Blote v. First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Rapid City

• Decision Date: 18 November 1987
• Docket Number: No. 15699,15699
• Citation: 422 N.W.2d 834
• Parties: 4 IER Cases 311 Larry L. BLOTE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF RAPID CITY, Defendant and Appellee. . Considered on Briefs
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 834

422 N.W.2d 834

4 IER Cases 311

Larry L. BLOTE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF RAPID CITY,

Defendant and Appellee.

No. 15699.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs Nov. 18, 1987.

Decided April 27, 1988.

Hermon B. Walker, Rapid City, for plaintiff and appellant.

Michael M. Hickey of Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Simmons, Rapid City, for defendant and appellee.

HENDERSON, Justice.

ACTION/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff/Appellant Larry L. Blote (Blote) initiated (a) wrongful discharge and (b) defamation actions against Defendant/Appellee First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Rapid City (Federal) after dismissal from his job. The circuit court for Pennington County granted a motion by Federal for summary judgment regarding Blote's claims, concluding that no material questions of fact existed and Federal was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Blote appeals, asserting error in four regards:

(1) Federal's personnel manual established an employment contract which terms Federal violated in dismissing him;

(2) Summary judgment was improper regarding Blote's claim under a prima facie tort theory;

(3) Federal's statements, during unemployment insurance proceedings, that he was terminated for work-related misconduct was defamation; and

(4) Allegations that he had taken kickbacks which were discussed among Federal's directors and officers constituted defamation.

We disagree and accordingly affirm the circuit court. These four issues are treated fully below.

FACTS

Blote was initially hired by Federal in 1971 and was made a vice-president in 1979. His salary was determined on an annual basis, but no written employment contract was signed at any time by the parties. Federal's bylaws provided:

5. [T]he board of directors may appoint such additional officers and such employees and agents as it may from time to time determine. The term of office of all officers shall be one year or until their respective successors are elected and qualified; but any officer may be removed at any time by the board of directors. (Emphasis supplied.)

7. Powers of the board--The board of directors shall have power--

* * *

* * *

(c) To fix the compensation of directors, officers, and employees; and to remove any officer or employee at any time with or without cause [.] ¹ (Emphasis supplied.)

In 1977, Federal promulgated a personnel manual. This manual contained no procedures regarding termination except passing references in its "Vacation" and "Leave for Personal Reasons" sections, which respectively provided:

Upon separation an employee's unused vacation entitlement ... will be paid except in cases of discharge for cause.

If employees remain on leave of absence for more than six (6) months, or if they accept employment elsewhere, without sanction of the Association, their employment with the Association shall be deemed to have terminated.

A grievance procedure was set out "to assure that all employees receive fair and equitable treatment...."

Several of Federal's departments began to incur large financial losses in 1983. This trend continued, creating acrimony between the Installment Loan Department (ILD) managed by Blote, and other units, especially the Loan Service Department (LSD), whose head Blote blamed for the losses. By March 1985, relations between ILD and LSD had deteriorated to the point that an outside agency reported to Federal's board of directors that the departments were at an impasse, reducing income and employee morale.

On March 30, 1985, three days after being told that he was going to be given control of some of his internal rival's operation, Blote was informed that the transfer was stopped because the board of directors disapproved. He was later asked to resign, or he would be fired. Blote refused to resign. ²

Blote was fired on April 18, 1985, pursuant to a resolution unanimously passed by the board. This resolution specified that Blote was terminated because of the board's loss of confidence in him, financial losses, his failure to perform duties his own analysis called for, and other problems. The board allowed him compensation for unused vacation pay, notwithstanding the personnel manual's prohibition against such remuneration in terminations for cause.

After termination, Blote applied for unemployment compensation. Federal resisted, unsuccessfully, asserting that he had been fired for work-related misconduct. The South Dakota Unemployment Insurance Division determined that the alleged misconduct (failure to keep his expenses down and to follow underwriting guidelines) did not fall within statutory definitions (SDCL 61-6-14), and allowed his claim. Blote later heard from Federal employees that rumors of his having taken kickbacks had been discussed by Federal's directors and officers. There was no evidence that this kickback story circulated outside Federal itself.

