Blount v. Miss. Dep't of Human Servs.

• Decision Date: 05 June 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14cv336-DPJ-FKB
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
• Parties: WINDELL C. BLOUNT, et al. PLAINTIFFS v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al. DEFENDANTS

WINDELL C. BLOUNT, et al. PLAINTIFFS v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et al. DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14cv336-DPJ-FKB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI NORTHERN DIVISION

June 5, 2015

ORDER

This pro se civil-rights case is before the Court on Defendants Richard Berry, Linda Slaughter, Walley Naylor, Ruth Ann Williams, Nelene Ledford, Faye Petersen, Sequoia Eubanks, Andreal Harper, Vernassia Harbin, and Judy Price's ("Defendants") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [52].¹ For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the motion should be granted.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The four pro se Plaintiffs in this case, in general terms, complain about their treatment by the Mississippi Department of Human Services and its employees with respect to child custody, visitation, and child support matters. They purport to state claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for violations of their First, Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth Amendment rights. On January 5, 2015, the Court dismissed the claims against MDHS, including the official-capacity claims against the named defendants, based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. Order [43]. So the only claims remaining are asserted against the individual defendants in their individual capacities.

On February 11, 2015, Defendants filed their motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff Windell C. Blount, apparently purporting to act on behalf of all four pro se Plaintiffs,filed a non-substantive response to the motion [56, 57], and the Court entered a show-cause order giving Plaintiffs "one additional opportunity to respond to the pending motion," and cautioning them that each Plaintiff should file on his or her behalf or file a joint pleading signed by all Plaintiffs. Order [61]. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed additional non-substantive responses [62, 63], which were signed by each Plaintiff. Having reviewed the submissions and the applicable case law, the Court is prepared to rule.

II. Standard

In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the "court accepts 'all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555 (citations and footnote omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In this case, Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se. "It is well-established that 'pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (citing Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981)). "However, regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or is represented by counsel, 'conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.'" Id. (citing S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001) (additional citation omitted)).

III. Analysis

A. Claims of Plaintiffs James Evans and Wanda Kilgore

All of the allegations made by Plaintiffs James Evans and Wanda Kilgore are contained in paragraphs 30 through 33 of the Complaint:

30. The Department of Human Services has suspended James Evans['s] Driver License without just cause and this is a direct violation of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment which has caused him a hardship in case of emergencies and have disruptive his ability to find a job with limited public transportation available so that he can pay child support. The Agency is placing undue stress on Mr. Evans.

31. The Department of Human Services has committed fraud by never serving James M. Evans a Notice of Summons through Notice of Service and the Agency's actions have allegedly increased Mr. Evans arrears to arrest him. (Exhibit "U" is in the hands of the Defendant). This is a violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth Amendments et.als.

32. Wanda Kilgore's Driving License has been suspended for no good cause and has made it extremely difficult for her to make it to work, creating a hardship. (Exhibit "V" is in the hands of the Defendant). This is a violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth Amendments et.als.

33. Wanda Kilgore was wrongfully incarcerated in 2004 and 2009 fornonpayment of Child Support. Exhibit "W[.]"

Compl. [1] ¶¶ 30-33. All of these allegations concern alleged misconduct by MDHS, which has already been dismissed from this case. There is no factual allegation that any individual defendant was personally involved in the alleged violations of Evans's or Kilgore's constitutional rights. A § 1983 "plaintiff must establish that the defendant was either personally involved in the deprivation or that his wrongful actions were causally connected to the deprivation." James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008). Because neither Evans nor Kilgore has alleged that any remaining defendant was personally involved in the alleged suspensions of their driver's licenses, their claims are dismissed.

B. Claims of Windell Blount and Christopher Kelly-Patton

1. Claims Against MDHS

A number of Blount's and Kelly-Patton's allegations similarly fail to include a factual connection to any individual defendant. See Compl. [1] ¶¶ 7-8, 12, 14-16, 22, 25-28. For the same reasons justifying dismissal of Evans's and Kilgore's claims, the claims arising out of these allegations against MDHS are also dismissed.

2. Fifth Amendment Claims

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their Fifth Amendment rights. "The Fifth Amendment applies only to violations of constitutional rights by the United States or a federal actor." Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F. 3d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the defendants were acting under the authority of the federal government. The Fifth Amendment claims therefore fail.

3. Sixteenth Amendment Claims

Plaintiffs also assert violations of their rights under the Sixteenth Amendment. The Sixteenth Amendment permits Congress "to lay and collect taxes on income." U.S. Const. amend. XVI. Plaintiffs' allegations bear no connection to this provision, so the Sixteenth Amendment claims are dismissed.

4. Time-Barred Claims

"[Section] 1983 claims [are] subject to the Mississippi statute of limitations for general personal injury actions," which "requires plaintiffs to file an action within three years of [a claim's] date of accrual." Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 415 (5th Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on April 21, 2014, so any claims accruing before April 21, 2011, are time-barred. Plaintiff Blount's allegations concerning incidents that took place in June 2010 fall into this category and are therefore dismissed. See Compl. [1] ¶¶ 1-3.

5. Remaining Claims

Having disposed of the claims discussed above, and liberally construing the Complaint, the Court identifies the following remaining claims against Defendants: (1) a claim related to "Family Master" Faye Peterson's order directing Blount to pay child support and denying him visitation, Compl. [1] ¶ 5; (2) a claim that Ruth Ann Williams and Nelene Ledford interfered with Blount's access to visitation with his son, id. ¶ 13; (3) claims related to Judy Price's handling of Kelly-Patton's child-support payments, id. ¶¶ 17-19, 21, 24, 29; (4) a claim that Walley Naylor threatened to suspend Blount's driver's license, id. ¶ 6; (5) a claim related generally to Naylor's fitness for employment with the State, id. ¶¶ 9-11; and (6) a claim related to Richard Berry's alleged refusal to "assist[] plaintiffs . . . with answers to issues alleged in thiscomplaint," id. ¶ 2. Defendants assert, among other arguments, that they are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims.

"Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012). "When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense." McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam).

Because qualified immunity constitutes an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, the defense is intended to give government officials a right not merely to avoid standing trial, but also to avoid the burdens of such pretrial matters as discovery . . . as [i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government. Thus, adjudication of qualified immunity claims should occur at the earliest possible stage in litigation.

Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis deleted) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "If qualified immunity is raised in a motion to dismiss, 'it is the defendant's conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for "objective legal reasonableness."'" Senu-Oke v....