Motor Co. v. Tetreault, 270 Kan. 502, 506, 14 P.3d 1149 (2000).
Again, the statute at issue, K.S.A. 83-219(a)(16) makes it unlawful for "any owner of a commercial weighing or measuring device. . . to charge or attempt to charge, at the time of the sale of an item or commodity, a value which is more than the price which is advertised, posted or quoted." (Emphasis added.) A "measuring device" is defined to include "all weights, scales, beams, measures of every kind, instruments and mechanical devices for weighing or measuring, and any appliances and accessories connected with any or all such instruments." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 83-201(k). The terms "weights" and "measures" are not defined separately, but the definition of the term "weights and measures" means "all commercial weights or measures of every kind, instruments and devices for weighing and measuring, and any appliance and accessories associated with any or all such instruments and devices and any point-of-sale system." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 83-201(a).
A "point-of-sale system" is defined as (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 83-201(l).
These terms are used inconsistently throughout the weights and measures statutes. Given the ambiguity of the terminology and its usage, this court must look to the design and language of the statute as a whole, as well as to external aids, that may reveal the intent of the legislature. Several canons of statutory construction support the conclusion that K.S.A. 83-219(a) was intended to apply to point-of-sale systems even after the 1996 amendment.
First, Petty v. City of El Dorado, 270 Kan. 847, 852, 19 P.3d 167 (2001). ...
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