DECISION

ISSUE I. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

ISSUE II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In reviewing summary judgments, we premise our decision on the principle that affirmance of such a judgment is proper if there exists any basis which would support the trial court's ruling. Ruple v. Weinaug, 328 N.W.2d 857 (S.D.1983); Uken v. Sloat, 296 N.W.2d 540, 542 (S.D.1980). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Blote, we conclude that the summary judgment entered below was correct.

Blote argues that Federal's personnel manual created an employment contract under whose terms he could only be fired with cause. ³ We disagree.

Analytically, this case is most similar to Tombollo v. Dunn, 342 N.W.2d 23 (S.D.1984), which concerned an employee terminable at will by statute. The lack of detailed procedures distinguishes it from Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D.1983), where the employer's manual contained an exhaustive list of violations which would result in disciplinary action, and a statement disavowing discharge without just cause. Corporate bylaws are "the rules and regulations or private laws enacted by the corporation to regulate, govern, and control its own actions, affairs, and concerns, and its shareholders, directors, and officers." H. Henn & J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, § 133, at 306 (3d ed. 1983) (footnote omitted). The bylaws, in this case, provide that officers can be terminated at any time, for any reason. They are the functional equivalent of SDCL 9-10-9, which operated to remove the presumption of annual hiring, set out in SDCL 60-1-3, in Ruple, 328 N.W.2d at 859. While such bylaws may sometimes be overridden by an employment contract, it must fairly appear that the contract is intended to do so. 18B Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 1432 (1985); Annot., Bylaw of Corporation Authorizing Removal of Officer, Agent, or Employee at Any Time, as Affecting Contract of Employment for a Specified Period, 145 A.L.R. 312, 317 (1943). There is no indication of such an intent. As there is no signed contract, no provisions in the personnel manual establishing exclusive procedures for termination, and the bylaws establish an at-will relationship, Blote's employment was governed by SDCL 60-4-4: "An employment having no specified term may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other, unless otherwise provided by statute." See also Hopes v. Black Hills Power & Light Co., 386 N.W.2d 490, 491 (S.D.1986); Tombollo, 342 N.W.2d at 25-26.

The record indicates that Federal terminated Blote in accordance with its bylaws. Blote argues that the decision to fire him was made when the board was improperly constituted of only four members. This is irrelevant. The board was properly composed of seven members when he was fired on April 18, 1985.

In short, Blote was a terminable at-will employee. No contractual provision altered his status. His firing was done in accordance with Federal's bylaws, and was amply justified by the facts in his own deposition: inability to work effectively with his co-workers and superiors, broken guidelines, and participation in internal strife within Federal. No question of fact presents itself on this record, and the court correctly applied the law. SDCL 15-6-56(c) states that summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with any affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Hopes v. Black Hills Power & Light Co., 386 N.W.2d 490 (S.D.1986); Wilson v. Great N. Ry. Co., 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19 (1968).

Blote's claim regarding wrongful discharge under prima facie tort theory has no validity as he was an employee at will. Tombollo, 342 N.W.2d at 26; Swanger v. National Juvenile Law Center, 714 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Mo.App.1986). The circuit court was correct in granting summary judgment to Federal on the wrongful discharge claims.

Additionally, considering Federal's birth and life via federal charter under the auspices of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, we note the decision of Inglis v. Feinerman, 701 F.2d 97 (9th Cir.1983) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040, 104 S.Ct. 703, 79 L.Ed.2d 168 (1984), with its core holding that attempts to create employment rights from independent sources such as personnel manuals are void under the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (12 U.S.C. § 1421, et seq.), which authorizes dismissal of bank officers "at pleasure" of the bank (12 U.S.C. § 1432(a)) and preempts state laws. Inglis, 701 F.2d at 98-99. State jurisdictions seem to blend their holdings with this core ruling of the Ninth Circuit. See Berry v. American Fed. Sav., 730 P.2d 905 (Colo.App.1986) (affirming a summary judgment against a savings and loan association employee); Shepherd v. Jones, 136 Cal.App.3d 1049, 1058, 186 Cal.Rptr. 708, 712-13 (1982) (adopting Inglis ' interpretation of "at pleasure").

ISSUES III. & IV. DEFAMATION

Blote's assertions of defamation...