Bloss v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1987
• Citation: 126 A.D.2d 804,510 N.Y.S.2d 304
• Parties: Edward BLOSS et al., Respondents, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 304

510 N.Y.S.2d 304

126 A.D.2d 804

Edward BLOSS et al., Respondents, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Jan. 8, 1987.

Maynard, O'Connor & Smith (Christine Kirwin Krackeler, of counsel), Albany, for appellant.

E. Stewart Jones (Jeffrey Kyle Anderson, of counsel), Troy, for respondents.

Before KANE, J.P., and MAIN, MIKOLL, YESAWICH and HARVEY, JJ.

HARVEY, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Walsh, Jr., J.), entered January 24, 1986 in Fulton County, which denied defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs' demand for discovery and granted plaintiffs' cross motion to compel discovery.

In May 1981, plaintiffs commenced this action against defendant seeking damages caused when the jeep plaintiff Edward Bloss was driving, while employed by the United States Army, overturned. Defendant allegedly designed, manufactured and sold the jeep to the Army. In preparation for the instant lawsuit, and others pending against it, defendant retained a law firm in Detroit, Michigan, to review and index the approximately 76 boxes of documents relating to the design and development of the vehicle in question. An attorney from the Detroit firm, along with two or three paralegals, spent approximately a month reviewing the documents. As part of this review, two indexes of the documents were prepared.

In January 1985, Jeffrey Anderson, an attorney from the law firm representing plaintiffs, traveled from Troy, New York, to Dearborn, Michigan, to review the aforementioned documents. Upon arrival in Dearborn, Anderson was allegedly informed that he would only be allowed two days to review the documents and that, if additional time was needed, he would have to make subsequent trips at plaintiffs' expense. Anderson's cursory review of the documents revealed that they had been indexed. He was subsequently informed that between 25 to 30 boxes of documents had been removed as defendant claimed they were either attorney's work product or contained confidential attorney-client information.

Plaintiffs subsequently served a discovery notice upon defendant seeking production of its indexes. Defendant moved for a protective order and plaintiffs cross-moved to compel production of the indexes. Special Term granted plaintiffs' cross motion and ordered defendant to produce the indexes in question. The court permitted defendant to redact any information which it, in good faith, believed to contain conclusions or opinions of its attorneys. Defendant appealed.

Defendant asserts that the indexes are privileged matter (CPLR 3101[b]), attorney's work product (CPLR 3101[c] ) or material prepared for litigation (CPLR 3101[d] ). Initially, we note that trial courts are clothed with broad discretion in supervising the scope of disclosure (Allen v. Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 406, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449, 235 N.E.2d 430; Spinosa v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 114 A.D.2d 633, 634, 494 N.Y.S.2d 468). The party seeking to prevent disclosure bears the burden of establishing that the information sought is immune from disclosure (Central Natl. Bank v. Thorington, 115 A.D.2d 829, 830, 495 N.Y.S.2d 787).

Turning first to whether the indexes constituted attorney's work product, the term "work product" has been narrowly construed to include only...