Blount v. Davey
| Decision Date | 13 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:16-cv-01653-DAD-SKO HC,1:16-cv-01653-DAD-SKO HC |
| Parties | TYRIN LEE BLOUNT, Petitioner, v. DAVID DAVEY, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINE TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
(Doc. 22)
Petitioner, Tyrin Lee Blount, is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. Petitioner raises five grounds for habeas relief: (1) the pretrial identification procedures were unduly suggestive; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence in violation of Petitioner's rights pursuant to Miranda1; (3) the trial court erred by conducting ex parte communication with the jury; (4) improper admission of evidence; and (5) insufficient evidence. The Court referred the matter to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 and 304. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny habeas relief.
On April 10, 2012, shortly after 9:00 a.m., a young African-America male approached Sue Lopez's ("Lopez") front door, knocked loudly, and repeatedly rang the doorbell. Lopez and her adult daughter, Sarah Andrews ("Andrews"), looked at the man through the door's peephole. After 30 seconds, the man walked to a gold, mid-sized car parked on the street in front of the house. Two other African-American men were in the vehicle and all three drove away.
A short time later, a young African-American man jumped over the fence into Lopez's backyard. Lopez called 911. Finding a dog in the backyard, the man jumped back over the fence and walked towards a street behind Lopez's house. Through the slats in her backyard fence, Lopez could see the same gold vehicle parked on the street behind her residence, Rolling Ridge Drive.
Andrews and Lopez observed three men walk toward their house from Rolling Ridge Drive. The men proceeded to the front door, rang the doorbell, and knocked very loudly. Andrews looked at them through the peephole, while Lopez peeked through a side window two or three feet away from the men. Lopez then looked through the main window, which was seven or eight feet away from the men.
Lopez and Andrews retreated from the door to hide, but after hearing the front door kicked open, Andrews came out and discovered the three men inside the home. Andrews stood eight feet from the men and looked at their faces for 10 seconds.
The three men fled through the back sliding glass door into the backyard. It took the men approximately 20 seconds to exit the house. Two of the men jumped the backyard fence to the west and the third man jumped the fence to the south.
Bakersfield police officers arrived at or around the time the men were fleeing from the house. The police officers began a search and a police officer located Petitioner walking in a field approximately one-half mile south of Lopez's home. The officer approached Petitioner in his patrol car and heard him speaking on his cellular phone. Petitioner said, "It's over, Cuzz." Petitioner ran away from the officer, but was apprehended shortly thereafter.
Petitioner's co-defendants, Franklin Lamar Randle ("Randle") and Clifford Lee Jackson, Jr. ("Jackson"), were found together in a backyard three or four houses to the west of Lopez's house.
Later that morning, the police conducted field identifications by individually showing Petitioner, Randle, and Jackson to Andrews and Lopez. Both Andrews and Lopez identified the three co-defendants as the men who broke into their house.
Officers located the gold vehicle parked on Rolling Ridge Drive, behind the Lopez house. Petitioner's identification was inside the vehicle and he had a key in his possession which operated the car.
At trial, neither Andrews nor Lopez could describe the suspects' facial features on the day of the burglary, but both described the clothing worn by the suspects. At times, their testimony conflicted regarding the suspects' clothing and how the events unfolded on the day. Andrews was able to identify each of the co-defendants as the men she encountered in her home and was "sure" of her trial identifications. Andrews also confirmed the co-defendants were the same men she identified on the morning of the burglary.
Lopez had difficulty identifying the co-defendants. She testified about never having seen the three men inside her house. Through her bedroom window, Lopez saw the three men flee into her backyard and jump over the fence, but she only saw one face for a few seconds.
Both Andrews and Lopez identified a picture of Petitioner's car as the vehicle they saw outside the residence before the incident.
Lopez's neighbor, Anthony Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") and his girlfriend, Brittany Cocanower ("Cocanower"), also testified at trial. They both observed the gold vehicle parked in front of Lopez's house on the morning of the incident occupied by three African-American men.
Rodriguez testified that he saw people get out of the vehicle and knock on Lopez's door before returning to the car and driving around the corner. Rodriguez saw the men walk back to the door and heard them kick it in. He initially identified the co-defendants as the three men he saw on the morning of the incident. However, on cross-examination he admitted having only seen two individuals approach the Lopez residence and he believed it was either Petitioner or Randle whom he had never seen before. He stated he initially identified all the co-defendants in court because they were the people arrested by the police after the incident and because he confirmed it with his girlfriend, Cocanower.
Cocanower identified a photograph of Petitioner's vehicle as the vehicle she saw in front of the Lopez residence. She saw a man exit the vehicle and approach Lopez's house before returning a minute or two later, and then saw the vehicle drive away. She next heard a lot of noise at the Lopez residence, like someone kicking something, and saw a man run through her backyard. She believed a second man might have been present in her backyard, but she did not see his face. Cocanower was not asked to identify the co-defendants in court.
Officer Brian Holcombe ("Holcombe") of the Bakersfield Police Department testified as the prosecution's gang expert. He discussed the history of the gang which co-defendants were alleged to be a part of, the Country Boy Crips, its pattern of criminal activity, and certain predicate offenses its members had committed. Based on a review of tattoos, arrest records, street checks, and booking statements, Holcombe opined the co-defendants were each active members of theCountry Boy Crips as of the date of the Lopez burglary.
The jury found the co-defendants guilty of felony burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 460(a)), and promoting felony street gang conduct (Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(a)). The jury found true for each co-defendant that a person other than an accomplice was present during the commission of the burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 667.5(c)(21)), but found not true that the burglary was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)).
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that Petitioner had suffered a prior conviction within the meaning of California's three strikes law (Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(c)-(j), 1170.12(a)-(f)), that the prior conviction qualified as a prior serious felony (Cal. Penal Code § 667(a)), and that Petitioner had served a prior prison term (Cal. Penal Code § 667.5(b)).
Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 17 years for the felony robbery conviction, and an aggregate prison term of 12 years for the felony street gang conduct conviction, which was stayed.
On June 18, 2015, the California Court of Appeal ("Court of Appeal") affirmed the judgment. The Court of Appeal denied Petitioner's petition for rehearing on July 10, 2015. The California Supreme Court denied review on September 23, 2015.
Thereafter, Petitioner filed various state petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the state superior court on February 5, 2016, which was denied on June 3, 2016. On June 21, 2016, he filed a petition with the Court of Appeal, which was denied on July 21, 2016.
Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus before this Court on November 2, 2016. On March 6, 2017, the Court granted Petitioner's motion to stay and abey the proceedings to exhaust his unexhausted claims in state court.
On March 20, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court, which was denied on May 17, 2017.
Petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court on June 19, 2017, and the Court lifted the stay on June 22, 2017. Respondent filed an answer to the petition on August 21, 2017.
A person in custody as a result of the judgment of a state court may secure relief through a petition for habeas corpus if the custody violates the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed thereafter. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). Under the statutory terms, the petition in this case is governed by AEDPA's provisions because it was filed April 24, 1996.
Habeas corpus is neither a substitute for a direct appeal nor a device for federal review of the merits of a guilty verdict rendered in state court. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). Habeas corpus relief is intended to address only "extreme malfunctions" in state criminal justice proceedings. Id. Under AEDPA, a petitioner can obtain habeas corpus relief only if he can...
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