Bloomfield v. City of St. Petersburg Beach

• Decision Date: 16 September 1955
• Citation: 82 So.2d 364
• Parties: Lawrence BLOOMFIELD, Willard Johnson, Harry G. Rodefeld, Albert W. Furen and Sheldon A. Lindsey, Appellants, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG BEACH, Florida, a municipal corporation, Earl W.Compton, Carlisle T. Manly, Virginia R. Neel, Mayrie G. Woolf, Walter Sweeney,Rex Padgett, Ben F. Overton, Harold Soehl, and William Meinberg, Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 364

82 So.2d 364

Lawrence BLOOMFIELD, Willard Johnson, Harry G. Rodefeld, Albert W. Furen and Sheldon A. Lindsey, Appellants, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG BEACH, Florida, a municipal corporation, Earl W.Compton, Carlisle T. Manly, Virginia R. Neel, Mayrie G. Woolf, Walter Sweeney,Rex Padgett, Ben F. Overton, Harold Soehl, and William Meinberg, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida, En Banc.

Sept. 16, 1955.

Sheldon A. Lindsey and R. M. Cargell, St. Petersburg Beach, for appellants.

Carroll R. Runyon, St. Petersburg, Ben F. Overton, St. Petersburg Beach, and S. E. Simmons, St. Petersburg, for appellees.

THORNAL, Justice.

The appellees above named were plaintiffs in a declaratory judgment proceeding in the trial court. From a decree adverse to their liking the appellants, who were among the defendants below, have appealed.

The dispute grows out of a contest for political control of the government of the City of St. Petersburg Beach. By an amended complaint the appellees, Compton, Manly and Neel, Contended that they, plus the appellants, Bloomfield and Johnson, were the duly elected and qualified City Commissioners of St. Petersburg Beach. The appellants Bloomfield, Johnson and Rodefeld contended by their answer that they, plus appellees, Compton and Neel, were the duly elected and qualified City Commissioners of said city. The whole dispute centered around the appellee Manly in that if he was a qualified elector of the city and therefore duly elected, the majority control of the government of the city rested with what we shall call the 'Manly group'. On the contrary, if Manly was not legally elected, the majority control rested with what we shall call the 'Bloomfield group'. Although ultimately the control of the government of the city turns on the question of the election of Mr. Manly, the facts set forth in the complaint as well as the answer reveal a condition of municipal chaos and uncertainty that according to appellees justified the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court under the Declaratory Judgment Act, F.S.A. § 87.01 et seq. The other parties to this appeal were various city officials appointed by the respective groups.

It seems that they had a city election at St. Petersburg Beach on May 4, 1954. When the smoke of the political battle cleared away, the tabulation of votes revealed Manly had received 262 votes, Compton had received 253, Rodefeld had 185, and Furen had 181. It was obviously a factional contest. Under normal conditions pursuant to the municipal charter, the results of the election would have been that Manly and Compton would become members of the City Commission. In fact the then-incumbent City Commission, which included three of the appellants, formally met on May 7, 1954, canvassed the ballots and certified the results of the election. On June 15, 1954, on the occasion of the first meeting of the City Commission subsequent to the election, the appellees Manly and Compton, having theretofore taken the oath of office, attended the meeting with the expectation of performing the duties of City Commissioners. At this point the so-called 'Bloomfield group' declared Manly ineligible to hold the office of City Commissioner on the ground that at the time of the election he was not a qualified elector of the community for reasons hereinafter pointed out; that his election was, therefore, of no consequence at all, and in the judgment of this group, it was necessary to fill the vacancy created by the alleged ineligibility of Mr. Manly, and in order to fill such alleged vacancy, Mr. Rodefeld was elected to a position on the municipal commission.

