Bloomfield v. Weakland

• Decision Date: 10 December 2008
• Docket Number: 003497.,003480.,A134685.
• Citation: 224 Or. App. 433,199 P.3d 318
• Parties: Stefan D. BLOOMFIELD; Molly M. Bloomfield; Ruth H. Bloomfield and Richard Andrew Bloomfield, trustees of the William H. and Ruth H. Bloomfield Trust U/A dated July 9, 1980; Milosh Popovich, trustee of the Milosh Popovich Trust dated January 29, 1991; J. Michael Schwab; Steven W. Brookshire; Robert M. Cortwright; Joseph S. Cortwright; Cascadia Investment Co., LLC, an Oregon limited liability company; Lin L. Craft, trustee of the Lin L. Craft Trust dated December 23, 1998; Bruce G. Blain; Patricia A. Blain; Janet Yarbrough; Dokay, LLC, an Oregon limited liability company; Dennis L. Pike and Kathryn L. Pike, as trustees of the Dennis and Kathryn Pike Family Trust dated April 5, 1999; Marilyn J. Thompson; Gary J. Jones; Sarah D. Wright; John Buchner; Kathleen L. Buchner, fka Kathleen L. Weswig; Robert Dean Jones and Hilda M. Jones, as trustees of the Hilda M. Jones Trust; and Bloomfield Associates, a California limited partnership, Plaintiffs-Respondents, and Sarah K. Chartz and Brian D. Tooley, Plaintiffs, v. Jean Marie WEAKLAND, Defendant-Appellant. Sarah K. Chartz and Brian D. Tooley, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Jean Marie Weakland, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

199 P.3d 318

224 Or. App. 433

Stefan D. BLOOMFIELD; Molly M. Bloomfield; Ruth H. Bloomfield and Richard Andrew Bloomfield, trustees of the William H. and Ruth H. Bloomfield Trust U/A dated July 9, 1980; Milosh Popovich, trustee of the Milosh Popovich Trust dated January 29, 1991; J. Michael Schwab; Steven W. Brookshire; Robert M. Cortwright; Joseph S. Cortwright; Cascadia Investment Co., LLC, an Oregon limited liability company; Lin L. Craft, trustee of the Lin L. Craft Trust dated December 23, 1998; Bruce G. Blain; Patricia A. Blain; Janet Yarbrough; Dokay, LLC, an Oregon limited liability company; Dennis L. Pike and Kathryn L. Pike, as trustees of the Dennis and Kathryn Pike Family Trust dated April 5, 1999; Marilyn J. Thompson; Gary J. Jones; Sarah D. Wright; John Buchner; Kathleen L. Buchner, fka Kathleen L. Weswig; Robert Dean Jones and Hilda M. Jones, as trustees of the Hilda M. Jones Trust; and Bloomfield Associates, a California limited partnership, Plaintiffs-Respondents, and Sarah K. Chartz and Brian D. Tooley, Plaintiffs, v. Jean Marie WEAKLAND, Defendant-Appellant.

Sarah K. Chartz and Brian D. Tooley, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Jean Marie Weakland, Defendant-Appellant.

003480.

003497.

A134685.

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted on July 23, 2008.

Decided December 10, 2008.

George W. Kelly, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Thomas L. Gallagher, Jr., Corvallis, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents.

Before SCHUMAN, Presiding Judge, and ORTEGA, Judge, and CARSON, Senior Judge.

CARSON, S.J.

This is the fourth time that we are asked to consider issues arising out of a dispute among these same parties about the existence of an easement over defendant's ocean-front property in Lincoln County. In our most recent decision, we reversed and remanded a judgment of the trial court granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their claims for an implied easement for beach access over a path on defendant's property and an injunction preventing defendant from blocking plaintiffs' use of the easement. Bloomfield v. Weakland, 193 Or.App. 784, 92 P.3d 749 (2004), aff'd, 339 Or. 504, 123 P.3d 275 (2005) (Bloomfield I).¹

This appeal is from a judgment of the trial court on remand determining that plaintiffs have an express easement over defendant's property for beach access and enjoining defendant from barring their access. Among the rulings challenged on appeal are the trial court's decision to enjoin defendant from preventing plaintiffs' use of the easement and its rejection of defendant's bona fide purchaser defense. We review those rulings de novo. Phair v. Walker, Coe, 277 Or. 141, 145, 559 P.2d 882 (1977); D'Abbracci v. Shaw-Bastian, 201 Or.App. 108, 117, 117 P.3d 1032 (2005) (claim for injunctive relief for interference with easement rights is equitable in nature and reviewed de novo). However, central to the dispute is the effect of a notation on a 1957 plat showing a "Private Walk Way" over defendant's property from a public street to the beach. The trial court determined that the notation created an express easement. That is a legal determination that we review for errors of law. Hunnell v. Roseburg Resources Co., 183 Or.App. 228, 232, 51 P.3d 680, rev. den., 335 Or. 114, 61 P.3d 256 (2002); Watson v. Banducci, 158 Or.App. 223, 230, 973 P.2d 395 (1999) (construction of scope of easement is a question of law).

