Bloom v. Oliver
| Decision Date | 12 June 1909 |
| Citation | 120 S.W. 1101 |
| Parties | BLOOM v. OLIVER et al. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Leon County; S. W. Dean, Judge.
Action by Mattie Oliver and others against N. Bloom and another, as administrators of J. H. Oliver, deceased. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant Bloom appeals. Affirmed.
Boyd & Boyd, for appellant. A. J. Harper, Joe H. Seale, and Wm. Watson, for appellees.
Mrs. Mattie Oliver, surviving wife of J. H. Oliver, deceased, for herself and as next friend for Joe T. Oliver, J. H. Oliver, and Jim Oliver, minors, and Annie Bigham, joined by her husband, Sam Bigham, as the only heirs at law of J. H. Oliver, deceased, brought this suit against N. Bloom and B. D. Dashiell, as administrators of the estate of said J. H. Oliver, to set aside and annul an order of the county court of Leon county made and entered in the proceedings relating to the administration of the estate of said J. H. Oliver approving a claim of $4,500 against said estate in favor of N. Bloom, which claim had previously been allowed by Dashiell, the administrator. The district court, on the petition of the plaintiffs, granted the certiorari prayed for, and the proceedings were removed from the county to the district court for a trial de novo. The only ground upon which the judgment of the county court was sought to be set aside, that we need notice, was that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations at the time of its allowance by the administrator and its approval by the county court. Defendant Bloom answered by general denial and specially denied plaintiffs' interest in the subject-matter of the suit. Defendant Dashiell the administrator, answered that he allowed the claim of Bloom under the belief that it was a subsisting bona fide charge against the estate, and that he had no notice or knowledge that it was barred by the statute of limitations; and he joined in the prayer of the plaintiffs that the judgment approving it be annulled. The case was tried by the court without a jury, and judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs canceling the allowance of the claim by the administrator and setting aside the order of the county court approving the claim, from which judgment the defendant Bloom has prosecuted this appeal.
Appellant presents but one assignment of error upon which he seeks a reversal, which is as follows: "The court erred in rendering judgment in favor of plaintiffs and B. D. Dashiell, and against defendant N. Bloom, in canceling and setting aside the claim of defendant Bloom against the estate of J. H. Oliver, deceased: (1) Because the evidence fails to show that administration is pending in the matter of the estate of said J. H. Oliver, deceased, or that such administration was pending at the time of the institution of this suit, or at the time of the trial; (2) because the evidence is wholly insufficient to establish the fact that the claim of defendant N. Bloom for $4,500 against the estate of J. H. Oliver, deceased, was barred by the statute of limitations at the time of its allowance by the administrator and approved by the county probate court of Leon county."
Appellant's first proposition under this assignment is that a cause cannot be removed from the county to the district court by writ of certiorari after administration has been closed, and, in order to confer jurisdiction on the district court granting such writ to try the case de novo, it must be alleged and proved that the administration is pending. This contention is without merit. Article 332, Rev. St. 1895, provides that any person interested in the estate of a decedent may have the proceedings of the county court revised and corrected at any time within two years after such proceedings were had, and that minors and femes covert shall have two years after the removal of their respective disabilities within which to apply for such revision and correction. It was shown that three of the plaintiffs were minors at the time of the institution of the suit, and that one was feme covert. There is nothing in the statute to justify the contention that such a proceeding as this was must be begun and prosecuted before administration is closed.
Appellant's second proposition under this assignment is that: ...
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Denton v. Meador
...presumptions are conclusively in favor of its validity. Cannon v. McDaniel, supra; Williams v. Robinson, 63 Tex. 576; Bloom v. Oliver, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 391, 120 S. W. 1101; Fryckberg v. Scott, supra; Krawietz v. Kneiski (Tex. Civ. App.) 236 S. W. 805; Howard v. Johnson, 69 Tex. 655, 7 S. W......
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Reeves v. Fuqua
...an order of the probate court of Hale county entered upon the claim for same duly adjudicated, cannot be sustained. Bloom v. Oliver, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 391, 120 S. W. 1101. As to the questions of tender and of limitation, raised by appellees' exceptions, we do not think it necessary to pass ......
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Bell v. Bowles
...W. 861, 92 S. W. 255, Hicks v. Oliver, 78 Tex. 233, 14 S. W. 575, De Cordova v. Rogers, 97 Tex. 63, 75 S. W. 16, and Bloom v. Oliver, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 391, 120 S. W. 1101, and hence that the question should be certified to our Supreme Court for We disavow any purpose on our part to invade ......
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Dunaway v. Easter
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