The contesting groups thereupon withdrew to opposite sides of the same meeting room. In an atmosphere reminiscent of the Hatfields and the McCoys challenging each other from opposite sides of the valley, each group proceeded to appoint its own city department heads. Out of the welter of feuding that resulted, the City of St. Petersburg Beach, like Noah's Ark, had two of everything; including city clerks, police chiefs, patrolmen, city attorneys, city judges and building inspectors. The 'Bloomfield group' retained control of the Police Department patrol car, as well as the books and records of the city, but this did not produce any dismay on the part of the department heads appointed by the 'Manly group'. Apparently the respective police officers patroled opposite sides of the street, the respective city attorneys rendered varied and conflicting opinions as to the authority of the various officials. Offenders against law and order were faced with possible trial by two municipal judges, and the Gulf Beach Bank, where public funds were on deposit, refused, for obvious reasons, to honor any checks at all because the officials at the bank did not know whose check to honor.

It cannot be denied that when this suit was filed, as alleged in the complaint and admitted in the answer, 'business affairs and government of the City of St. Petersburg Beach, Florida, are in a state of chaos and confusion'. The complaint was filed as a step toward eliminating the chaos. This leads us back to what appears to be the controlling question to wit: the eligibility of Mr. Manly to run for municipal office in the City of St. Petersburg Beach.

Manly's eligibility was questioned on the ground that he was not an elector of the city within the contemplation of applicable statutes at the time that he became a candidate for office early in 1954. The Circuit Judge, after hearing all of the testimony, concluded that Mr. Manly was a qualified elector and therefore eligible to hold office in the city. Appellants seek reversal on several grounds, the principal one, however, being founded on certain provisions of the city charter which require that municipal officials shall be qualified electors of the municipality. Another section of the charter provides that 'all electors shall be qualified according to the laws of the State of Florida or special acts applicable to electors in the County of Pinellas.'

Appellants further contend that under Section 97.041, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., in order to be a qualified elector among other things a person must be 'a permanent resident living in Florida for one year and residing in the county where he wishes to register for six months'. Furthermore, appellants refer to Article VI, § 1 of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A., which fixes a very similar requirement, and also reference is made to Chapter 24214, Acts of 1947, governing registration in Pinellas County where in addition to the other requirements, it is stipulated that to be an elector in a municipality one must be a resident of such municipality for three months. As other grounds for reversal appellants contend that the provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act are not available to the appellees to test the title to an office inasmuch as the appropriate procedure, so they contend, would have been quo warranto, and furthermore that in this contest the burden should have been upon the plaintiffs below to establish that Mr. Manly was a qualified elector rather than upon the defendants below to prove that he was not.

As we shall see, the principal question to be resolved is whether Manly was a qualified elector on May 4, 1954, when at least 262 of his fellow-townsmen though he was by voting for him for City Commissioner.

It becomes necessary to summarize briefly the history of Mr. Manly's residence in Florida. It appears that he and his wife visited St. Petersburg Beach in 1949. They returned again in 1950, and bought a piece of real estate. They were visitors again in 1951. It then appears that early in 1952 they decided to build a motel on the land which they had previously purchased, constructing one apartment in the motel for themselves pursuant to a decision to move to St. Petersburg Beach to make their future home. Early in 1952 application was made for a construction loan at a local savings and loan association, and the motel was completed in August, 1952.

The Manlys, prior to the completion of the motel, placed on the market for sale their home in Michigan. They actually sold it in September, 1952, and put the proceeds of the sale into their Florida property or in Florida banks. Prior thereto Mrs. Manly had moved to the apartment in the motel and had brought with her from Michigan all of the personal effects of herself and her husband such as dishes, lamps and other personal belongings accumulated over a lifetime. They sold the bulk of their furniture with their home in Michigan. In August, 1952, they closed out two bank accounts in Michigan and immediately opened an account in Florida. Ever since the construction of the motel they have retained the same motel apartment as their residence according to their original plan. The Manlys filed their joint income tax return for 1952 income in the Jacksonville District Office of the Internal Revenue Department, the same having been filed between January and March, 1953. Similarly in 1954 they filed their income tax return in the same office for the 1953 income taxes. In both of these returns they showed their residence to be at the address of the motel above described. Both husband and wife testified positively that they decided to become legal residents of Florida on December 1, 1952, when Mr. Manly was in Florida. Their testimony is positive, consistent and unequivocal on this point. It appears that on or about that date they concluded that the motel cost them more than they had anticipated and was not yet producing...