Blount v. Walker
Decision Date | 15 April 1889 |
Citation | 9 S.E. 804,31 S.C. 13 |
Parties | BLOUNT v. WALKER et al. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Richland county; HUDSON Judge.
The will of Mrs. Harris, construed in the opinion, is as follows:
Pope & Shand, for appellants.
Allen J. Green, for respondent.
The fundamental question in the case, as it seems to me, is, what estate did the trustee take under the will of Mrs. Harris? If he took an estate in fee, then there can be no intestacy, for the testatrix devises her whole estate to the trustee, and there was no room for any intestacy. If, however, the trustee took an estate only for the life of Mrs. Blount, then, as the ulterior limitations after the death of the life-tenant have failed by reason of her dying without issue, and without executing the power of appointment, there is a case of intestacy, and the estate, subject to the life-interest of Mrs. Blount, was then her sole heir, became vested in her, and the personal property passed under her will, while the real estate goes to her heirs; her will being sufficient to pass personal property, but insufficient to pass real estate. I think that, under a proper construction of the will of Mrs. Harris, the trustee took a fee. There can be no doubt that the testatrix intended to dispose of her entire estate, and did not intend to die intestate as to any portion thereof. This appears from the terms she has used, for she gives to the trustee "all the estate, real and personal, of which I may die seised, possessed, and entitled to." That this language imports an intention to dispose of the fee is shown by the case of Canedy v. Jones, 19 S.C. 300, 301, and the authorities there cited. Next, it will be observed that she uses technical terms which are act and appropriate to convey a fee,--"to my nephew Julius H. Walker, and his heirs, "and finally we observe that there is not residuary clause in the will, disclosing even an apprehension that she had left any portion of her estate undisposed of. We have then a case in which the testatrix has, in express terms, declared her purpose to dispose of her entire estate, which, the authorities above cited show, means not merely the entire corpus of the property, but the whole of her interest therein, which is conceded to have been a fee; and we find her using the most apt and appropriate technical words to convey such an interest,--to the trustee "and his heirs,"--and therefore I cannot doubt that she intended to confer a fee upon the trustee, and that she executed that intention in the most approved from of law. If this be so, then, as it seems to me, it follows inevitably that there could have been no intestacy. If the entire interest of the testatrix--the fee--passed to the trustee by the terms of the will, there could, of course, be nothing left to descend to the heirs or representatives; no intestacy.
It is said, however, that this being a devise to a trustee, who, it is conceded takes no beneficial interest, the well-settled rule is that, however ample may be the terms in which a devise to a trustee is made, he will only take such an estate as may be necessary to the complete execution of the trusts created; that a devise to a trustee and his heirs does not necessarily create in him an estate in fee, though the terms used are sufficient to create such, and estate; but that his estate will be measured by the purposes for which it was created, and will be cut down to such an estate as will be sufficient to serve those purposes. Conceding, for the purposes of this discussion, the correctness of that rule in its broadest extent, before it can have any practical application to this case, it would be necessary to show that the objects of the trust created by the will could be fully accomplished by an estate in the trustee less than a fee. We must therefore inquire into the objects of the trusts created. Without going into any detailed statement of these trusts which are minutely specified in the will, a copy of which will doubtless be embraced in the report of this case, it will be sufficient to say, in general terms, that the trustee was to hold the estate for the sole and separate use of Mrs. Blount during her life, in such a way as that the same could not be reached by her creditors, or disposed of by her, but with power in the trustee, upon her written request to sell the same or any part thereof, if he should deem it expedient to do so, and either reinvest the proceeds, "or else turn the same over to the said Mrs. Blount for her sole, separate, and absolute use, freed and discharged of all trusts." Now, while it may be conceded that, so far as what may be called the primary object of this trust--protecting the estate during the life of Mrs. Blount--is concerned, such object might be fully accomplished by placing an estate for the life of Mrs. Blount in the trustee, or cutting down his estate in fee to an estate purautre vie, yet I do not see how the next object--the power of...
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