The facts are set out in detail in our most recent decision in this case. Bloomfield I, 193 Or.App. at 787-90, 92 P.3d 749. We set them forth here again as necessary to resolve the issues raised on this appeal. As plaintiffs properly remind us, because the last appeal was from rulings on summary judgment, in stating the facts in Bloomfield I, we viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, the nonmoving party. Now, as previously noted, our review is de novo. We note, additionally, however, that this appeal returns to us on a somewhat different substantive footing. Initially, plaintiffs sought a declaration that they had an implied easement; on remand, the trial court allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint to conform to its ruling that plaintiffs had established an express easement. One of the issues that we will address in this opinion is whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing plaintiffs to amend the complaint after trial to include that claim.

Plaintiffs and defendant are owners of lots in a subdivision, Sea Woods Park. Seven of the lots, including Lot 14, are ocean-front lots. A 14-foot cliff separates the subdivision from the beach. All the deeds to the subdivision lots share a common chain of title, from Charles LaBarre, who purchased the property in 1935, and the LaBarre heirs,² who inherited the property from him in 1954. Until roads into the property were developed, family members would reach the property from the beach by climbing a ladder and using a path in substantially the same location as the Private Walk Way.

The heirs partitioned the property in 1955, and, on February 5, 1957, they recorded a plat for the subdivision, filed in Book 9, Page 7, Plat Records of Lincoln County. The plat depicts the dimensions of the individual lots and the widths of the streets in the Sea Woods Park subdivision. The plat also depicts the location of a Private Walk Way, 10 feet in width, running from the southwesterly corner of Lot 14 as it joins the street known as Sea Woods Terrace, along the southwesterly line of Lot 14 to the westerly border of the plat. The Private Walk Way is delineated by a dashed line within the solid lines of Lot 14. Sea Woods Terrace is a dedicated public street within Sea Woods Park. The Private Walk Way connected to a stairway down to the beach and is in approximately the same location as the path that the LaBarre family members formerly used to gain access to and from their individual parcels. The parties agree that the Private Walk Way is not expressly dedicated as a public path or right-of-way. By four warranty deeds recorded June 18, 1957, the LaBarre heirs divided the lots of Sea Woods Park among themselves, expressly cross-referencing in the deeds the plat recorded in Book 9, Page 7 of the Lincoln County Plat Records.

Defendant, whose chain of title is through Corinne LaBarre, purchased her property, Lot 14, in 1972. The deed made no mention of an easement and described the property as "free of all encumbrances exc[ept] of record." The deed did not cross-reference the plat. Defendant did, however, learn of the plat and acquired a copy of it before she purchased the property. On a tour of the property, she saw the path and the stairs down to the beach and asked the sellers of Lot 14 the significance of a "Private" sign that they had placed on the path. The sellers told her that the sign was meant to notify others that the path was theirs, although they allowed neighbors to use it. Defendant was aware that others in the subdivision were using the path. Defendant's lawyer and a real estate agent reviewed the plat and researched Lincoln County records and found no record of an easement or encumbrance on Lot 14.

In fact, two of the pre-plat deeds to the LaBarre heirs, encompassing what later became Lots 4, 5, and 6, described an appurtenant easement "for ingress and egress" over a 10-foot strip of land on what became Lot 14. Later conveyances made no express mention of an easement along the path.

After defendant purchased Lot 14, she continued to let neighbors use the Private Walk Way, but she believed that she had full ownership and control of it. In 1991, sand under the stairway was partly washed away, and, since that time, defendant has refused to allow anyone other than Craft, the owner of nearby Lots 5 and 6, to use the walkway.

Plaintiffs brought this action, seeking a declaration that they have an appurtenant easement over the Private Walk Way, including the stairway, by virtue of the plat notation that is cross-referenced in the four original deeds in their chain of title, and other evidence showing an intention on the part of the LaBarre heirs to create an easement for access to the beach to all subdivision owners. They further sought to enjoin defendant from preventing them from using the easement.

The trial court agreed with plaintiffs and entered the requested declaration and injunction. Defendant appeals, raising five assignments of error: (1) The trial court erred in declaring that plaintiffs have an express easement over Lot 14; (2) the court erred in rejecting defendant's bona fide purchaser defense; (3) the court erred in including an injunction as a part of its judgment; (4) the court erred in allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint, post-trial, to add a claim for express easement; and (5) the court erred in denying defendant's motion for partial summary judgment as to plaintiff Craft on the ground that her claims were barred by claim preclusion.

We first address defendant's contention, raised in her fifth assignment of error, that Craft's claims are barred by claim preclusion. In Craft I, Craft established an easement interest in the Private Walk Way, appurtenant to Lots 5 and 6, through an express grant in her deed to those lots. We affirmed that judgment without opinion. Craft v. Weakland, 145 Or.App. 482, 928 P.2d 366 (1996) (Craft I). In Craft I, Craft made no mention of her ownership of Lots 17, 18, and 25, although she owned those lots at the time. In the instant case, Craft seeks to establish an easement appurtenant to Lots 17, 18, and 25.

In Bloomfield I, these same plaintiffs sought implied easements over the Private Walk Way. By way of affirmative defense and in her motion for summary judgment, defendant asserted that the implied easement claims of all the plaintiffs, including Craft, were barred by claim preclusion because plaintiffs, including Craft as trustee, were in privity with Craft when she brought her easement...